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Georgia's Unconstitutional
Business Venue Provision:
A Kingdom with
Impermissible Borders
by Lucas Bradley*
I. INTRODUCTION

A sub-clause of Georgia's business venue statute, as construed in
October 2016, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.' That statute, section 14-2-510(b) of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),2 provides four venues (counties) in which
a company can be sued for an act or omission, depending on the kind of
act or omission at issue. The first three venue options apply equally to
in-state and out-of-state companies. 3 The fourth venue option does not.
This fourth option grants in-state companies an unwarranted advantage
compared to out-of-state companies and as a result, runs afoul of the
Constitution's Dormant (or Negative) Commerce Clause. 4
That fourth option allows a plaintiff to sue a company in the county
where the "cause of action originated."5 However, the Georgia General

*Attorney in the firm of Bouhan Falligant LLP, Savannah, Georgia. Duke University
(B.A., 2010); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., summa cum laude, 2013). The
Author wishes to thank Katie Croghan for support and thoughtful commentary, as well as
Rory A. Weeks for thoughtful critiques that substantially improved this Article's analysis.
Further thanks are extended to Lennon Haas and Todd M. Baiad. All errors or omissions
are, of course, my own.

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b) (2017).
3. These first three provisions allow for a suit against a business to be brought in: (1)
the county containing the company's registered office, (2) the county where a contract was
to be enforced or performed (for contract claims), and (3) any county where the company
has an office and committed a tort (for tort claims). O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(1)-(3) (2017).
4. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) (2017).
5. Id.
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Assembly realized this provision might be onerous for a corporate
defendant. For example, a company could be sued in a far-flung county
where the isolated event triggering a cause of action occurred, so the
company would constantly risk being "home-cooked" in remote and
hostile counties. Because of this risk, the provision contains a safety
valve for the corporate defendant. If the fourth venue option is the sole
statutory reason that venue is appropriate in a county, a company can
remove the suit back to its "principal place of business."6 Put simply, if a
company is only being sued in County X because County X is where an
incident occurred, it can remove the suit back to its home county in
Georgia.
The statue's plain language does not obviously discriminate between
in-state and out-of-state companies. But, in PandoraFranchising,LLC
v. Kingdom Retail Group, LLLP, 7 the Georgia Supreme Court held that
a company can only remove a suit back to its principal place of business
if its worldwide "principal place of business" is in Georgia.8 A company
whose worldwide principal place of business is out of state may not
remove a Georgia suit to its Georgia headquarters. Because of this
interpretation, a company with out-of-state headquarters lacks a crucial
litigation advantage that a company with its headquarters in Georgia
has.
The business venue provision thus conflicts with the Dormant
Commerce Clause. That clause proscribes any law that is passed with the
sole intent of disadvantaging foreign businesses-in other words, it
proscribes "simple economic protectionism" that inhibits interstate
trade.9 Moreover, even if a statute was not passed for simple economic
protectionism, the Dormant Commerce Clause still requires courts to
balance the government interest behind the statute against the net
negative effect on interstate trade it imposes.10
The interpretation of Georgia's business venue removal provision in
Pandora Franchisingfails both tests. It facially discriminates against
companies whose principal places of business are outside Georgia
without offering much, if anything, in the way of justification.
Accordingly, it is likely per se invalid. Even if the business venue removal
provision is not per se invalid, it denies a key litigation advantage to outof-state companies that it allows to in-state companies, and that
discrimination serves no compelling state purpose. The burdensome
6. Id.
7.
8.
9.
10.

299 Ga. 723, 791 S.E.2d 786 (2016).
Id. at 727, 791 S.E.2d at 789.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
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effects on out-of-state businesses are clear: Companies that litigate in
their home counties face lower transactional costs throughout litigation
and enjoy a home-turf advantage that can help win at trial and drive
down settlement values. Those companies also have at least two venue
options to choose from; if nothing else, a company can make a reasoned
choice between the venue where the alleged tort occurred and its home
county.
Under Pandora Franchising, out-of-state companies are denied all
these advantages." This Article will show that the limited justifications
that the Georgia General Assembly and the Georgia Supreme Court
offered for the decision are of little value (if any at all). Pandora
Franchisingthus subjects Georgia's business venue statute to a federal
constitutional challenge.
II. GEORGIA'S BUSINESS VENUE PROVISIONS AND PANDORA FRANCHISING
Two factors control where a party can bring a suit in Georgia:
jurisdiction and venue. 12 While jurisdiction determines whether a
defendant may constitutionally be sued in Georgia, venue determines the
county in which that defendant may be sued.13 Like other defendants,
businesses have a right under the Georgia Constitution to be sued in a
constitutionally and statutorily prescribed venue. 14
This Article does not address the well-established jurisdictional
parameters that apply to suits against businesses in Georgia.15 However,
after Pandora Franchising, venue for suits against businesses is an
important and open topic. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b) provides a set of four
potential venues in which a business can be sued. The first three venue
provisions are relatively straightforward. A domestic or foreign company
can be sued:
(1) in the county in Georgia where it maintains its registered office;
(2) in the county where a contract to be enforced was made or is to be
performed (for contract cases); or

11. See 299 Ga. at 723, 791 S.E.2d at 786.
12. See generally GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (prescribing constitutional venue); Innovative
Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat'l Bank of Ames, 279 Ga. 672, 673, 620 S.E.2d
352, 353 (2005).
13. See generally GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
14. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 6 (venue as to suits against corporations to be
prescribed by law); see also O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510 (2017) (prescribing those venues).
15. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 (2017) (Georgia's Long-Arm Statute); see also
Innovative Clinical, 279 Ga. at 675, 620 S.E.2d at 355.
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(3) "in the county where the cause of action originated, if the
corporation has an office and transacts business in that county" (for
tort cases). 16
For most other suits against companies, Georgia established a catch-

all rule, O.C.G.A.

§ 14-2-510(b)(4), which provides:

In actions for damages because of torts, wrong, or injury done, in the
county where the cause of action originated. If venue is based solely on
this paragraph, the defendant shall have the right to remove the action
to the county in Georgia where the defendant maintains its principal
place of business. 17
In other words, a litigant may sue a company in any Georgia county
where the company causes a harm, but if that is the only reason that
venue exists in that county, the company may remove the case back to
the "county in Georgia where [it] maintains its principal place of
business."18
That raises the question-does the "county in Georgia" where a
company maintains its "principal place of business" refer to: (1) the
company's worldwide principal place of business, if it happens to be in
Georgia; or (2) the company's principal place of doing business in
Georgia? If a company with a worldwide headquarters out of state
nevertheless maintains a large Georgia office in Atlanta, can it remove a
suit in a far-flung county back to that primary Georgia hub?
19
In the 2016 case, PandoraFranchising,
the Georgia Supreme Court
answered these questions. Kingdom Retail Group filed suit against
Pandora Franchising, a Maryland company, in Thomas County, Georgia
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4). Pandora Franchising removed the
case to Gwinnett County, Georgia, noting that Gwinnett was where it
''maintains its registered office as its principal place of business in
Georgia." The trial court allowed this removal, the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to
settle the interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4). 20
The Georgia Supreme Court held that Pandora Franchising was not
allowed to remove the case back to its primary Georgia place of doing
business. 2 1 The court reasoned that the principal place of business
described in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) is analogous to a corporation's
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(1)-(3).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4).
Id.
299 Ga. at 727, 791 S.E.2d at 789.
Id. at 724, 791 S.E.2d at 787.
Id. at 730, 791 S.E.2d at 791.
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"nerve center" for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction and that a
company has only one such nerve center 22:
Applying the rules of statutory construction . . . we conclude the

language of subsection (b)(4) confers the right of a company to remove
an action in which venue is based upon this subsection only to the
county in Georgia where the defendant maintains its worldwide
principal place of business. If that place is not located in a Georgia
county, then no right to remove is granted.23
The court's analysis was largely textualist, exploring in detail whether
its interpretation "renders the phrase 'in Georgia' meaningless" and
comparing the phrasing and linguistic structure of the statute to other
Georgia venue provisions. 24 The supreme court attempted to account for
the rationale of the Georgia General Assembly-the court said that
allowing companies to remove to its principal place of business in Georgia
would "be subject to manipulation and forum shopping, which appears to
be contrary to the purpose for which this subsection was added." 25
Weighing all of these factors, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that
removal was an advantage reserved only for companies whose worldwide
principal places of business were within Georgia; companies with out-ofstate headquarters were simply out of luck.
Filtered through the Pandora Franchising lens, O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-510(b)(4) now allows a Georgia company that is subject to venue
in Georgia County X, solely because the cause of action against it
originated there, to remove that case to the county containing its
principal place of business. However, a company whose worldwide
headquarters are in Tennessee, subject to venue in the same County X
for the same tort, must remain in the hostile county. As explored in
subsequent sections, this arrangement does not just seem unfair-it is
unconstitutional under the federal Constitution's Commerce Clause.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Long ago, the Supreme Court of the United States judicially engrafted
the Dormant Commerce Clause onto the Constitution's Commerce
Clause. 26 It constitutes a "silent command that the states abstain from

22. Id. at 725, 791 S.E.2d at 788.
23. Id. at 727, 791 S.E.2d at 789.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 728-29, 791 S.E.2d at 790 (noting that former venue provisions allowed
corporations to manipulate venue by designating the county in which registered agent
resided).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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discriminating against interstate commerce."2 7 Specifically, the clause
"forbids States and their subdivisions [from] regulat [ing] interstate
commerce"28 or trying to advantage in-state economic interests at the
expense of out-of-state interests. As the Supreme Court put it in 1949:
"This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the
gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy, including the vital
power of erecting customs barriers against foreign competition, has as its
29
corollary that the states are not separable economic units."

"The scope of the dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial creation."30
Although the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has time and again held that it
"also imposes limitations on the States in the absence of congressional
action." 31 As a federal creature, the Dormant Commerce Clause is
supreme over state law. Georgia's state courts respect and implement the
doctrine. 32
[The Supreme] Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered
approach to analyzing state economic regulation under the Commerce
Clause. When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests, [the Court has]
generally struck down the statute without further inquiry. 33
Overt economic discrimination is not the only potential sin under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. Even when a law has "only indirect effects
on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, [the Court has]
examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the
burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits." 34 The
discriminatory state laws subject to review or censure under the
Dormant Commerce Clause span a gamut. These include laws amounting

27. Case Comment, Dormant Commerce Clause-Personal Income TaxationComptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynn, 129 HARV. L. REV. 181, 181 (2015).
28. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 402 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949).
30. C&A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Elbert Cty. v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 297 Ga. 429, 435, 774 S.E.2d 658,
664 (2015) (remanding and requiring state trial court to conduct balancing test mandated
by Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
33. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79
(1986).
34. Id. at 579.
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local processing requirements, 36

and certain tax schemes that disadvantage those who earn money in
states where they do not live. 3 7

Infirm laws vary not only in subject matter, but in scope. It does not
matter, for purposes of Dormant Commerce analysis, whether the
disadvantage imposed on foreign businesses actually changes its
behavior. Arguments that there is only a small "overall burden" 38 on outof-state interests do not pass constitutional muster; as the Supreme
Court has noted, the "volume of commerce affected measures only the
extent of the discrimination; it is of no relevance to the determination
whether a State has discriminated against interstate commerce." 39 A
court, in analyzing a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, looks only to
whether discrimination exists and whether a sufficiently compelling
state interest justifies that discrimination-there is no need to analyze
its perniciousness or the breadth of its applicability.
The Dormant Commerce Clause specifically prohibits states from
imposing arbitrary litigation disadvantages on residents of other states.
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.40 is the principal
articulation of this doctrine. In Bendix, the Court examined an Ohio law
that tolled the statute of limitations for claims against any foreign
company that had not appointed a registered agent in Ohio (and
therefore had not consented to general jurisdiction in Ohio's courts). 41
Ohio-registered corporations, thus, were immune from suit for breach of
contract or fraud after four years, but a foreign company without a
registered Ohio agent could be sued for the same fraud or breach for,
conceivably, decades after the triggering event. 42 In other words, Ohio
intentionally exposed foreign corporations to more suits (for a longer
period) than Ohio corporations.

35. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623-24.
36. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984).
37. Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynn, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1793-94 (2015).
38. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992). See also Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner,
516 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1996) ("[W]e have never recognized a 'de minimis'defenseto a charge
of discriminatory taxation under the Commerce Clause."); Associated Indus. of Mo. v.
Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 650 (1994) (noting that unless an exception exists, "actual
discrimination, wherever it is found, is impermissible, and the magnitude and scope of the
discrimination have no bearing on the determinative question of whether discrimination
has occurred").
39. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 455.
40. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
41. Id. at 890.
42. Id. at 891.
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The Court said that disparity violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 43 The Court discussed both facial invalidity and balancing test
invalidity. A statute that sufficiently discriminates against "interstate
commerce, restricting its flow in a manner not applicable to local
business and trade," can, the Court explained, either be so onerous that
it "renders the regulation invalid without more," or it can be subjected to
a balancing test, in which the Court "weigh[s] and assess[es] the State's
putative interests against the interstate restraints to determine if the
burden imposed is an unreasonable one." 44

The Court noted that the Ohio statute imposing a more onerous
statute of limitation on out-of-state corporations "might have been held
to be a discrimination that invalidates without extended inquiry." 45 In
other words, the statute might have been so discriminatory that it fell
into the "facially invalid" category. However, the Court chose to conduct
a balancing inquiry to "demonstrate that [Ohio's] legitimate sphere of
regulation is not much advanced by the statute while interstate
commerce is subject to substantial restraints." 46 That inquiry
demonstrated that the Ohio statute harmed interstate trade without
sufficient justification. 47 How did the statute burden interstate trade?
To gain the protection of the limitations period, [an out-of-state
corporation] would have had to appoint a resident agent for service of
process in Ohio and subject itself to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio
courts. This jurisdiction would extend to any suit against [the
company], whether or not the transaction in question had any
connection with Ohio.48

The intrinsic burden of the Ohio limitations statute was that it made
a foreign corporation "choose between exposure to the general
jurisdiction of Ohio courts or forfeiture of the limitations defense." 49
The court made clear that even if legal defenses "are not a
fundamental right . .. it is obvious that they are an integral part of the
legal system and are relied upon to project the liabilities of persons and
corporations active in the commercial sphere. The State may not
withdraw such defenses on conditions repugnant to the Commerce

43. Id. at 890.

44. Id. at 891.
45. Id.

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 892.

49. Id. at 893.
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Clause."50 Indeed, any law that "denies ordinary legal defenses or like
privileges to out-of-state persons or corporations engaged in commerce"
must "be reviewed under the Commerce Clause to determine whether the
denial is discriminatory on its face or an impermissible burden on
commerce. The State may not condition the exercise of the defense on the
waiver or relinquishment of rights that the foreign corporation would
otherwise retain."5 1
After articulating these burdens and principles, the Court applied its
balancing test to the Ohio statute. The Court found that the limitations
differential could not be justified as protecting Ohio's citizens because it
did not affect their ability to effect service on a corporation through the
applicable long-arm statute. 52 Indeed, the fact that it "subject[ed] the
activities of foreign and domestic corporations to inconsistent
regulations" showed that the statute accomplished no crucial state
objective-how could it, if the examined regulations were not important
enough to apply to all companies? 53
Bendix's rule-that states may not impose discriminatory litigation
disadvantages on out-of-state parties and that even a burden that is not
facially discriminatory fails if unsupported by a compelling state
interest-has been upheld and reiterated throughout the country.
Multiple courts have applied Bendix to statutes of limitation that
disparately impact out-of-state litigants. A state, courts note, may not
assist "its residents in litigating against non-resident defendants" at the
expense of interstate commerce. 54 Statutes that require onerous consent
from out-of-state companies in order to transact business also risk
invalidation-indeed, some scholars have speculated that all statutory
schemes that confer jurisdiction via registration are infirm under the
Dormant Commerce Clause.55 State courts have also noted the as50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 894.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Bottineau Farmers Elevator v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 963 F.2d
1064, 1074 (8th Cir. 1992) ("the state's interest in assisting its residents in litigating against
non-resident defendants, when long-arm service of process is available, cannot justify the
imposition of a greater burden on non-residents than residents"); Heritage Mktg. & Ins.
Servs., Inc. v. Chrustawka, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 126, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (invalidating
statute that extended time to file suit if "the defendant was outside California when the
action accrued or leaves the state after it accrued').
55. See John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce Clause as a Limit on Personal
Jurisdiction, 102 IOWA L. REv. 121, 138 (2016) ("Given the law explained above,
jurisdiction-via-registration statutes cannot pass muster, at least when they are used to
assert jurisdiction over a non-domiciled defendant who is injured out of state."). Notably, it
is not enough that a state rule "might conceivably give state citizens some detectable
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sometimes-applied unconstitutionality of "door-closing" statutes, which
prohibit a business that does not have a license to transact business in a
state from "enforcing its contracts in the courts of [the] state."5 6

Pertinent to the PandoraFranchisinganalysis, at least one court has
voided a discriminatory choice-of-venue provision because it violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause. In John Havlir & Associates, Inc. v. Tacoa,
Inc.,5 7 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
invalidated a Texas statute that, among other things, "declar[ed] certain
types of venue agreements" to be void if an out-of-state litigant attempted
to enforce them, but not if an in-state litigant attempted to do so. 5 8
Specifically, the Texas statute held that when an out-of-state party
entered a contract with a Texan, the "contract may not validly establish
venue for an action related to the contract in a state other than Texas."5 9

However, that provision did not "appl[y] to manufacturers with a
permanent or fixed place of business in Texas."6 0 The district court held
the Texas statute to be invalid, noting that the "Texas statute does not
apply evenhandedly and is therefore facially discriminatory."6 1
It is, thus, fair to say that courts throughout the country carefully
analyze statutes that place litigation burdens on outsiders. The
applicable test is to first analyze whether the statute is facially
discriminatory and motivated by simple economic protectionism. If so, it
is likely per se invalid. If not, the statute must still provide the state with
a significant, non-protectionist advantage that outweighs the negative
effects on interstate trade. Under Pandora Franchising, O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-510(b)(4) of Georgia's business venue statute fails either test.

litigation advantage." McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 230-31 (2013) (discussing Virginia
law that gave only citizens right to request documents under Freedom of Information Act).
The Court in McBurney was clear that its ruling was because other litigants could access
discovery through Virginia's rules of civil procedure. Id. The Court made no indication that
a genuine litigation advantage, conferred on in-state litigants but denied to those who were
out of state, would be permissible.
56. TradeWinds Envtl. Restoration, Inc. v. Brown Bros. Constr., 999 So. 2d 875, 878
(Ala. 2008) (holding that statute, as applied, governed purely intrastate commerce and was
acceptable, but would constitutionally fail if commerce was interstate).
57. 810 F. Supp. 752 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
58. Id. at 754.
59. Id. at 757.

60. Id.
61.

Id.
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VIOLATES THE

DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

The removal portion of the Georgia business venue scheme, as
interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court, violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause. The removal portion facially discriminates against
out-of-state companies, and it denies out-of-state businesses doing
business in Georgia a crucial benefit that Georgia companies receive: the
right to remove a significant percentage of the cases companies defend to
favorable venues, with all the advantages that attach to those venues.
Nothing justifies the discrepancy, and the statute is accordingly
unconstitutional.
This Article first shows that under Pandora Franchising's
interpretation, the removal provision of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) facially
discriminates and is per se invalid. It then shows that the statute, per se
invalid or not, would fail Bendix's balancing test.
A. The statute, as interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court, is facially
discriminatoryandpresumptively invalid
The removal provision of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4), as the Georgia
General Assembly wrote it, can either be construed as a facially neutral
option given to all companies, or as a facially discriminatory privilege
reserved only for companies with principal places of business within
Georgia. Georgia's Supreme Court chose the second option, interpreting
62
the statute as openly discriminatory against out-of-state businesses.
This facial discrimination potentially renders the statute per se invalid
because facially discriminatory statutes that reflect pure protectionism
presumptively fail.
As an initial matter, the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) in PandoraFranchisingshould govern federal
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Federal circuit courts have
deferred to state supreme courts in interpreting those states' legislative
enactments. For example, in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Jim's Motorcycle,
Inc., 63 the Eastern District of Virginia, and afterward the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, deferred to the Virginia Supreme
Court's interpretation of an ambiguous Virginia motorcycle regulation
provision. 64 As the Fourth Circuit noted, "[i]n considering the case, the
district court recognized that no Virginia court had interpreted the

62. See PandoraFranchising,299 Ga. at 725-30, 791 S.E.2d at 788-91; see also Elbert
Cty., 297 Ga. at 435-36, 774 S.E.2d at 664-65.
63. 401 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2005).
64. Id. at 565.
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Second Paragraph. Accordingly, before issuing a decision, the district
court certified four questions to the Supreme Court of Virginia that dealt
with the scope of an existing dealer's protest rights." 65 In turn, the
Virginia Supreme Court conducted a largely textual analysis of the
statute and determined its scope. 66 It was the Virginia statute as
interpreted by the Virginia Supreme Court that the Fourth Circuit
analyzed.6 7 Likewise, the Georgia Supreme Court's largely textual
interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) controls federal constitutional
analysis of this statute's Dormant Commerce Clause implications.
Interpreting for the General Assembly is certainly what the Georgia
Supreme Court believed it was doing-its PandoraFranchisingopinion
noted that it "construe[d] the statute so as to carry out the legislative
intent."6 8
So construed, the statute facially discriminates against out-of-state
companies and accordingly is per se invalid. Pursuant to the Georgia
Supreme Court's PandoraFranchisinganalysis, the General Assembly
intended to draw a facial distinction between companies headquartered
in Georgia and companies headquartered elsewhere within the statutory
text. Only the former may remove cases brought under O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-510(b)(4) back to the county of their primary place of business. 69
Any facially discriminatory burden that "falls by design in a predictably
disproportionate way on out-of-staters" fails the Dormant Commerce
test. 70 Indeed, the Georgia statute, as construed, is just as facially
discriminatory as many state statutes the Supreme Court has struck
down. 71
Such facial distinctions rarely, if ever, survive review. As other courts
examining facially discriminatory venue provisions have noted, when a
65. Id.
66. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Quillian, 571 S.E.2d 122, 127 (2002).
67. Yamaha Motor Corp., 401 F.3d at 565.
68. PandoraFranchising,299 Ga. at 729, 791 S.E.2d at 790.
69. Id. at 726-27, 730, 791 S.E.2d at 789, 791 (holding that the General Assembly
"meant what it said and said what it meant" and noting that 'andora ... cites no authority
for the proposition that companies headquartered outside Georgia are a protected class, nor
are we aware of any such authority").
70. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 57980 (1997) ("Given the fact that the burden of Maine's facially discriminatory tax scheme
falls by design in a predictably disproportionate way on out-of-staters, the pernicious effect
on interstate commerce is the same as in our cases involving taxes targeting out-of-staters
alone.").
71. See, e.g., id. at 580; Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93,
99-100 (1994) (striking Oregon statute that placed additional surcharge on waste
"generated out-of-state . . . even if the surcharge merely recoups the costs of disposing of
out-of-state waste in Oregon.").
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"statute does not apply evenhandedly" to in-state and out-of-state
litigants, it "is therefore facially discriminatory." 72
The opinions of the [United States Supreme] Court through the years
have reflected an alertness to the evils of "economic isolation" and
protectionism, while at the same time recognizing that incidental
burdens on interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a State
legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its people. Thus, where
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a
virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected. 73
This inherent infirmity stems from the "distinction between the power
of the State to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety
and from fraud, even when those dangers emanate from interstate
commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of
74
such commerce for their economic advantage."
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) allows a company to remove a case brought
under that provision to a company's principal place of business, unless
that company's headquarters is out of state, in which case it does not.
That is facially discriminatory, and it accordingly fails constitutional
review under the first of two potential Dormant Commerce tests.
B. Even if the statute is not facially discriminatory,it fails scrutiny
under Bendix because it affords domestic companies significant
advantages it denies foreigners
Even if the statute is not per se invalid because it facially
discriminates, it still likely violates the Dormant Commerce Clause
because it represents a substantial burden on interstate trade, and the
statute does not confer a benefit upon Georgians that outweighs that
burden (outside of pure protectionism). Analyzing the significant
advantage the provision confers on businesses that can remove cases
under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) begins to explain why it violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause.
Under Georgia law, venue operates by county-meaning the correct
venue to bring a case under Georgia law will be a certain county that is
a constitutionally-permissible locale for a suit.75 A party analyzing which

72.
73.
74.
75.
venues
county

John Havlir & Assocs., Inc., 810 F. Supp. at 757.
City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623-24.
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 533.
See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, paras. 1-7. These provisions set county-by-county
for divorce (the county where the defendant resides), disputes as to land title (the
where the land lies), equity (where the defendant resides), joint obligors (either
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Georgia county is the proper one in which to sue encounters a wealth of
options. Georgia has 159 counties, the second-highest number in the
United States (after Texas).7 6 Georgia courts have acknowledged that
"forum shopping" is a real phenomenon and that parties will seek to find
a friendly county in which to try their case. 77 Implicit in that assumption
is that some counties are, indeed, friendlier places for defendants. That
assumption is true for at least two reasons.
First, a company has real advantages when it litigates in its home
county-or, at least, in the Georgia county where it has its central
presence. As Georgia secondary sources have acknowledged, companies
frequently remove eligible cases to federal court "to get away from 'home
cooking' in the adversary's home county."7 8 As those scholars note, a
"plaintiff suing a defendant that is either a well-known local person or an
economically dominant employer in a small county" may seek to escape
the jurisdiction.7 9 Federal courts have acknowledged the phenomenon
too, noting that some defendants may "run from the sure whipping [they
think they] will get from a 'home-cookin' state court."80 This analysis
passes the common-sense test: Would Pilgrim's Pride rather defend a
case in a far-flung and random county or in Cherokee, Georgia, where it
is the largest employer?8 What about YKK AP America, Inc.-would it
prefer trial in Polk County or in Laurens County, where it is the thirdlargest employer? 82
Even a company that does not economically dominate one of the state's
smaller counties appreciates the comforts of home. The Home Depot,
United Parcel Service, The Coca-Cola Company, and Delta Air Lines,
83
Inc., all Fortune 100 companies, call metropolitan Atlanta home.
Litigating next door to the office makes witness preparation easier,
obligor's county of residence), suits against the maker or endorser of a promissory note
(where the maker or endorser resides), and all other cases (where the defendant resides).
76. Georgia Facts, GA. GOv'T, https://georgia.gov/georgia-facts (last visited Sept. 24,
2017).
77. Delgado v. Combs, 314 Ga. App. 419, 425, 724 S.E.2d 436, 440 (2012).
78.

KENNETH L. SHIGLEY & JOHN D. HADDEN, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS PREPARATION

FOR TRIAL § 16:5 (2016 ed.).
79. Id.
80. Gray v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 906 F. Supp. 628, 633 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
81. Major Employers, CHEROKEE COUNTY, http://www.cherokeega.org/regional-info
/major-employers/ (last visited May 7, 2017).
82. Economic Environment, DUBLIN-LAURENS COUNTY (archived as of Mar. 12, 2017),
http://web.archive.org/web/20160606094434/http://www.dublinlaurensgeorgia.com:80/inde
x.php/advantageseconomicenvironment.
83. Resources: Metro Atlanta Fortune 500 & 1000 Headquarters,METRO ATLANTA
CHAMBER, https://www.metroatlantachamber.com/resources/most-popular/fortune-500-for
tune-1000-in-metro-atlanta (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
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makes depositions easier to attend, and dramatically reduces costs
associated with attorney travel. When attorneys may need to make
dozens of trips to review hundreds of thousands of documents, meet with
principals, and generally prepare for trial, these savings become
substantial. Indeed, that is the entire point of the federal decisions
ensconcing personal jurisdiction as a Due Process right-if a defendant
is to be deprived of the right to litigate close to home, she must have
established sufficient contacts with the target forum to mitigate the
unfairness.84

&

The second primary advantage is that some counties are more likely
to render massive verdicts than others, and companies can selectively
avoid them via removal. Georgia law firms have their own various
internal calculi about what forums to seek out and to avoid, and some
even publicize the information. For example, Swift Currie McGhee
Heirs, LLP, a respected Atlanta firm, identifies twelve liberal counties to
be avoided in defensive litigation: Dade, Walker, DeKalb, Fulton,
Clayton, Muscogee, Bibb, Richmond, Chatham, Dougherty, Ware, and
Glynn.85 In 2015, nine of the ten highest verdicts rendered in the state
came from a county in the preceding list.86 To be fair, many of the
companies that would potentially remove a case to its home venue are
housed in one of the above-listed counties, but some companies are not.
Even the companies that are housed in plaintiff-friendly forums gain an
additional and asymmetrical litigation option-plaintiffs have the option
to sue a defendant in either its home county or the county where a tort
occurred, so if a plaintiff has chosen the county where the tort occurred,
she clearly has a reason for her choice. A company, at the least, preserves
the option to remove to a different county under O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-510(b)(4).

84. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122-23 (2014) (holding that, when
examining fair play and substantial justice inherent in Due Process analysis, a defendant's
contacts with citizens of the target forum was no substitute for contacts with the target
forum itself).
85. Georgia Venue Map, SWIFT CURRIE, https://www.swiftcurrie.com/uploads/file/2012
%20GA%20Venue%20Mapfinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
86. See Ken Shigley, Georgia Jury Verdicts on a Roll in 2015, ATIANTA INJURY LAW
BLOG (Jan. 19, 2015, 2:26 PM), http://www.atlantainjurylawblog.com/uncategorized/
georgia-jury-verdicts-on-a-roll-in-2015.html. In order, the ten highest verdicts rendered
that year were in Fulton, DeKalb, Floyd, Gwinnett, Gwinnett, Clayton, Fulton, Clayton,
Fulton, and Bibb County. Floyd County is the only semirural county among that list, and
the Floyd County verdict arose when an off-duty ambulance pulled out from a stop sign and
hit a motorcycle rider, amputating his leg. Id. Although it is not clear whether the jury
awarded additional funds solely for the irony of being injured by an ambulance, the
possibility cannot be wholly discounted.
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In sum, litigants have multiple reasons for choosing one Georgia
county over another. Litigating in a home forum allows a company to
leverage its goodwill among a community and remind the entire jury pool
that if a large verdict destroys the business, that verdict takes hundreds
or thousands of local jobs with it. Removal to a different county provides
a company's counsel tangible advantages in terms of travel, witness
preparation, and document review-advantages that help keep litigation
costs down and make possible a war of attrition against the plaintiffs
counsel. Additionally, it gives defendants the biggest advantage of all:
choice. A company that knows a plaintiff has carefully chosen a target
venue can instead move the suit halfway across the state, knowing that
by doing so, it has also foiled many of the plaintiffs plans. Choosing a
forum is a real advantage.8 7
It should, accordingly, be obvious that a litigant would want these
advantages. However, under the Georgia business venue statute, a
company whose principal place of business is outside the state cannot
invoke them. A company whose principal place of business is within the
state, contrarily, can invoke them freely.
This discrepancy means that Georgia's business venue statute, as
interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court, denies litigants whose
headquarters are out of state a litigation advantage every bit as
significant as the advantage that was denied in Bendix. The Bendix
statute essentially forced a litigant to submit to general jurisdiction in
Ohio or else be subject to suit for longer than the prescribed statute of
limitations-a real disadvantage, to be sure.88 Although, if a company
was sued and served in a timely manner, there would be no disadvantage
at all-it would be no worse off because of the Ohio statute. However,
under Georgia's statute, a litigant must submit to general jurisdiction in
Georgia (described in detail below) or cede its right to remove a case to
its home county, thus foregoing all the advantages discussed above. If a
company does not submit to the same conditions found unacceptable in
Bendix, it surrenders its right to fight on home turf, as well as its right
to choose ahead of time the county in which it will be sued.
In other words, even if the statute was not "simple economic
protectionism," 89 it would still deny the protection of "an integral part of

87. In the context of federal venue transfer, that advantage is quantifiable. In a study
spanning federal civil cases from 1979-1991, the "plaintiff wins in 58% of the nontransferred cases that go to judgment for one side or the other, but wins in only 29% of such
cases in which a transfer occurred." Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising
the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511-12 (1995).

88. 486 U.S. at 892-93.
89. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
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. relied upon to project the liabilities of persons and

corporations active in the commercial sphere."90 Denying the right to
control venue to only businesses with a primary place of business outside
Georgia is, accordingly, an "impermissible burden on commerce,"91
sufficient to void the statute under the Dormant Commerce Clause even
if it is not motivated by protectionism. It is a "deni[al ofj ordinary legal
defenses or like privileges to out-of-state persons or corporations engaged
in commerce." 92
The Georgia Supreme Court pushed back on the idea that its
interpretation was discriminatory within the Pandora Franchising
opinion, though not in the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Pandora Franchising argued that the "venue provisions of subsection (b)
of OCGA § 14-2-510 expressly apply to both domestic corporations and
foreign corporations authorized to transact business in this state," and
therefore, the supreme court's interpretation violates the statute.98 The
supreme court reasoned that its interpretation did not violate the express
inclusion of domestic and foreign companies within the statute, because:
Subsection (b)(4) does not grant a right to remove to either a foreign
corporation or a domestic corporation that maintains its principal
place of business outside Georgia. Conversely, that subsection grants
a right to remove to any corporation, foreign or domestic, that
maintains its principal place of business in a county in Georgia. 94
That analysis might reconcile the supreme court's interpretation with
the General Assembly's command that O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) must
apply to both domestic corporations and foreign corporations authorized
to transact business in Georgia, but it does not square it with the
Dormant Commerce Clause as articulated in Bendix. Although the Court
in Bendix did analyze a statute that drew the line between foreign and
domestic corporations, the Court emphasized that the statute violated
the Dormant Commerce Clause because it forced a corporation that
would not otherwise be subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio to submit
to general jurisdiction there to gain an advantage regarding the
limitations period.9 5
Georgia's interpretation fails that basic test. As the Supreme Court
has repeatedly noted, a state that is a company's "principal, if temporary,

90. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 893.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. PandoraFranchising,299 Ga. at 730, 791 S.E.2d at 791.

94. Id.
95. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 893.
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place of business" can exercise general jurisdiction over that company. 96
So, any company whose principal place of business is in Georgia will be
subject to general jurisdiction in the state, while a company whose
principal place of business is not in Georgia may well not be, even if it
has an office in the state.9 7 Georgia's venue statute, accordingly,
discriminates against companies that are not necessarily subject to
general jurisdiction in Georgia. Georgia's venue statute, therefore, fails
the core test of Bendix, and the distinction the Georgia Supreme Court
made in squaring itself with the General Assembly's intent does not
square it with the Commerce Clause.
That narrow general jurisdiction test arising from Bendix squares
with the broader purposive identifiers of a law that violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause. The only reason the Georgia Supreme Court provided
for the out-of-state/in-state disparity in its opinion-besides pure
textualism-is because allowing companies outside Georgia to deploy the
venue provision might encourage forum shopping.98 But, this rationale
still only makes sense through the lens of economic protectionism. A
company with its primary place of business in Georgia could just as easily
forum shop by establishing its headquarters in a defendant-friendly
county. Indeed, the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Pandora
Franchising reveals that the Legislature was concerned about forum
shopping only for out-of-state companies.9 9 In other words, the statute is
both facially discriminatory and an under-inclusive solution to the ill that
it purports to solve.100 Moreover, the General Assembly and supreme
court did not even attempt to argue that the "solution" the statute
provided was not purely linked to companies headquartered out of
Georgia and those which were not.
Other courts have recognized this purposive reading when striking
down similar onerous state laws. In invalidating one such provision, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized that
any state's unconstitutional attempt to help "its residents in litigating

96. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 756 (2014).
97. See id. at 760 ("With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and
principal place of business are 'paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.' Those
affiliations have the virtue of being unique-that is, each ordinarily indicates only one
place-as well as easily ascertainable.").
98. PandoraFranchising,299 Ga. at 728, 791 S.E.2d at 790.
99. Id.
100. The same rationale could have bolstered the Texas statute that a federal court
struck down in John Havlir & Associates, Inc., 810 F. Supp. at 754. The prohibition on outof-state businesses contractually providing for venue anywhere other than Texas certainly
would cut down on some interstate forum shopping. But that pseudo-protectionist rationale
did not save the Texas statute, either. See id.
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against non-resident defendants" at the expense of interstate commerce
was at the heart of the Dormant Commerce prohibition.1 01 That is
certainly the effect of Georgia's provision, and arguably, that is the
statute's purpose as no compelling alternative explanation exists.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) further resembles the "door-closing" statutes
that state courts have stricken, at least as far as it explicitly denies outof-state companies the full menu of litigation advantages that in-state
companies enjoy. 102 Finally, the purposive reading of Bendix and the
Dormant Commerce doctrine generally have supported striking
discriminatory venue provisions in the past. 103 Federal district courts
have shown a no-nonsense streak in analyzing those provisions-like the
Northern District of Texas, which when faced with a provision that a
"contract may not validly establish venue for an action related to the
contract in a state other than Texas" (and applied only to out-of-state
companies)1 04 struck that statute, reasoning only that the "Texas statute
does not apply evenhandedly and is therefore facially discriminatory." 0 5
This is simplicity at its finest. The decision is a common-sense, purposive
acknowledgment that laws which tie foreigners' hands in matters of
venue-while not tying home-staters' hands in the same way-violate
the spirit and the letter of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
A court examining a constitutional challenge to Georgia's business
venue provision would have the advantage of Bendix and the specific
command that a state may not arbitrarily condition litigation rights on
submission to general jurisdiction. A court examining a constitutional
challenge would know the general command that laws may not seek to
disadvantage interstate commerce. It would see that other courts have
stricken laws related to statute of limitations tolling, door-closing

101. See, e.g., Bottineau Farmers Elevator, 963 F.2d at 1074 ("the state's interest in
assisting its residents in litigating against non-resident defendants, when long-arm service
of process is available, cannot justify the imposition of a greater burden on non-residents
than residents"); Heritage Mktg. & Ins. Servs., Inc., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 129 (invalidating
statute that extended time to file suit if "the defendant was outside California when the
action accrued or leaves the state after it accrued").
102. TradeWinds Enutl. Restoration, Inc., 999 So. 2d at 878-79. Notably, the feature
that saved the door-closing statute as applied in TradeWinds probably would not save
O.C.G.A. §14-2-510(b)(4) in many cases. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the
construction contract in Trade Winds was purely intrastate in nature, so it could not violate
the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. While this construction might theoretically save some
applications of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4), it would do nothing to save cases involving
interstate contracts. And that as-applied savings feature could only come into play if the
statute cleared the first prong of the Dormant Commerce analysis-facial neutrality.
103. John Haulir & Assocs., Inc., 810 F. Supp. at 755.
104. Id. at 757.
105. Id.
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provisions, and discriminatory venue rules-all because they applied
unequally to foreigners and violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. The
examining court would be able to take the Georgia Supreme Court at its
word-O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) intentionally disadvantages out-of-state
companies but not in-state companies. It would not be required to show
that any businesses actually eschewed commerce in Georgia because of
the disadvantage, because "actual discrimination, wherever it is found,
is impermissible, and the magnitude and scope of the discrimination
have no bearing on the determinative question whether discrimination
has occurred."106 Taken together, these factors would make a decision
relatively clear-as construed in Pandora Franchising, the removal
safety valve in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) violates the Dormant Commerce
Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The Georgia General Assembly gave companies facing suit within the
state a clear advantage-if a company was worried about being homecooked in a hostile county, it could remove the case to the county
containing its principal place of business. The General Assembly realized
that this was a significant advantage (hence its inclusion in the venue
scheme), and Georgia litigation experience confirms it. But, the General
Assembly (as interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court) denied that
advantage to any company that chose to locate its principal place of
business outside of Georgia. The General Assembly accordingly denied a
crucial litigation advantage to companies that are not subject to general
jurisdiction in Georgia, and its purported reasons for doing so are murky
at best.
The Dormant Commerce Clause forbids the Georgia General
Assembly's action. The business venue provision is "simple economic
protectionism," and it is accordingly per se invalid. Even if it were not,
the provision denies an "ordinary legal defense" to out-of-state companies
but affords them to in-state companies. This duality constitutes an
"impermissible burden on commerce" and violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause.

106. Associated Indus. of Mo., 511 U.S. at 650.

Racial Justice and Federal Habeas
Corpus as Postconviction Relief
from State Convictions
by LeRoy Pernell*
INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this Article not to simply document the influence
of race on our criminal system and its role in the current racial crisis of
overrepresentation of minorities in our prisons, but rather to focus on the
future and importance of a key tool in the struggle for racial equityfederal habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy. By looking first at the
racial context of several "landmark" criminal justice reform decisions,
this Article considers how race serves as the root of the procedural due
process reform that began in earnest during the Warren Court. This
Article then notes the important role played by federal habeas corpus as
a postconviction remedy as well as the unique nature and suitability of
this "extraordinary writ" to bring about transformative change.
On July 14, 2015, President Barack Obama, in a historic and unique
statement for a United States President, declared that the American
criminal justice system is particularly skewed by race. In a speech to the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
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Annual Convention, President Obama noted a "long history of inequity
in the criminal justice system in America."' Although the United States
is home to only 5% of the world's population, it accounts for 25% of the
world's prisoners. Incredibly, of those 2.2 million prisoners, 60% are
African-American or Latino men. This translates to the incarceration of
1 in 35 African-American men and 1 in 88 Latino men-as opposed to 1
in 214 white American men. 2 The sheer number and percentage of
African-Americans-men in particular-in prison represent a social and
political epidemic and pose what may be the most significant question
regarding the state of civil rights faced in the twenty-first century.
Professor Michelle Alexander refers to this level of incarceration as the
"New Jim Crow." 3

President Obama's speech set forth three areas of particular concern
motivating the President to propose federal action. He generally
described these areas as the community, the courtroom, and the cell
block. Part of the President's concern, outlined in his address, focused on
what he termed as "change in the courtroom." 4 In this context, he focused
almost exclusively on the outcome of the adjudicatory process-namely,
sentencing. Like Professor Alexander, President Obama placed the root
cause of the disproportionate presence of African-Americans in prisons
largely on non-violent drug offences. The President's suggested remedy
consisted of encouraging better use of prosecutorial discretion,
treatment-oriented alternatives to prison, and legislative sentencing
reform.5

Additionally, the President's address concerned itself with
institutional conditions and the function of penal institutions. The level
of prison overcrowding, overuse of solitary confinement, and the lack of
rehabilitative programs, combined with lengths of sentences that are the
longest in western societies, serve much more destructive purposes than
rehabilitation. The President also suggested that attention be paid to
barriers to successful reintegration of convicted felons into society after
incarceration. Citing Montgomery County, Maryland, which provides job
training and eliminated unnecessary reporting of prior convictions on job
1. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at the NAACP Conference,
THE WHITE HOUSE (July 14, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/07/14/remarks-president-naacp-conference
[hereinafter Remarks by the
President].
2. Id.
3.

See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010).

4. See Remarks by the President,supra note 1.
5. See id. The first of these concerns, community, centers largely on the perception
and treatment of children in African-American communities. Id. Much of this concern is
expressed in the current parlance of the "school-to-jail" pipeline. Id.
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applications, the President raised old and new ideas of institutional
reform.6 Alexander and the President's remarks focused on the
devastating and disproportionate impact conviction and incarceration
have had on the African-American community. The generations of
African-Americans adjudicated as felons who are ostracized and
disenfranchised-both politically and economically-have often deprived
an entire community of its best and brightest. Notwithstanding the
significance of Alexander's and President Obama's positions, attention
should be paid to the equal, if not greater, extent that the process of
adjudication and law enforcement ensnares one out of thirty-five AfricanAmerican men. The existence of racism and the impact of disparate
perception and treatment because of race, in a system of selective law
enforcement and guilt determination, raises fundamental questions of
societal and legal legitimacy.
This historic and profound corruption of justice in the court plaguing
our legal system has not gone entirely unnoticed. A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., perhaps one of the greatest African-American jurists of our time,7
commented on the interaction between law and racism present in our
judicial system. In Shades of Freedom,8 Higginbotham states, "Acts of
racism in the courts are symptomatic of the society's cultural racism.
They trigger other racist assumptions in the minds of [the] courtroom
participants and symbolize to society the legitimacy of the ideology of
racism."9 Higginbotham describes how the culture of racism impacts even
the setting for a supposedly fair trial. 10 In the 1948 decision in Murray v.
State," the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld segregation by not
allowing African-Americans to observe the African-American defendant's
"public" trial except from the balcony of the courtroom. 12 It was not until
fifteen years later that the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized that such segregation not only denied the right of African-

6. Id.
7. Judge Higginbotham was the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit and the Public Service Professor of Jurisprudence at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University. He was a recipient of the Presidential Medal of
Freedom, the author of IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, and the winner of several awards
including the American Bar Association's Silver Gavel Award and the National Bar
Association's Literary Award.
8. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM (1996).

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 132.
Id. at 132-34.
33 So. 2d 291 (Miss. 1948).
Id. at 292-93.
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Americans to be part of the public at a public trial but also denied the
defendant equal protection.' 3
From courtroom "apartheid" 14 and the debasing and devaluing of
witnesses and evidence because of race15 to the undisguised appeal to
racial fear, 16 American legal history has been replete with the denial of
fair and equal justice because of race. In Moulton v. State,17 this
distortion of justice often reflects the impact of fear based on stereotypes
of the African-American people.' 8
There is perhaps no more vivid demonstration than Brown v.
Mississippi9 of racism destroying any semblance of due process. On
March 30, 1934, someone murdered a prominent local planter named
Raymond Stewart. The crime was particularly brutal in that Stewart was
substantially disfigured with an axe. 20 The local sheriff was unable to
obtain a solid lead on the crime-particularly after bloodhounds were
unable to track a scent. The sheriff and his deputies concluded that the
crime must have been committed by African-Americans. This notion
particularly took hold when a local African-American, Arthur Ellington,
having heard about the murder, visited the Stewart estate to pay his
respects. 21
With no physical evidence or leads, Sheriff Adcock remembered that,
on Stewart's large property holdings, there lived a thirty-year-old
African-American tenant by the name of Ed Brown. Within a span of
forty-eight hours, Ellington, Brown, and another local African-American
resident, Henry Shields, became the objects of suspicion, terror, and
torture. On the afternoon of March 30, Deputy Sherriff Dials and others
13. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963).
14. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 8, at 132-34.
15. In ExparteMary Hamilton, 156 So. 2d 926, 926-27 (Ala. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 650
(1964), African-American witnesses were refused the respect and the implied credibility
from being addressed on the stand by more than just their first name.
16. Moulton v. State, 74 So. 454, 454 (Ala. 1917) ("Unless you hang this negro, our
white people living out in the country won't be safe; to let such crimes go unpunished will
cause riots in our land.").
17. 74 So. 454 (Ala. 1917).
18. Former New York City Mayor Edward Koch has stated, "[F]or many whites, crime
has a black face." Edward I. Koch, Crime, Race, Prejudice,Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/19/opinion/crime-race-prejudice-fear.html. Regarding the
1989 alleged rape of a Central Park jogger, then-financier Donald Trump publicly called for
the death penalty. Rick Perlstein, New York Republicans: Before You Vote Today, Read
This, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/new-york-republicans-voteread-449301. See Remarks by the President,supra note 1.
19.

297 U.S. 278 (1936).

20. Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 339-40 (Miss. 1935), rev'd, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
21. Brown, 297 U.S. at 282.
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visited Ellington's home. After requesting that Ellington accompany Dial
to the deceased's home, Ellington was then subjected to accusation by a
mob of white men demanding Ellington's confession. Ellington
maintained his innocence and was thereafter hanged from the limb of a
nearby tree. This was done twice; still Ellington would not confess. He
was thereafter beaten severely, but then released to return home, still
maintaining his innocence. Ellington's ordeal continued when the
sheriffs deputy and his gang of whites returned sometime during the
next two days under the pretext of arresting Ellington, but the deputy
transported him to Alabama where he was severely beaten and told that
the beating would continue until he confessed. Alone and presented with
no alternative, Ellington "agreed" to confess. Brown and Shields fared no
better. Both were arrested on April 1, stripped, beaten, and informed that
the beatings would continue until they confessed-which they did.
Ellington's injuries were so bad that the marks of the beating and
hanging were plainly visible at trial. 22
Particularly significant for discussion in this Article is the fagade of
"due process" provided to the defendants. A "hearing" was conducted to
determine the voluntariness of the confessions twenty-four hours after
the defendants' arrest. This was conducted by the same sheriffs
department responsible for the torture. Unsurprisingly, the confessions
were found to be voluntary. 23 Legal counsel was appointed, as this was a
capital case. The defendants were indicted just twenty-four hours before
the trial. Aside from cross-examining the sheriffs officers, who freely
admitted their conduct in coercing the confessions, and objecting
generally to the admission of the statements, no real effort was made by
appointed counsel to suppress the confessions. 24 The Supreme Court
found a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

22. Id. at 281-83.
23. Id. at 282-83. We know about the charade of this proceeding only because the
tormentors of these African-American men were so brazen as to detail their efforts and the
consequences for the defendants fully on the record at trial. The tormentors told the
defendants that if they changed or denied their statements at trial they would be beaten
and tortured again. In an infamous statement at trial, Deputy Dial, when asked about
whether he observed that the defendants were severely beaten, testified, "Not too much for
a negro; not as much as I would have done if it were left to me." Id. at 284.
24. Id. at 279-80, 283-85. It is relevant to note for this Article that defense counsel's
failure to move to suppress may well have constituted a procedural default pursuant to
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), had this matter been one of Federal Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2017), or this claim might have otherwise been barred in
habeas by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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Amendment of the United States Constitution 25 in light of the
extraordinary record. 26

Brown demonstrates that Michele Alexander's "New Jim Crow" is
more than just disproportionate numbers in prison but includes the
product of racial fear infecting our criminal justice system-not just at
sentencing, but in the very determination of who is subjected to criminal
justice and what type of justice the African-American defendant receives.
Race's role as an impermissible part of criminal adjudication was often a
large (although mostly unspoken) part of the criminal justice reforms of
the 1960s and 1970s. Racism has been fought as the antithesis of due
process and equal protection. While few deny significant progress was
obtained through these reforms, it is somewhat Pollyannaish to suppose
this negative legacy does not still provide a major source of concern.
Federal judicial review has been the principal tool for addressing the
impermissible unfairness of race consideration in the criminal
adjudication. Federal review has historically been proven as necessary
not just because state courts were "distrusted" or "suspect" but because
the core principles of due process and equal protection for insular
populations are of national importance and significance. As such, the
uniformity, clarity, and hoped-for finality of federal pronouncement has
provided, and continues to provide, national guidance.
The process of change has been slowed by retrenchment in the years
following the Warren Court. Yet, despite contrary assessment from some
scholars, the full achievement of racial adjudicatory justice, even under
the guise of due process expansion of defendant-rights, was never fully
realized. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),27 and the ratification of the act by the Court, appears to remove
needed federal habeas corpus determination from the fight. This Article
looks at those barriers, as well as opportunities for bringing the
extraordinary writ back to the forefront. If "Black Lives Matter" is to be
the twenty-first century rallying cry for justice in the criminal justice
system, that cry must be heard at the adjudication stage and not just
concerning the dispositional impact.

25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Brown, 297 U.S. at 287.
27. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
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I. THE MYTH OF COLOR-BLIND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Cases such as Brown show that the basic tenets of due process were
not always available for African-American defendants. This was no truer
than in the events that occurred in the year prior to Brown, in Scottsboro,
Alabama. In the battle for civil rights, which particularly consumed the
nation for the remainder of the twentieth century, the case of the
"Scottsboro Boys" 28 was a major social and legal battleground. Out of
these events, the Supreme Court ultimately issued three significant
decisions. 29 The first, Powell v. Alabama,30 was perhaps the most
important for criminal procedure reform. 31 Although not a habeas corpus
case, its progeny expanded into the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution 32 through the use of federal habeas corpus.
The basic facts, riveting as any in Brown, have fueled books, movies,
and documentaries.33 On March 25, 1931, following an altercation on a
train bound from Chattanooga to Memphis, Tennessee, several hoboing
white men were ejected from a train by what was described as several
black youths. The station master in Stevenson, Alabama discovered these
white males and, after hearing of their ejection from the train by the
black youths, telephoned ahead for the train to be stopped in Scottsboro,
Alabama. The train, having already passed through Scottsboro, was
halted in Paint Rock, Alabama by a sheriffs posse, which discovered not
only the nine black youths but two white women as well. 34 The two
women, Ruby Bates and Victoria Price, alleged they had been raped, 35
although a later dispassionate review of the evidence showed no rape had

28. Although the use of the term "Boys" is rightly often considered pejorative when
applied to African-American men given its place in American race-based tradition, it was
accurate when describing these defendants. These eight young men were all teenagers
ranging from age thirteen to twenty. Scottsboro Trials, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALA.,
http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1456 (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
29. Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
30. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
31. See generally id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. See HAYWOOD PATTERSON & EARL CONRAD, SCOTTSBORO BOYs (1950); CAST
RECORDING, THE SCOTTSBORO BOYs (Jay Records 2010) (composed by John Kander & Fred
Ebb); DVD: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: SCOTTsBORO: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (PBS 2001).
34. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 3-5 (rev. ed.
1979).
35. See Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Confronts 'legal
Lynchings," in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 1-2 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
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occurred. 36 However, the accusation was enough to stir a lynch mob so
set on hanging these black teenagers that the local sheriff sought and
received the assistance of the Alabama National Guard. 37 Against this
backdrop, the defendants were indicted, arraigned, and brought to trial
within twelve days of the alleged offense. An additional defendant was
added for a total of nine, and the defendants were divided into three
groups for trial.38 Each trial was what could most charitably be referred
to as a mockery of justice.
At arraignment, the Scottsboro defendants appeared without
counsel.3 9 At the trial itself, a mere six days after indictment, no one
answered for the defendants or appeared to represent them except for the
curious appearance of a "Mr. Roddy." Roddy, a Tennessee lawyer, was
not a member of the local bar, but was there because "people who were
interested had spoken to him about the case." 40 Roddy was very careful
not to agree to representation of the defendants and suggested that he
would be willing to assist if local counsel appeared. 4' A "Mr. Moody," who
later commentators suggested may have lacked the competency to handle
this capital case, 42 referred vaguely to the trial court's prior appointment
of the "entire bar" and suggested that all had been done that could be
done to prepare for trial.43 As stated by the Court, "[a]nd in this casual
44
fashion the matter of counsel in a capital case was disposed of."

36. J. MICHAEL MARTINEZ, THE GREATEST CRIMINAL CASES: CHANGING THE COURSE OF

AMERICAN LAW 43 (2014).
37. See Klarman, supra note 35, at 2.
38. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49, 53, 74.
39. Id. at 49. The Court noted that, despite a bizarre claim from the State that the trial
court appointed counsel at arraignment, there effectively was no such appointment. There
was a colloquy referred to by the trial judge shortly before trial in which the trial judge
allegedly appointed "all seven members of the Scottsboro bar to represent the [defendants]."
Id.; CARTER, supra note 34, at 17. This "appointment" would allegedly have included the
prosecution as well. With no one identified as responsible counsel, the defendants were
called upon, in a case in which their lives were at stake, to enter a plea without the benefit
of effective assistance of counsel. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49-50.
40. Powell, 287 U.S. at 53. The headlines about the case had attracted the interest of
out-of-state socialist and communist movements. See CARTER, supranote 34, at 68-69.
41. Powell, 287 U.S. at 53-56.
42. J. Michael Martinez described Moody and Roddy as follows: "Milo Moody was a
befuddled septuagenarian who had not represented clients in court for decades and Stephen
Roddy was an alcoholic real estate attorney from Chattanooga, Tennessee." MARTINEZ,
supra note 36, at 43. Milo Moody was nearly seventy years old and described as a
"doddering, extremely unreliable, senile individual who is losing whatever ability he once
had." Id. at 18.
43. Powell, 287 U.S. at 54-56.
44. Id. at 56.
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The issue of race dominated the setting and the issues in this case.
Adding to the racially-hostile climate was the fact that the Scottsboro
defendants were tried before juries from which qualified AfricanAmericans were systematically excluded because of race. This was one of
the denials of due process and equal protection complained of before the
Court in Powell.45 However, the only issue that the Court chose to
address was that of denial of counsel. 46 Rather than addressing directly
what mistreatment the Scottsboro defendants suffered constitutionally
because of race, the Court turned instead to the basic tenets of procedural
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 7
The landmark decision in Powell is the fountainhead for much of what
we know today as procedural due process in criminal procedure. It is
certainly the beginning of what ultimately became the Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel as well as the Sixth Amendment concept of
effective assistance of counsel. Basing its analysis on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court determined that
procedural Due Process at a minimum always requires reasonable notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to judgment.48
Regarding the "opportunity to be heard," the Court linked such a right
to the need to be effectively heard through counsel.4 9 Although tempted,
the Court, through its discussion, avoided directly holding that appointed
counsel is necessary for those who cannot afford counsel, and avoided
applying the Sixth Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment.50 Instead, the Court stressed that the right to be heard
"would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel."51
45. Id. at 50.
46. Id. The systematic exclusion of African-American jurors in the Scottsboro case was
addressed directly in Norris. See Norris, 294 U.S. at 588-89. In Norris, the Court concluded
that the systematic and arbitrary exclusion of "negroes" from grand and petit jury lists,
solely because of their race or color, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 589.
47. Powell, 287 U.S. at 50.
48. Id. at 68.
49. Id.
50. That would come later in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
51. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69. The Court also stated:
It never has been doubted by this court, or any other so far as we know, that
notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an
enforceable judgment, and that they, together with a legally competent tribunal
having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional
requirement of due process of law. The words of Webster, so often quoted, that
by "the law of the land" is intended "a law which hears before it condemns," have
been repeated in varying forms of expression in a multitude of decisions.
Id. at 68.
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For counsel to be effective it must be more than in name only.
Appointed counsel must be assigned "at such a time or under such
circumstances as to [not] preclude the giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case." 52 This bedrock principle of due process

was stated in terms many perceived to have universal application for
indigents facing criminal prosecution without counsel. 53 As such, it
appeared to take on a meaning devoid of its racial justice history. This
perception was drastically altered by the habeas corpus decision in Betts
v. Brady54 ten years later.55
Betts concerned an unemployed forty-three-year-old white farmhand
accused of robbery.56 Unemployed and minimally educated, Betts sought
appointed counsel. His request was denied, and he was found guilty at
trial and sentenced to eight years. Relying on the Court's holding in
Powell, Betts asserted that due process required the appointment of
counsel for an indigent accused of crime as a fundamental protective
right.57 The Court in Betts both declined to recognize a right to appointed
counsel as an "incorporated" right of the Sixth Amendment made
applicable to the State via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

52. Id. at 71.
53. Optimistically, a note in the Maryland Law Review following Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), opined that state abridgement of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment under Powell because such a right was part
of the fundamental principles of liberty and justice. Extent to Which Rights Secured by the
First Eight Amendments to the Federal Constitution are ProtectedAgainst State Action by
the FourteenthAmendment, 2 MD. L. REV. 174, 175-76 (1937-1938). This interpretation
was specifically rejected by Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
54. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
55. See generally Yale Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to
Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1962-1963). Professor Kamisar
argued, prior to the landmark decision of Gideon, that the Court was wrong to reject the
concept of incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the Fourteenth
Amendment and as independently consistent with Due Process values of fundamental
fairness. Id. at 219-20.
56. See Peter W. Fenton & Michael B. Shapiro, Looking Back on Gideon v. Wainwright:
"Lawyers in Criminal Courts Are Necessities, Not Luxuries," 36 CHAMPION 24, 24 (June
2012).
57. Brief for Petitioner at 7, 16, Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (No. 837).
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Amendment5 8 and declined to hold that Due Process directly required
appointed counsel for indigents as a result of its opinion in Powell.59
Finding that Powell required "special circumstances" to be decided on
a case-by-case basis in order for a defendant to be constitutionally
entitled to appointed counsel, the Court noted that the racial tension,
poverty, and perceived intellect of the Scottsboro defendants were key to
the finding of a due process violation.60 Although Betts was also indigent
and possessed a limited education, his situation did not have the climate
of racial injustice present in Powell.61 The Court's path of expansion of
"circumstances" beyond the racially charged climate of Powell and
towards a generalized concept of appointed counsel via the Sixth
Amendment ran through a growing list of key situations dependent less
on correcting racial injustice and more on the significance of counsel to
the trustworthiness of the adjudication system. 62
Gideon v. Wainwright,63 a federal habeas corpus original action, firmly
resolved the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants. Under
the incorporated Sixth Amendment, a "flat" right applies to all indigents
regardless of special circumstances. 64 However, while Clarence Earl
Gideon was not a poor African-American, the significance of this decision
should be considered in the context of both the emerging national
struggle over civil rights for African-Americans and in the specific
context of the Court's own activity incorporating Bill of Rights protections
for criminal defendants.
58. Betts, 316 U.S. at 461-62. The Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment forbade
the federal government from denying appointed counsel for indigents facing criminal
prosecution. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). However, the Court in Powell, and
subsequently prior to Betts, declined to find such a protection was part of an "Ordered
Scheme of Liberty" for incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71-72.
59. Betts, 316 U.S. at 473.
60. See id. at 463-64. The Court noted:
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, ignorant and friendless negro youths,
strangers in the community, without friends or means to obtain counsel, were
hurried to trial for a capital offense without effective appointment of counsel on
whom the burden of preparation and trial would rest, and without adequate
opportunity to consult even the counsel casually appointed to represent them.
Id. at 463.
61. Id. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting).
62. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 447 (1962) (noting habitual offender
statutes are so complex as to satisfy the special circumstances test); Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961) (noting arraignments by their nature satisfy the special
circumstances test); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 648 (1948) (noting capital cases by their
nature satisfied the special circumstances test).
63. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
64. Id. at 343-44.
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The Court agreed to hear the handwritten petition of Gideon on June
4, 1962.65 That year marked a key point in the Civil Rights movement
timeline. James Meredith became the first African-American student to
enroll at the University of Mississippi.6 6 Just a few months earlier,
during the spring and summer of 1961, "Freedom Rides" 67 to end

segregation in transportation and travel began throughout the South. By
the time of the Court's decision in 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King's Letters
from Birmingham Jail6 8 was just weeks away, and Medgar Evers would
be murdered in approximately ninety days.69 Most importantly, perhaps,
the historic March on Washington, D.C., was already announced to take
place in August.
Despite the seminal role that Gideon played in establishing rights for
all criminal defendants, it was, at its heart, a case concerned with racial
justice. Professor Chin states, "Gideon was a race case, in that Gideon
and the Court's other criminal procedure cases of the era were concerned
with institutional racism." 70 Citing back to Powell, Chin sees Gideon as
an "outgrowth of Jim Crow ideology" where the Court resolved injustice
against African-Americans by accepting racial stereotypes of AfricanAmericans as ignorant, incompetent, and requiring special scrutiny by
providing the "guiding hand of counsel" throughout adjudication. 71
The connection between the right to appointed counsel and race is at
least as strong as the connection between the right to counsel and
poverty. 72 The challenge for the Warren Court in Gideon, however, was
65. Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
66. UM Historyof Integration,UNIV. OF MISS., https://50years.olemiss.edu/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2018).
67. Freedom Rides (1961), BLACKPAST.ORG, https://www.blackpast.orglaah/freedomrides-1961 (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
68. Martin Luther King Jr.'s 'Letter From Birmingham Jail', ATLANTIC, https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/1963/08/martin-luther-kings-letter-from-birmingham-jaill
274668/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
69. Medgar Evers Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, https://www.biography.com/people/
medgar-evers-9542324 (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
70. Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the DisappointingRight to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236,
2239 (2013).
71. Id. at 2239, 2247. Note how the Court in Powell, particularly as interpreted through
Betts, spoke first of the Scottsboro defendants as "ignorant and friendless negro youths."
Betts, 316 U.S. at 463; see Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. This perception of African-Americans in
the context of defendant rights was rampant in its racial vision prior to the Warren Court's
refocusing on less overtly race-driven views. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238
(1940) (describing interrogation of "ignorant young colored tenant farmers"); Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 102 (1923) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) ("The fact that petitioners
are poor and ignorant and [B]lack naturally arouses sympathy.").
72. I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the FourthAmendment: Race, Citizenship, and the
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 n.56 (2011) ("[Flailure to provide
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to move away from the race-oriented conception of the importance of a
right to appointed counsel and towards a right with broad and uniform
application through incorporation of the Sixth Amendment.
The goal of a broader application, less dependent on race, as a special
circumstance, was aided by the fact that the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund did not file an amicus brief as it did in two other cases. 73

Two amici mention race only in passing, though in the context of the
aforementioned questionable link of being black to ignorance. 74
Perhaps the most significant link of the right to counsel to raceAfrican-Americans in particular-can be found in recognizing the
importance of counsel to the African-American prisoner. The AfricanAmerican prisoner, greatly overrepresented in the prison population,7 5
has particular need for the guiding hand of counsel. The need for counsel
to challenge unjust convictions and sentences has been a source for
challenging the extent of Gideon's application.
It was in the federal habeas corpus case of Mempa v. Rhay7 6 that the

Court first addressed whether Gideon applied to post-adjudication of
guilt. The Court in Mempa concluded that Gideon applied to sentencing,
even where that sentencing is on a date separate from adjudication of
guilt.77 Applying its "critical stage" rationale, which dates back to Powell,

the Court found that appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant is
required at every stage of the criminal proceeding where substantial
rights of a criminal accused may be won or lost. 7
This critical issue of legal representation for prisoners who, after
imprisonment, have even fewer resources for hiring counsel is important
to any sense of justice for the incarcerated. In Johnson v. Avery, 79 the
Court addressed this issue. Once again, habeas corpus was the tool of
adequate assistance of counsel to accused indigents draws a line not only between rich and
poor, but also between white and black.") (quoting Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the
New PublicDefender for the 21st Century, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 83 (1995)).
73. Chin, supra note 70, at 2246-47, 2246 n.45.
74. See Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae at 6, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1962)
(No. 155) (mentioning race only when citing cases where the Supreme Court found denial
of the right to counsel to an "ignorant Indian," Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 786-87 (1945),
and an "ignorant, inexperienced Negro," McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 110 (1961), among
others); Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Florida Civil Liberties Union,

Amici Curiae at 9, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1962) (No. 155) (mentioning a particular race only
when discussing Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957), which involved "a 17 year old
Negro with a 7th grade education and possible mental defects").
75. See Remarks by the President, supra note 1.
76. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
77. Id. at 134, 137.
78. Id. at 134.
79. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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choice.80 The Court considered whether practical access to assistance
from a "jailhouse lawyer" could be barred where such a bar meant the
realistic denial of an illiterate and poor-access inmate to federal habeas
corpus relief.8 1 Significantly, and perhaps ironically, the opinion in
Johnson is authored by Abe Fortas, the then lawyer who successfully
argued Gideon just seven years earlier. 82 While declining sub silentio to
extend Gideon to postconviction relief attempts, 83 Justice Fortas wrote,
presumably as a matter of Due Process: "[U]nless and until the State
provides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation
of petitions for postconviction relief, it may not validly enforce a

80. Id. at 485. Johnson, after being placed in solitary confinement, initially sought
relief by way of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Johnson, 393 U.S.
483 (1969) (No. 40). The district court, viewing the request liberally, treated the complaint
as a petition for federal habeas corpus. Id. at 484. The Court, in addressing the allowance
of consideration for habeas corpus relief, said, in terms that would be rather surprising in
today's climate: "This Court has constantly emphasized the fundamental importance of the
writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme, and the Congress has demonstrated its
solicitude for the vigor of the Great Writ. The Court has steadfastly insisted that 'there is
no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired."' Id. at 485 (quoting Bowen v. Johnston,
306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939)).
Because the purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain
their freedom, it is fundamental that prisoners' access to the courts, for the purpose of
presenting their complaints, is not denied or obstructed. For example, a state may not make
the writ available only to prisoners who could pay a $4 filing fee. Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708, 712-14 (1961). The Court has insisted that, for the indigent as well as the affluent
prisoner, postconviction proceedings must be more than a formality. For instance, the state
is obligated to furnish a transcript or equivalent recording of prior habeas corpus hearings
to prisoners not otherwise able to obtain it for use in further proceedings. Long v. Dist. Ct.
of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 194-95 (1966). Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
81. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 487.
82. Id. at 484; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335-36.
83. See Johnson, 393 U.S. at 483. The Court in Mempa ruled in favor of applying
Gideon to sentencing only because it viewed sentencing as a continuation of the trial
process. 389 U.S. at 134-37. The application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
consistently been determined to be limited to the critical stages of the trial process. That
process ends with sentencing. Id. at 133-34. The issue of appointed counsel for an indigent
defendant once the trial process has ended, based on considerations other than the Sixth
Amendment, was addressed in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), where it was
determined that, where the State guarantees a defendant a right to appeal following
conviction, it cannot, consistent with equal protection and due process, deny appointed
counsel for an indigent appellant. Id. at 357-58. The non-application of an absolute right
for appointed counsel in discretionary appeals or postconviction relief challenging the
conviction or sentence was determined by the Court in Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 610
(1974) (regarding discretionary appeals), and Murray v. Giarratano,492 U.S. 1, 26 (1989)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Maccollom, 426 U.S. 317, 328 (1976)
(regarding postconviction relief sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255).
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regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates from furnishing
such assistance to other prisoners."84
In Bounds v. Smith,8 5 the court again considered the need of poor and
often illiterate prisoners for assistance in perfecting postconviction
claims absent a right to appointed counsel. In Bounds, North Carolina
inmates sought, via a civil action, to require the state to provide adequate
libraries or adequate persons trained in the law to help provide inmates
meaningful access to the courts to pursue federal habeas corpus or
postconviction relief.8 6

Absent the availability of a Sixth Amendment rationale for requiring
appointed counsel in a post-sentencing context, the Court, relying on
Avery, nonetheless recognized some of the same values associated with
effective assistance of counsel.87 The Court, relying on Avery and Griffin
v. Illinois,88 recognized that a constitutional right to access to the courts
for habeas corpus review requires that access be meaningful.89
Consistent with the Court's past application of the Griffin analysis,90 the
Court in Bounds held that the Constitution mandated prisoners be
provided access to an adequate law library or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law.91
B. ProtectionAgainst UnreasonableSearch and Seizure
Today, many of us would immediately associate the name of Don King
with his role as a professional boxing promoter with a unique hair style. 92
However, his connection to a landmark case at the foundation of racial
justice and expansion of individual rights for all Americans under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 93 as incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment, is just as interesting and
significant. In 1957, Donald "the Kid" King, then twenty-five years old,
84. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 490.
85. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
86. See id. at 818.
87. Id. at 831.
88. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
89. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
90. Cf. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1971) (recognizing that the
state, consistent with due process and equal protection requirements, may meet its
constitutional obligation of providing court access via a free transcript for appeal as-of-right
purposes or by employing an adequate substitute, such as use of codefendant or prosecution
transcripts).
91. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830-31.
92. See Don King, BIOGRAPHY.coM, http://www.biography.com/people/don-king-40721
(last visited Sept. 16, 2017).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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had already had several run-ins with the law, several of which were
connected to allegations of gambling. On May 20th of that year, a bomb
was detonated at King's home in Cleveland, Ohio. King, suspecting that
the bombing was connected to the activities of another suspected
gambling "boss," contacted the Cleveland Police Department. 94
As a result of the investigation, attention soon focused on the residence
of Dollree Mapp, a reputed "numbers runner." An anonymous tipster
reported to the police that Virgil Ogletree, one of the suspected bombers,
could be found at Mapp's address.9 5 Dollree Mapp, an African-American
woman who passed away in December 2014, has been referred to as "[t]he
Rosa Parks of the Fourth Amendment."9 6 She was long believed by
Cleveland law enforcement to have extended involvement in "numbers"
gambling in the African-American community. As described by Carolyn
Long, "numbers" or "policy" were forms of a daily lottery prominent in
many large cities, particularly in African-American communities.97
These communities largely considered the enforcement of gambling laws
against numbers participants to be racially motivated.9 8
The May 23, 1957, confrontation between Mapp and the Cleveland
police 99 was destined to change the State's responsibility to respect
reasonable expectations of privacy and the consequences of any violation
of that responsibility for criminal prosecutions. The confrontation began
when Officer Delau of the Cleveland Police arrived at Mapp's address on
the same afternoon he received the anonymous tip regarding Ogletree.
Without a warrant, Delau rang Mapp's doorbell. When Mapp responded
by coming to an upstairs window, the officer indicated that he wanted to
"come in and look around." Mapp, an assertive woman not accustomed to
backing down, immediately contacted her lawyer's office while Delau
repeatedly pounded on the door demanding entrance. A lawyer at her
attorney's firm advised Mapp to ask for a warrant. Officer Delau

94. MARTINEZ, supra note 36, at 75, 77-78.
95.

JOHN S. DEMPSEY & LINDA S. FORsT, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLICING 384 (2011);

MARTINEZ, supranote 36, at 77.
96. Ken Armstrong, Dollree Mapp, 1923-2014: The Rosa Parks of the Fourth
Amendment, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/printpost/2014/12/08/dollree-mapp- 1923-2014-the-rosa-parks-of-the-fourth-amendment.
97. CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIo: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES 10 (2006).

98. Id. One observer is quoted as saying, "The white police officers who invaded Dollree
Mapp's home did so with confidence that they would not be called to task for violating her
fundamental rights by entering her home without a warrant." Id. at 11.
99. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961).
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admitted that he did not have a warrant. Mapp refused to admit the
officers.100
Three hours later, the Cleveland police again sought entrance after
consulting with police headquarters. This time, police forced open the
door and refused to allow Mapp's attorney, who had since arrived, access
to the house. Again, Mapp demanded a warrant. 101 The officers pretended
to have a warrant by waiving about a piece of paper, 102 although police
later admitted that it was not a warrant. Mapp seized the paper and
stuffed it into her bosom. 103 Officer Delau struggled with Mapp and
violated her personal dignity by reaching into her clothes to retrieve the
fake warrant despite Mapp's objections.1 04 Offended by Mapp's "attitude,"
which Officer Delau described as belligerent, police arrested Mapp and
searched her apartment and basement, including areas where no fugitive
suspected bomber could possibly hide, such as drawers and a chest. 105 In
fact, Ogletree was in another apartment of the building.106
Determined to find something incriminating, police ultimately
discovered a trunk filled with what was later claimed to be obscene
material. 107 This material was deemed enough to serve as pretext for
arrest. Initially, Mapp was charged with possession of obscene
material.1 08 In conference,109 the Justices decided that rather than
reviewing the conviction on the issue of obscenity, this case presented the
10 by incorporating
opportunity to overrule its ruling in Wolf v. Coloradoo
1
the Fourth Amendment to the states ' and extending the federal
system's exclusionary rule.11 2

100. MARTINEZ, supra note 36, at 77-78.
101. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644.
102. MARTINEZ, supra note 36, at 80.
103. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644-45.
104. MARTINEZ, supra note 36, at 80.
105. Id.; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 645.
106. MARTINEZ, supranote 36, at 80.
107. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 645.
108. Lewis R. Katz, Mapp after Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America, 52 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 471, 471 (Winter 2001).
109. The Court in Mapp recognized that the appellant "chose to urge what may have
appeared to be the surer ground [(First Amendment)]" and that it was the amicus curiae
that urged the Court to overrule Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding that the
exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), was not binding on the
states). Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646 n.3.
110. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
111. Id. at 33.
112. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
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As profound an influence as Mapp has had on administering criminal
justice for all, the significance of.the case as part of the ongoing struggle
for racial justice cannot be ignored. Professor Katz pointed out that Mapp
is one of three hallmark cases, along with Brown v. Board of Education"13
and Baker v. Carr,114 defining the Warren Court, and that all three deal,
directly or indirectly, with race.11 5 Katz succinctly states the proposition
regarding Mapp's racial justice significance:
The impact of Mapp was naturally greatest in the African-American
community where Fourth Amendment violations were the most
common. Whatever limited effect Mapp would have, it would be felt
most where police conduct was the least restrained. It was this
community which the Warren Court intended to benefit by the due
process revolution, because wherever injustice existed in America, its
worst impact was felt in the black community." 6
Professor Ogletree explained the racial justice impact of Mapp and
cases like it in terms used by W.E.B. DuBois, speaking to the duality of
African-American life and consciousness in America.11 7 This "twoness,"
which grows from the racial divide in America, manifests itself in the
racial insult borne by both the individual and the African-American
community. Thus, "[w]hen Dolly [sic] Mapp, an African-American
woman, suffered the indignity of police officers illegally entering her
home, claiming to have a non-existing search warrant, ... the indignity
was both personal to her and an affront to the African-American
community."118
The issue of race and its relationship to permissible Fourth
Amendment activity was squarely brought to the attention of the Court
seven years later in a case that would once again profoundly shape

113. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
115. Katz, supra note 108, at 475.
116. Id. at 482.
117. DuBois wrote:
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight
in this American world,-a world which yields him no self-consciousness, but
only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a
peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness .... One never feels the twoness,an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from
being torn asunder.
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Conference on CriticalRace Theory: When the Rainbow is Not
Enough, 31 NEw ENG. L. REV. 705 (1997) (emphasis omitted) (quoting W.E.B. DUBois, THE
SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 5 (1996)).
118. Id. at 707.
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individual rights for all Americans. This time, a changed Court did not
use the opportunity presented in Terry v. Ohio'19 to expand protection to
restrict individual privacy. The essence of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment is that any invasion of a protected privacy interest
must be based on sufficient individualized suspicion.120 While the Court
indicated that the requisite suspicion may be less than probable cause
under some circumstances, the Court has never completely done away
with the need for some level of suspicion. 121 The issue in Terry was
whether that suspicion base must always be individualized or whether
constitutionally-required suspicion may be based on suspicion of an
entire class of persons to which an individual belongs. 122 When suspicion
is based on race, it fails to be individualized.
On October 31, 1963, Officer Martin McFadden was on patrol and in
plainclothes in Cleveland, Ohio. Officer McFadden approached several
individuals standing in front of a department store in the middle of the
afternoon. Initially, the African-American individuals drew the officer's
attention because, as the officer stated, "[something] didn't look right to
me at the time." 123 Then, and in the decades since Terry, only vague
explanations have been offered as to what "didn't look right" other than
that the officer had a hunch that criminal activity was afoot based on his
experience. McFadden did not act until a white male joined the two
African-American men in conversation. This concerned the officer
enough to approach the trio, identify himself as a police officer, and ask
for names. The mumbled responses of the trio allegedly made the officer
both suspicious and concerned for his safety. 124 McFadden thereafter
conducted a pat-down search of the trio which revealed that the two
African-Americans had handguns on their person. 125 No threat or
attempted reach for the weapons was reported. Neither did any
individual say or do anything to suggest an intent to commit a criminal
act.126

These types of confrontations have long been the focus of much concern
in the African-American community to the extent they suggest that

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See id. at 20-22.
See, e.g., id. at 27.
See id. at 9-10.
Id. at 5.
MARTINEZ, supra note 36, at 156-57.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
See id.
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suspicion is based less on individuals' behavior and more on their race.1 27
In its amicus brief, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund noted that "stop and
frisk" is used by law enforcement most frequently against the poor and
persons of color. 128 The concern was dramatically stated in the testimony
of Marilyn Fullwood, from Los Angeles, who stated: "I am married to
Raymond Fullwood, a Negro. Because I am Caucasian, in the five years
of our marriage, we have been stopped no less than twenty times by Los
Angeles police officers.... I am certain that the reason they chose to stop
us is because we are a mixed couple."1 29

The Legal Defense Fund (Fund) urged the Court to consider the issue
of racial injustice in addressing Terry as a matter of Fourth Amendment
doctrine rather than an obscenity case.1 30 The Fund believed "that
Amendment protects the unpopular, the Negro, and all our citizens alike,
from subjection to the oppressive police discretion which stop and frisk
embodies."1 3 1 In this context, the Fund pointed out that the parties
affected by stop-and-frisk go beyond the typical appellant or petitioner
concerned with overcoming their own admittedly guilty conduct. 32 The
issue was of vital concern not only to criminal defendants but to the
"thousands of our citizens who have been. . . stopped and frisked yearly,
only to be released when the police find them innocent of any crime."1 33
Nonetheless, the Court's opinion focused on whether an officer can
have a reasonable, even if somewhat abstract, hypothesis of crime.1 34 The
127. The issue of the race of the individuals playing a part in the officer's suspicion was
raised to McFadden, but dismissed simply because he said race was not a factor. Lewis R.
Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five:A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L. REV. 429 (2004).
128. Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae
at 4, Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74, 67) [hereinafter Brief for the N.A.A.C.P.].
129. CRAY, THE BIG BLUE LINE 31 (1967) (quoting Report: Police Malpractice and the
Watts Riot, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California 15-16 (1965)). Cray
documents the prevalence of the police practice of accosting interracial couples for other
cities as well. See generally id.; see also Rexroth, The Fuzz, 14 PLAYBOY 76 (July 1967).
130. Brief for the N.A.A.C.P., supra note 128, at *3-4.
131. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at *4-7.
133. Id. at *4-5.
134. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10-13. The Court considered and decided on the same day the
companion case, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In Sibron, the Court drew a
distinction between two defendants convicted in New York. One defendant, Sibron, was
followed over an extended period of time by a patrol officer, who observed Sibron talking
with known drug users. Without observing any conduct the officer could describe as
"suspicious" or "criminal," Sibron was asked to go outside of a restaurant where, after being
questioned, he reached into his pocket. The officer, suspicious but not testifying that he
feared for his safety, also reached into the defendant's pocket, where drugs were recovered.
Id. at 45. The Court determined that without probable cause for arrest, the search of Sibron
could not be justified as incident to arrest; in addition, the search did not meet the frisk
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racial justice challenge regarding Fourth Amendment activity and
criminal justice reform was suggested but avoided in Terry, and later in
Whren v. United States,135 and remains an issue of interest and
significance for the communities of color. This is particularly true
considering current concern over racial profiling. 136
Racial profiling has become a fact of everyday life for many Americans.
Professor David A. Harris reported in 1999 that, in a study of motorists
traveling along the New Jersey Turnpike, African-Americans made up
approximately 35% of those stopped for traffic violations and 73.2% of
those arrested. These statistics are even more significant considering
that African-Americans made up only 13.5% of the turnpike motorists.137
The importance of federal habeas corpus as a safeguard against
race-infused convictions and, perhaps, unwarranted prosecutions
resulting from Fourth Amendment abuses, such as racial profiling, was
missed by the Court when it severely limited the cognizability of such
claims under section 2254138 of title twenty-eight of the United States
Code.139 In Stone v. Powell,140 the Court considered one defendant's claim
that testimony concerning a murder weapon found on his person at the
time of arrest should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment

doctrine of Terry. Id. at 63-64. Almost thirty years later, in Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806 (1996), the issue of the role that racial perception might play in justifying a stop
was hinted at, but not completely resolved. See id. at 813.

135. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
136. Although racial profiling is a term that is fast becoming a substitute for a wide
range of racist conduct and policies, the concept is more properly described as the
establishment of policy, usually governmental and most often law enforcement, based on
the assignment of behavioral characteristics or conduct expectations to individuals because
of perceived statistical correlations or stereotypes based on race. Racial Profiling:
Definition, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/racial-profiling-definition (last visited Mar.
14, 2018). While racial profiling pretends to be based on social science, it is, in fact, more
often a reflection of America's basic racial fears. The black and brown male in particular is
often stereotyped as drug dependent (or dealing), bedecked in gold chains, dark glasses,
and amoral.

137. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black"Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 279 (1999). Professor Harris details the shortcomings
concerning the statistical justifications for racial profiling:
As appealing as this argument[, targeting Blacks on the basis of supposed higher
crime involvement,] may sound, it is fraught with problems because its
underlying premise is dubious at best. Government statistics on drug offenses,
which are the basis for the great majority of pretext traffic stops, tell us virtually
nothing about the racial breakdown of those involved in drug crime.
Id. at 294.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2017).
139. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976).
140. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest. 141 In the companion
case, the Court considered the defendant's claim that evidence admitted
against him violated the Fourth Amendment because of an invalid search
warrant. 142 In both cases, the Court held that the lower court's
determination upholding the admissibility of the evidence provided a
"full and fair" litigation of the issue.143 The Court further held that
Fourth Amendment claims of improper application of the exclusionary
rule were not cognizable in federal habeas corpus where the claim had
been fully and fairly litigated in the state court. 14 The Court rested its
opinion on two premises. First, Fourth Amendment claims do not address
the central concern of habeas corpus, which is the actual guilt or
innocence of the defendant. Second, the exclusionary rule's purpose of
deterring unwanted police conduct is not served by § 2254 determination,
which may occur long after the alleged wrongful conduct and the
subsequent state review of such conduct. 145
Professors Hoffmann and Stuntz criticize the Court's conclusions. The
authors point out that constitutional principles of criminal procedure,
long protected by the Court both on appeal and in postconviction review,
include a mixture of values beyond the reliability of guilt
determination.1 46 Additionally, they can find no "deterrence-based
argument for treating Fourth Amendment claims differently from
anything else in constitutional criminal procedure."1 47
The Court has subsequently recognized the importance of not
extending Stone beyond its limitation of Fourth Amendment claims. In

141. Id. at 469.
142. Id. at 472-73.
143. Id. at 481-82.
144. Id.
145. See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the
Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65 (1993).
146. Id. at 110.
147. Id. at 111. The authors propose that rather than the current system of procedural
default and Stone cognizability limitations:
. . . [T]wo "tracks" of habeas relief-one focused on the protection of innocents,
the other focused on deterrence. On the first track, petitioners who can
demonstrate a reasonable probability of innocence would receive de novo review
of their federal claims, free of the restrictions currently imposed by the habeas
doctrines of procedural default and retroactivity. On the second track,
petitioners who cannot make a sufficient showing of innocence would have their
federal claims (whether legal, factual, or mixed, and including those Fourth
Amendment claims now barred in habeas under Stone v. Powell) reviewed solely
to determine if the state court acted reasonably in denying them; such
deferential review is all that is needed for habeas to fulfill its deterrence role.
Id. at 69. The proposal of the authors would be in keeping with recognizing the importance
of deterring the wrongful influence of race on the criminal justice system.
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Kimmelman v. Morrison,148 the Court declined to extend Stone to Sixth
Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.14 9 In Withrow v.
Williams,15 0 the Court likewise found that Fifth Amendment claims
under Miranda v. Arizona 51 were still justiciable in federal habeas
corpus despite state court review. 152
C. Race and Confession
There is no more iconic case of the Warren Court's constitutionalizedcriminal-procedure revolution than Miranda.153 Its place is sealed not
only in our legal lexicon but in our social and political milieu by
symbolizing the tension between the individual and the state through the
litany of "Miranda Rights." The concept of Miranda Rights is that, in the
incommunicado setting of police station interrogation, a person may
shield themselves with certain rights grafted onto our legal and cultural
reality. Like the right to counsel and Fourth Amendment protections, the
expanded protection against often-abusive police overreaching in
interrogation settings articulated by the Court spoke to the agenda of
racial justice.15 4

Dating back at least to the late nineteenth century, police tactics in
interrogating suspects have a long history of reliance on coercion and
out-right torture.1 55 The infamous "third degree," 156 associated with the
infliction of physical and psychological pain to obtain confessions, became

148. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
149. Id. at 382-83.
150. 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
151. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 682-83.
153. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
154.
Similarly, Miranda grew out of a painful history of cases addressing gross police
over-reaching in the interrogation of suspects, many of whom were minorities.
Indeed, police abuses against minority suspects, especially in the former slave
states, often involved staggering and unabashed racism and injustice. One early
example is Moore v. Dempsey, where [BIlack suspects were tortured until they
confessed. Later cases included Brown v. Mississippi, where the Court
overturned convictions because the suspects were whipped and beaten (though,
according to state officials, "not too much for a Negro") ....
John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Ross Feldmann, Education and Interrogation:
ComparingBrown and Miranda, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 321, 328 (2005).
155. Tracey Maclin, A ComprehensiveAnalysis of the History of InterrogationLaw, with
Some Shots Directed at Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B. U. L. REV. 1387, 1391 (2015).
156. "The process of extracting a confession or information from a suspect or prisoner by
prolonged questioning, the use of threats, or physical torture." Third Degree, BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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part of American culture and its perception of law enforcement.15 7 Media
coverage in the closing decades of the 1800s, through at least the 1930s,
recognized that police regularly engaged in tactics such as the sweat box,
hanging suspects by the neck, and use of incommunicado detention.158
Less prominent in the public acknowledgement of police torture was
the connection between the use of torture and race. Police abuse of
African-Americans was particularly prominent in southern, former slave
60
states. 5 9 The first example of such to reach the Court was Brown.o
Yet
Brown was hardly alone in the Court's reporting or consideration of
torture tactics used against African-American suspects. As noted by
Professor Maclin, "In the eight years following Brown, the Court heard
six more confession cases coming from southern state courts where
[African-American] defendants alleged their confessions had been
coerced."'61
This trail of cases involving confessions resulting from brutality
ultimately led to official disavowal of the third degree as a sanctioned
method of interrogation. The "Wickersham Report," commissioned by
President Herbert Hoover, condemned the use of physical coercion and
called for the adoption of alternative methods of interrogation.1 62
Judicial response, keying in on the lack of reliability of confessions
obtained from brutality, developed an "involuntary" or "coerced
confessions" rule. Building on its handling of Brown, the Court, through
a series of cases, crafted an approach to confessions derived from torture,
depending less on disapproval of race-inspired violence and more on the
probative value of statements gained through such mechanisms.
Building on the common-law proscription against coerced confessions as
unreliable, 63 the Court developed a complex due process-based matrix to
determine the constitutional permissibility of admission of statements
157.

See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 66-74 (2008).

158. Id. at 67-68.
159. Blume et al., Education and Interrogation,supranote 154, at 328.
160. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 278.
161. Maclin, supra note 155, at 1392. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Vernon v. State, 200 So. 560 (Ala. 1941), rev'd
per curiam, 313 U.S. 547 (1941); Lomax v. State, 144 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940),
rev'd per curiam, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); White v. State, 128 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1939),
rev'd per curiam, 309 U.S. 631 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 191 So. 260 (Ala. 1939), rev'd per
curiam, 309 U.S. 629 (1940).
162. Hoover, concerned about the administration of criminal justice as well as the
growth of organized crime, appointed an eleven-member commission to review the
shortcomings of criminal justice. The eleven reports ultimately issued, though important,
had little immediate impact on the use of torture. See LEO, supra note 157, at 44-45 n.2.
163. See OTIS STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 17 (1973);
LEO, supra note 157. See also, e.g., 3 WIGMORE EVIDENCE §§ 816, 817 & 821 (3d ed. 1940).
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derived from coercion on a case-by-case basis. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the Court weighed the probative value of such
statements, along with whether the confession was the product of free
will.164

Concern regarding the effectiveness of torture-like tactics in producing
usable confessions, growing judicial concern over reliability and
voluntariness, and growing public distaste over reported brutal acts
caused reform of the training and approach of police officers. Recognizing
the recommendation for change in the Wickersham Report, police
developed new techniques, using behavioral science and psychology, as
an alternative to physical violence. 16 Psychological manipulation
became a cornerstone of modern interrogation. 16 6 The police training
manual became central to developing psychological manipulation
skills. 167
In 1962, Professor Fred Inbau of Northwestern University, along with
John E. Reid, published the first edition of what would become the
standard text for police training.1 68 Professor Inbau, who was once the
director of the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory in Chicago,
developed and taught interrogation techniques relying on deceit,
deception, and tricks to produce incriminating statements. His method
also relied on presenting the suspect with large amounts of damaging
facts in order to persuade confession. The use of these psychological
techniques was touted as a reform and replacement for the third degree.
It was the coercive nature of these techniques in incommunicado
interrogation settings that formed a large part of the concern expressed
by the Warren Court in Miranda.

164. In Chambers v. Florida,309 U.S. 227 (1940), the Court overturned the convictions
of four African-Americans sentenced to death. Id. at 242. Although Justice Black's opinion
clearly recognizes the strong racial animosity present in the treatment of these defendants,
who were subjected to continuous day and night interrogation without food or access to
family (and, according to conflicting testimony, most likely physical abuse), it emphasizes
the untrustworthiness and involuntariness of the resulting statements as contrary to due
process. Id. at 230-31. The extreme presence and reliance on racism permeated the action
of law enforcement throughout this case. Following the discovery of the murder victim, local
authorities conducted a race-based sweep of the Fort Lauderdale community and seized
twenty-five to forty African-Americans living in the area. It was from this group that the
petitioners were selected for questioning. Id. at 229. A grueling, non-stop, two-day
interrogation, that produced a confession was also the fact pattern ofAshcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 149 (1944).
165. LEO, supra note 157, at 106.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 107.
168. See generally FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(4th ed. 2001).
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Mirandais seen as a statement on the relative balance of the position
between the police and a criminal suspect in an in-custody interrogation
setting. The Court found that the somewhat amorphous totality-of-thecircumstances approach, of the coerced or involuntary confession test,
under due process failed to give adequate guidance and control regarding
police infringement
of the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination in the coercive environment of the interrogation
room. 169 Less discussed, but nonetheless present, are the racial justice
imperatives still present in police interrogation despite the
Inbau-inspired use of psychological manipulation. Various scholars have
noted that race and Mirandaare "inextricably intertwined." 170
Ernesto Arturo Miranda, of Hispanic descent, was convicted of rape in
1963. "Miranda, by [many] accounts, was a disturbed young man." 17 1 He
was taken into custody for questioning after a vehicle identified in the
investigation of the rape and two prior attempted rapes was linked to a
residence where he lived with the vehicle's owner. Following a somewhat
unreliable line-up identification by the rape victim, Miranda was tricked
into giving a confession by the investigating officer using the ploy of
telling a "half-truth"-a tactic consistent with the Inbau-developed
psychological manipulation technique described earlier.1 72
At no time was Miranda advised of a right to remain silent or to have
counsel present during interrogation.1 73 The Court had previously
determined, in Escobedo v. Illinois,174 that a suspect cannot be denied
access to counsel during interrogation once the investigation has
"narrowed" its focus on the accused.17 5 The Court then considered
questions unanswered in Escobedo, such as what affirmative duty police
had to inform the suspect of his or her right to remain silent and to have
counsel present in a custodial interrogation setting regardless of whether
the investigation has "focused" on the suspect.1 76
The interest in the Court's inquiry went beyond the question of the
rights of suspects in general and included racial justice-a matter of
169. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
170. Blume et al., Education and Interrogation, supra note 154, at 332. "As previously
noted, most of the notorious examples of forced confessions through beatings and torture
occurred in the heavily segregated South. As police interrogation became more
sophisticated, the victims were still largely minorities and the offenders were mainly white
police officers." Id.
171. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492; MARTINEZ, supra note 36, at 117.
172. MARTINEZ, supra note 36, at 118-21.
173. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492.
174. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
175. Id. at 492.
176. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439-40.
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great concern in the 1960s. The "reforms" of psychological manipulation,
while moderating somewhat the rampant use of physical torture, had not
significantly lessened the coercive and racially disproportionate
experience of forced confessions. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren, in an
early draft of his Miranda majority opinion, stated: "In a series of cases
decided by this Court .

.

. Negro defendants were subjected to physical

to
extort
hangings,
whippings-employed
brutality-beatings,
confessions. In 1947, the President's Committee on Civil Rights probed
further into police violence upon minority groups." 177 Although this draft
language was modified by removing race-specific references, Chief
Justice Warren continued to rely on the history of racial injustice and the
third degree as support for the landmark reforms announced by the
majority.178 Indeed, the majority opinion concluded that psychological
coercion can be mental "torture," even without blood.179
The reason for the change from the earlier draft was linked to the need
to hold a majority vote together in what was ultimately a 5-4 decision.
Justice Brennan objected to turning police tactics in interrogation into a
"race problem," as opposed to a broader emphasis on the relative
disempowerment of poverty. 180 Warren omitted this passage in a
subsequent draft of the opinion in deference to Justice Clark, although
Justice Clark ultimately dissented. 181
The racial-justice significance of Mirandais also borne out considering
the broader context of the Civil Rights movement and its recognition of
the perceived strong link between crime and race. 182 Although the

177.

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPERCHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A

JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 591 (1983).
178. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447-48.
179. Id. at 448. In Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), the Court had previously
found that even so mild a "whip" as withholding access to contact with a spouse could be as
impermissibly coercive as physical beating for purposes of the coercive confession rule
under Due Process. Id. at 513-14.
180. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 751 n.254
(1992).
181. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
182. Professor Neuborne states:
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the gravitational pull of race on Warren Court
constitutional doctrine was in the areas of criminal law and procedure. It is hard
to overstate the sense of urgency driving the Court's concern over racial
discrimination in the enforcement of the criminal law.... The Warren Court's
most dramatic responses to law enforcement's interaction with the [B]lack
population were the Court's efforts in Mapp v Ohio to prevent the use of illegally
obtained evidence in criminal proceedings, and in Miranda v Arizona to impose
prophylactic rules on police interrogations.
Burt Neuborne, The GravitationalPull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV.
59, 85-86 (2010).
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NAACP Legal Defense Fund did not file an amicus brief in Mirandaperhaps because Thurgood Marshall, the Solicitor General for the United
States, had to argue the government's position-its activities in 1968
were well in line with supporting the need for reform of the criminal
justice system when it came to interrogations. 83
Gideon, Mapp, and Miranda were the foundations of not only the
criminal justice reform of the Warren Court but also a part of its
conscious address of the civil rights struggle. For these cases to have the
intended impact, a vehicle needed to exist for addressing decades of
injustice that had disproportionately filled the American prison system
with persons of color. The prison cell was as much a battle ground for
civil rights as a lunch counter, bus, or schoolhouse. The critical tool in
this endeavor was habeas corpus, with its ability to go beyond the cold
record and provide redress for those victimized by procedural inequality
and the politics of race. The Court's opinions in Townsend v. Sain,184
Sanders v. United States,186 and Fay v. NoiaSe were essential to meeting
this challenge.
II. HABEAS CORPUS AS A POSTCONVICTION RELIEF TOOL FOR ADDRESSING
RACIAL INJUSTICE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

To understand the significance of federal habeas corpus as a
postconviction relief tool for the racial justice reform efforts of the Warren
Court, it is first necessary to consider the historic context and
development of the extraordinary writ. From its relatively humble
beginnings18 7 in England through most of its history within the United

183. See Seidman, supra note 180, at 748; Blume et al., Education and Interrogation,
supra note 154, at 332.
184. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
185. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
186. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
187. William Duker suggests that, despite the popular trend of linking the origins of
habeas corpus to the Magna Carta as an engine to "defeat the king's own orders" as in the

celebrated 1604 King's Bench writ to the jailer regarding the confinement of Walter
Witherley, who was held for disobedience of the King's commands, the actual origin might
be traced back to the humbler purpose of discouraging individuals using "self-help" to
redress neighborhood feudal spats.
In the laws of King Ine (688-725 A.D.), the general principle of the new order
was laid down: "If anyone exacts redress, before he pleads for justice, he shall
give up what he has taken, and pay as much again, and 30 shillings
compensation." The aim of the Anglo-Saxon code in general was to restrain
private vengeance. . . . Implementation of the new order required that a

mechanism be developed to ensure appearance before the "courts of law" and to
guarantee the payment of wergeld.
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 (1980).
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States, habeas corpus has served as a window by which the "justness" of
government and society was exposed. Halliday proclaims that, for more
than four centuries, habeas corpus has been the device through which we
hear the workings of justice as it pertains to ultimate right and wrong.1 88
Prisoners of conscience, political prisoners, and those whose confinement
represented more than just the technical issue of guilt or innocence of a
specific offense, have throughout history used habeas corpus to plead
their case. Thus, it was that the political prisoner John Lilburne wrote
that human judges, like God, should hear the sighs and moans of his poor,
oppressed, and distressed prisoners. 189
Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the form of habeas corpus most
associated with the postconviction relief explored in this Article,1 90 was
designated by Blackstone as "the great and efficacious writ, in all manner
of illegal confinement . . . directed to the person detaining another, and
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner." 191 As a result of
the ongoing struggle between the Crown and Parliament, and in light of
the growing concern regarding infamous examples of deprivations of
liberty, Parliament enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,192 which
required habeas corpus relief be available. 193 The Act specifically
provided that prisoners had the right to challenge their detention by
demanding judicial review from the justices of the King's Bench. 194
By the time of the American Revolution, the English Writ of Habeas
Corpus was firmly established in the soon-to-be United States. The Writ

Anthony Gregory links the origin of habeas corpus to the somewhat later milestone of
Henry I's Assize of Clarendon in 1166. The Assize, also associated with the origin of the
Grand Jury, "included an early version of the command 'have the body.' This order operated
to bring accused robbers, murderers, thieves, or receivers before the judge." ANTHONY
GREGORY, THE POWER OF HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: FROM THE KING'S PREROGATIVE TO

THE WAR ON TERROR 14 (2013).
188.

PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS 1 (2010).

189. JOHN LILBURNE, THE PRISONERS MOURNFULL CRY, AGAINST THE JUDGES OF THE
KINGS BENCH; AN EPISTLE WRIT BY LIEUT. COL. JOHN LILBURNE, PRISONER IN THE TOWER

OF LONDON (1648).
190. Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is defined literally as "you should have the body
for submitting." Halliday points out that though various other forms of habeas corpus (such
as cum causa and ad respondendum) might seem to resemble subjiciendum from the
thirteenth century on, "generally these medieval writs did not display any impulse to make
a vigorous review of the circumstances underlying an imprisonment order made by other
magistrates. HALLIDAY, supra note 188, at 16.
191.

WILLIAM C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, ABRIDGED 329 (1985).

192. Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Char. 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
193. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 767 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
194.

2 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA

729 (Wilbur R. Miller ed., 2012).
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played an essential role in developing the radical ideology at the root of
the American revolutionary spirit.1 95 The Revolution and its principles
served to usher in habeas corpus as a statutory guarantee throughout
the new states.196 Yet, of particular interest is the relation of race to the
history of the use of the concept of "producing the body" and justifying its
captivity. It is, ironically, the use of habeas corpus in England that
documents one of the earliest associations of the extraordinary writ with
racial justice.
In 1749, under the laws of Virginia, James Somerset was made a slave
to Charles Stewart. Somerset was born in Africa and violently removed
from his home there in his early teens.19 7 While accompanying Stewart
to England in 1771, he sought to escape by fleeing his "master."
Recaptured by Stewart, Somerset was placed on a ship bound for Jamaica
where, presumably as his punishment, he was to be sold on the open slave
market. 198 Abolitionist Francis Hargrave, made aware of Somerset's
plight, sought habeas corpus on Somerset's behalf to bring him before the
King's Bench.199 The Court, finding that enslavement was an insufficient
cause for Somerset's confinement, ordered him released. 200 It is
significant that using habeas corpus to seek freedom from slavery in
Somerset's case became the basis for the much more widely-known use
of habeas corpus in the case of Dred Scott to fight the racial injustice of
slavery.
Dred Scott, a St. Louis, Missouri slave, sued in habeas seeking the
freedom of his wife, two children, and himself. 201 In one of the most
infamous decisions of the Court, Scott's claim was rejected. 202
Following the rationale in Somerset, slaves who were taken to
non-slavery jurisdictions were deemed to revert to their natural status
as free persons in several states, including Missouri. 203 The key to the
success of Somerset and those American cases until Scott was habeas's
ability to assert that Africans, no matter where displaced, were human
beings by nature
njoying the natural rights of human beings-at least
195. GREGORY, supra note 187, at 44.
196. Id. at 55. In 1777, habeas corpus was specifically added as a guaranteed protection
in the constitution of Georgia. Likewise, in 1789, New York adopted provisions modeled
after the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, with New Jersey doing so in 1795. Id.
197. HALLIDAY, supra note 188, at 192.
198. Id.
199. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 499 (K.B. 1772).
200. Id. at 510.
201. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 400 (1856).
202. Id. at 454.
203. Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politicsof Law, 20 HAMLINE
L. REV. 1, 17 (1996).
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in jurisdictions not bound by the acceptance of slavery within their
borders. 204 Habeas had the ability to cut through oppressive definitions
created by other jurisdictions through its inherent nature as a collateral
attack. Collateral attack-the essence of habeas corpus-allowed an
independent jurisdiction to speak to the wrongs of another jurisdiction
while not being bound by stare decisis. 205 This concept later became the
heart of federal habeas corpus postconviction relief via 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.206 Unfortunately, history also showed an oppressive side of
habeas corpus when it came to racial justice.
In the earlier 1800s, the role of federal habeas corpus in the
administration of federalism was the opposite of what is reflected today
in § 2254.207 Federal courts had the power to review federal detentions
and state courts had the power to issue habeas corpus as to both state
and federal detentions. 208 Events in 1816 and 1817 involving the threat
of arrest of federal tax collectors by state officials threatened the
enforcement of federal law. This long struggle over federalism led to the
detention, in 1833, of federal officials by South Carolina under the
Nullification Acts. 209 Congress thereafter passed the Force Act, 210 which
granted power to the Court, or any federal district court, to grant habeas
corpus relief to anyone held in custody by, inter alia, any state for any
act done in furtherance of federal law. 211 The Act was never used to

protect federal tax collectors, but was used to support slavery. "[I]t was
used to rescue slave catchers who were arrested and held by state
governments." 212

204. See Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandford: The Court's Most Dreadful Case and How
It Changed History, 82 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3, 14 (2007).
205. CollateralAttack, BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
207. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 81 (1789), did not empower federal courts to issue
writs of habeas corpus in instances of persons held pursuant to a state order except for the
purpose of producing such persons to testify. See Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Issue
Writ of Habeas Corpus to Relieve Commitment by State Court, 21 HARv. L. REV. 204 (1908).
208. GREGORY, supra note 187, at 84.
209. In protest and to counter what was seen as high tariffs imposed during the Andrew
Jackson administration, South Carolina passed the "nullification act in November 1832
that declared that the tariff acts of 1832 and 1828 were unconstitutional and therefore null
and void in the state." Douglas A. Irwin, Antebellum Tariff Politics: Regional Coalitions
and Shifting Economic Interests, 51 J.L. & EcON. 715, 730 (2008).
210. 4 Stat. 632 (1833).
211. Id. at 634-35.
212. GREGORY, supra note 187, at 85; Ex Parte Jenkins, 13 Fed. Cas. 445 (1853); Ex
Parte Sifford, 22 Fed. Cas. 105 (1857).
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The Compromise of 1850 solidified the federal government's ability to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. 213 The Fugitive Slave Act penalized
officials who did not arrest suspected runaway slaves, who were to be
arrested without any right to trial or, ironically, habeas corpus. 214
Ableman v. Booth215 epitomized the role and use of habeas corpus in
relationship to the divisive question of slavery. This case not only
established the supremacy of federal power over state habeas corpus, but
also became the cornerstone for the later recognition of the supremacy of
federal habeas corpus over state law. 216 In Ableman, Joshua Glover was

a runaway slave. 217 His escape from jail was alleged to have been aided
by Sherman Booth in violation of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Booth,
detained under the Act, successfully petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Nonetheless, Booth was later tried and
convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Wisconsin
for violating the Fugitive Slave Act and was detained again. Another writ
of habeas corpus was sought from the state court and granted. This time,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the Fugitive Slave Act
unconstitutional and that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction
over Booth.218

Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Taney upheld the
supremacy of federal courts on the issue of federal law. 219 In so doing,

Taney stated, "[Als regards the decision of the District Court, it had
exclusive and final jurisdiction by the laws of the United States; and
neither the regularity of its proceedings nor the validity of its sentence
could be called in question in any other court." 220 Given the views

expressed by Taney in Scott regarding federal court supremacy over state
law, the Court became embroiled in the post-civil-war reconstruction of
federal habeas corpus power-particularly pertaining to racial justice. 221

213. 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
214. GREGORY, supra note 187, at 86.
215. 62 U.S. 506 (1859).
216. Wert writes, "During the Taney Court, however, federal habeas power for state
prisoners became an increasing reality for federal courts, as it was used to frustrate cases
prosecuted by northern states under their personal liberty laws." JUSTIN J. WERT, HABEAS
CORPUS IN AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 80 (2011).

217. See Ableman, 62 U.S. at 507.
218. Id. at 507-O8.
219. Id. at 515-16.
220. Id. at 526.
221. Habeas corpus and Justice Taney again became a focal point regarding the issues
(including slavery) of the nation as it entered the Civil War in regard to President Abraham
Lincoln's suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and its impact in Ex Parte Merryman,
17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Lincoln, fearing that a threatened secession of
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At its roots, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867222 was designed to "secure
the writ of habeas corpus to persons held in slavery or involuntary
servitude

contrary

to

the

Constitution

of the

United

States." 223

Specifically, the law provided that federal courts "shall have [the] power
to grant [the] writ of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his . . . liberty in violation of the constitution, or . . . any
treaty or law of the United States." 224 Of particular note is the reference

to "any person" restrained of liberty as opposed to "prisoners in jail," as
was previously referenced in legislation. 225
The Warren Court turned to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to justify
using habeas corpus as a postconviction review tool to address the
multitude of black and brown state prisoners whose incarceration was as
much a civil rights issue as school desegregation. The Warren Court,
faced with the perceived reluctance of states-particularly in the Southto "deal fairly with racially charged issues," 226 turned to expanding access
to federal habeas corpus.
Townsend and Fay became vehicles for both overcoming the barrier of
federalism and the implementation of the goals of the 1867 Habeas

Maryland, following the secession of Virginia, would literally starve Washington D.C. out
of existence, ordered General Winfield Scott to counter any effort to arm Maryland citizens
by use of "the most prompt, and efficient means ... including in the extreme necessity, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus." Abraham Lincoln: "Executive Order,"April 12,
1861, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=70145
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018). Merryman filed for a writ of habeas corpus following his arrest
by federal troops for possession of arms with intent to use them against the United States.
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147. Chief Justice Taney, took extraordinary steps to attempt to
hold a hearing on this request for federal habeas relief. Taney's actions were such that
many did not view him as impartial on the matter-particularly considering his association
with the decision in Scott. Relying on President Lincoln's statement, General George
Cadwalader refused to appear in response to Taney's granting of the writ on the grounds
that Lincoln had authorized the suspension of habeas corpus. Id. at 147-48. Ultimately
Taney backed down from seeking further to enforce the writ upon realizing that the Court
independently had no power to enforce it. Id. at 153.
222. 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
223. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1865).
224. 14 Stat. 385.
225. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81 (1789); Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57
§ 7, 4 Stat. 634 (1833); Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842); see also Lewis
Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI.
L. REV. 31, 33-35 (1965).
226. Neuborne, supranote 182, at 67.
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Corpus Act. The majority opinions in neither Townsend227 nor Noia 228
specifically mentioned the race of the defendants, but they were
presumably white. 229 The racial justice issues were never far from the
Court's mind. Indeed, in Noia, the Court addressed how its previous
habeas corpus ruling in Brown v. Allen 230 drew upon the Judiciary Act of
1867, which was passed in large part to vindicate the rights of those
recently freed from slavery. 231 Recognizing the federal court's obligation
to provide a forum for addressing "intolerable" imprisonments derived

227. In Townsend, the defendant challenged the determination by the Illinois state
courts that his drug-induced confession was voluntary. Defense counsel objected to the
introduction of such a statement asserting that it was the product of coercion. The trial
court rejected the challenge without any indication as to what standard was applied by the
trial judge in reaching that decision. At no time in the subsequent appeal and state
postconviction review was evidence taken or findings made as to the impact of
self-administered drugs, associated with the defendant's heroin addiction, on
voluntariness. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 295-97. This issue, which relies heavily on
information outside the court record, required, in the Court's view, an evidentiary hearing
as part of the defendant-petitioner's federal habeas corpus review, and not simply reliance
on the state determination of fact. Id. at 306. Although Townsend was not AfricanAmerican, the issue of coercion in interrogation settings has been a core concern in cases
alleging racial injustice during custodial questioning.
228. Like Townsend, Noia had, at its substantive root, the issue of whether a defendant's
conviction was based on a coerced confession. Noia, 372 U.S. at 394. As indicated earlier,
coerced confessions not only involve the increased possibility of conviction of persons
actually innocent, but also have been the infamous hallmark of racial injustice in the
criminal justice system. While Townsend spoke to the value of the habeas corpus
evidentiary hearing to explore truths outside the trial record, Noia presented the
conundrum of how the non-trial record can be pursued in habeas where the defendant has
not appealed in the state court from his conviction for murder. Id. Although Noia's
codefendants Bonino and Caminato successfully appealed their convictions alleging their
confessions, taken in concert with Noia's, were coerced in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Noia did not separately appeal because of poverty.
Id. at 394-95. As the district court noted: 'The relator did not at all deny that he knew of
his rights to appeal. He, however, testified that he did not appeal because he had no funds
to retain an attorney to prosecute the appeal and did not wish to put his family further into
debt." United States ex. rel. Noia v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
229. Neuborne, supra note 182, at 68.
230. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
231. Noia, 372 U.S. at 414, 416-17. As Neuborne says of Noia and Townsend:
[I]t is telling that Justice Brennan's decision relaxing the waiver rules relied on
the fact that one of the major aims of the 1867 habeas corpus statute was to
protect the constitutional rights of newly freed slaves against hostile state
judiciaries. Similarly, after Townsend's apparently drug-induced confession was
found voluntary by the minois state courts, Chief Justice Warren's opinion
opened the door to widespread federal oversight over state court fact-finding in
constitutional contexts.
Neuborne, supra note 182, at 69 (footnotes omitted).
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from coerced confessions, 232 Justice Brennan, for the majority in Noia,
detailed a laundry list of significant criminal procedure issues that had
been held cognizable in habeas corpus prior to Noia.233 Many of these

issues represented major civil rights concerns. 234
The civil rights implications of the Warren Court habeas corpus
decisions are probably best understood in the context of the major efforts
of the Court to expand federal court jurisdiction to achieve racial justice
at the state level. In Thompson v. City of Louisville,235 the Court had
granted relief to a Louisville African-American man convicted despite an
indication of actual innocence, a ground for later claims for habeas corpus
relief that persists today. 236 The conviction of Thompson, rather than
simply being challenged as against the manifest weight of the evidence,
a claim that is not normally cognizable in federal review of a state court
conviction, was deemed by the Court to be "so totally devoid of
evidentiary support as to render his conviction unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 237
Thompson was quickly followed by Monroe v. Pape,238 which involved
the unlawful police entry into the home of an African-American couple
where the married couple was forced to stand naked before the police
while Mr. Monroe was referred to as "n-r" and "black boy." 239 The Court
allowed federal jurisdiction to be extended via 42 U.S.C. § 1983240 by
concluding that the alleged conduct of the officers, if proven, was state

232. The Court in Noia cites back to the seminal racial justice and coerced confession
case of Brown v. Mississippi. Noia, 372 U.S. at 414.
233. Id. at 413-14.
234. Among those listed: Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888) (right to jury trial
in federal criminal cases); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920) (self-incrimination);
Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915) (double jeopardy); Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24
(1898) (right to counsel).
235. 362 U.S. 199 (1960). As noted by Neuborne:
You can scour the unanimous opinion in Thompson in vain for any mention of
Sam Thompson's race, but Louis Lusky's elegant Supreme Court brief notes that
the incident begins with Thompson's decision to contest two earlier unjustified
arrests, including a warrantless arrest for vagrancy and loitering in the "colored"
waiting room of a Louisville bus station.
Neuborne, supra note 182, at 67 n.49.
236. Thompson, 362 U.S. at 206.
237. Id. at 199 (italics omitted).
238. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
239. Neuborne, supra note 182, at 68. As in Thompson, and typical in Warren Court
decisions that in actuality were race-intensive, no mention was made in the majority
opinion of the race of the plaintiffs in this civil action. However, Justice Frankfurter, in his
dissent, points out the graphic details found in the briefs. Id.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2017).
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action entitling the plaintiff to seek federal court relief.241 The
combination of Thompson, Pape, Sain, and Townsend set the stage for
intensive federal intervention in the state criminal justice system,
particularly through habeas corpus, to further civil rights reform
regarding the treatment of black America. 242

III. RESTRICTING THE USE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AS A TOOL FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The activist role of the Warren Court in expanding the availability of
federal habeas corpus to address civil rights reform came to a screeching
halt with Wainwright v. SykeS 2 43 in 1977. In Sykes, a badly-divided Court
plurality (4-3-2) determined that the Nola deliberate-bypass rule was
an insufficient basis for allowing a petitioner in federal habeas corpus to
challenge his state court conviction because of the use of statements the
petitioner alleged were involuntary because, under the circumstances, he
did not understand the Mirandawarnings read to him by police. 244 Based
upon Jackson v. Denno,245 the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida ordered an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's claim
despite the petitioner not raising his claim by objection at trial.246 The
State maintained that failure to adhere to its "contemporaneousobjection rule," which waives any claim of inadmissible evidence not
raised at trial, barred the petitioner's federal habeas corpus review
postconviction. 247 A plurality of the Supreme Court, along with three
concurrent votes, agreed with Florida and held that a failure to adhere
to a state procedural rule bars federal habeas corpus review absent the

241. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
242. Neuborne states,
The Warren Court's most dramatic responses to law enforcement's interaction
with the black population were the Court's efforts in Mapp v Ohio to prevent the
use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal proceedings, and in Miranda v
Arizona to impose prophylactic rules on police interrogations. Race was not far
from the surface of either case. In Terry v Ohio, the Court sought to split the
difference between the loitering and vagrancy decisions and the strict Fourth
Amendment probable-cause test by authorizing the police to make investigatory
street stops on less than probable cause, but only if they can demonstrate an
"articulable suspicion" of unlawful activity. Finally, the right to counsel cases
from Gideon to Argersinger were driven, in part, by concern over a criminal
justice system where white judges and prosecutors processed poor,
unrepresented blacks and Hispanics.
See Neuborne, supra note 182, at 86 (footnotes omitted).
243. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
244. Id. at 85.
245. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
246. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 75-76.
247. Id. at 85-86.
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petitioner establishing "cause and prejudice" regarding such failure. 248
The Court cited Francis v. Henderson249 to support its holding.
In Francis, the defendant-petitioner failed to adhere to a state
procedural rule requiring challenges to an indicting grand jury's
composition be raised before trial.250 Relying on principles of "comity and
concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice," 251 the Court
held that a petitioner must show cause for failing to adhere to the state
procedural bar, actual prejudice, and that a failure to make that showing
bars federal collateral review. 252
The opinion in Sykes does not elaborate on the meaning of cause or
prejudice for determining when a state procedural default bars federal
habeas corpus. However, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, opined that
cause in this context "is [the] requirement that habeas applicants bear
an undefined burden of explanation for the failure to obey the state rule,"
and that "prejudice . . . appears to bear a strong resemblance to
harmless-error doctrine."253
The Sykes cause-and-prejudice test, regarding failure to adhere to a
state procedural rule, was a direct repudiation and reversal of the Noia
deliberate-bypass rule. Whereas Noia barred deliberate-that is,
conscious, with strategic reasons, and presumably after discussion with
the client-attempts by a defendant's trial counsel to bypass
consideration of a constitutional claim by the state trial court, Sykes
placed the inadvertent, and perhaps incompetent, failure of the attorney
upon the defendant. The burden, whose quantum of proof is yet
undefined by the Court, is particularly difficult, if not impossible, for the
indigent (and disproportionately black or brown) petitioner when one
considers that appointed trial counsel is guaranteed only through

248. Id. at 90-91.
249. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
250. Id. at 547-48.
251. Id. at 539.
252. Id. at 540.
253. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As to cause, Justice Brennan
drew upon Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), which was favorably cited by the
plurality opinion. Brennan added the concern at the heart of his dissent that cause is a
thinly masked embodiment of ineffective assistance of counsel and "[1]eft unresolved is
whether a habeas petitioner like Sykes can adequately discharge this burden by offering
the commonplace and truthful explanation for his default; attorney ignorance or error
beyond the client's control." Sykes, 433 U.S. at 116-17. Prejudice,as referred to by Brennan,
is defined by the Chapman v. California,386 U.S. 18 (1967), "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" test for constitutional error. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 117. Brennan stated that federal
courts could easily dispose of this issue by simply being permitted to reach the merits of the
petition. Id.
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sentencing-the last critical stage under the Sixth Amendment. 254 This
effectively means that the habeas petitioner is extremely unlikely to have
the same attorney and, therefore, perhaps no access to trial counsel's
strategic thinking habeas. 255
Five years later, in Engle v. Isaac,256 the Court doubled down on its
Sykes position. Three defendants-Hughes, Bell, and Isaac-were
separately tried and convicted prior to the decision in State v. Robinson257
by the Ohio Supreme Court.
The court in Robinson decided that once a defendant introduces some
evidence of self-defense, the prosecutor then has the burden to disprove
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 258 This holding radically
reversed a century of law in Ohio by placing the burden of proof for
self-defense totally on the defendant. 259
The Ohio legislature adopted a provision in 1974260 bifurcating the
burden of proof for self-defense. It established a "general" burden of proof
on the prosecution to disprove self-defense 261 and a burden on the
defendant of going forward with the evidence of self-defense as an
affirmative defense. 262 For at least two years following that enactment,
Ohio courts "assumed that this section worked no change in Ohio's
traditional burden-of-proof rules." 263

In December 1974, defendant Hughes was indicted for aggravated
murder. At trial, the jury was instructed that Hughes bore the burden of
proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Hughes did
object to the instructions in general, although Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority in Engle, dismissed this objection as one that was focused
on other issues. 264 Hughes was convicted of the lesser offense of voluntary

254. See Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973).
255. With no constitutional right to appointed counsel on collateral review petitions, the
habeas petitioner has little ability to meaningfully analyze trial counsel's actions.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (no federal right to appointed counsel
collateral postconviction proceedings even though state provided for right to appointed
counsel in state postconviction proceedings); Murray, 492 U.S. at 10 (no constitutional right
to appointed counsel in capital postconviction cases).
256. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
257. 351 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio 1976).
258. Id. at 108.
259. See State v. Seliskar, 298 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1973); Szalkai v. State, 117 N.E. 12
(Ohio 1917); Silvus v. State, 22 Ohio St. 90 (1872).
260. Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (LexisNexis 2017).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Engle, 456 U.S at 111.
264. Id. at 112-13, 112 n.6.

2018]

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

491

manslaughter and subsequently did not raise the issue of the jury
instruction on burden-of-proof regarding self-defense on appeal to either
the intermediate state court of appeals or to the state supreme court. He
did seek federal habeas corpus relief after the effective date of Robinson,
but that petition was dismissed by the district court because, in large
part, Hughes failed to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test of Sykes in
that he did not show cause for failure to assert a claim that had not
legitimately existed for over 100 years. 265 Likewise, defendant Bell was
convicted of murder in 1975.266 He also did not challenge the 100-year-old
rule on burden of proof at trial or before the state supreme court. 267
Isaac was convicted of felony assault in 1975 and also claimed
self-defense. Ten months after Isaac's conviction, the state supreme court
decided Robinson. Isaac thereafter relied on Robinson in his appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Isaac's appeal
was rejected because he failed to adhere to the Ohio requirement of
objecting to jury instructions during trial. The state supreme court
dismissed the subsequent appeal for "lack of a substantial question,"
while quixotically deciding the same day State v. Humphries.268 In
Humphries, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that every criminal trial held
after January 1, 1974, which would have included Isaac, had to be
conducted according to the then-recently enacted statutory provisions
shifting the burden of proof for self-defense to the prosecution. 269
The evidence of self-defense in all three cases was important and
substantial. Significantly, after the presentation of self-defense evidence,
all three defendants were not convicted of the indicted charges but of
lesser included offenses. 270 All three Ohio defendants were unsuccessful
in their federal habeas corpus petitions before the United States District
Court for the Southern District for Ohio. 271
The Supreme Court concluded in Isaac that all three habeas
petitioners failed to demonstrate cause-and-prejudice, pursuant to Sykes,
regarding the failure to raise the issue of burden of proof at or before trial
265. Idat 113, 116.
266. Id. at 113-14.
267. Although Bell did seek leave to appeal two months after Robinson was decided, the
supreme court overruled that motion. Id. at 114.
268. 364 N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio 1977).
269. Id. at 1356.
270. Engle, 456 U.S. at 113-14. Hughes was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a
lesser included offense of aggravated murder. Bell was convicted of simple murder, a lesser
included offense of aggravated murder. Isaac was convicted of aggravated assault, a lesser
included offense of felonious assault. Id.
271. Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1980); Hughes v. Engle, 642 F.2d 451 (6th
Cir. 1980); Bell v. Perini, 635 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1980).
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as required by Ohio law. 2 72 Remarkably, the Court did not find cause for
the trial counsel's failure to object even though at the time of trial the
Ohio legal system had ruled against the defendants' position for over 100
years. 273
The habeas petitioners asserted that the cause requirement of Sykes
was met in two ways. First, it was contended that the petitioners could
not have reasonably known that the issue of whether the prosecutor had
the burden of proof regarding negating self-defense, once raised, was of
constitutional Due Process significance. 274 Though in the 100 years prior
to Robinson the constitutional claim had never been accepted, Justice
O'Connor nonetheless claimed that a "colorable" claim could have been
extrapolated from In re Winship275 and its holding that the "Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt." 276 The Court concluded that while the Constitution

"does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every
conceivable . . . claim," an attorney's failure to have an expansive,
imaginative mind regarding constitutional theory is insufficient cause for
failure to contemporaneously object to the jury instructions as
unconstitutional. 277
Second, and much more difficult to understand, is Justice O'Connor's
rejection of the trial counsel's reliance on the futility of raising an
objection as sufficient cause under Sykes.2 78 O'Conner concluded that
defense counsel should have simply assumed that Ohio would change its
century-old position. 279 One aspect of this latter position the Court never
addressed is that legal counsel in Ohio, as with all jurisdictions, were
bound by the then-Canons of Ethics, the Rules of Professional
Responsibility, and the rules of court not to raise frivolous claims.
Nothing in Ohio law suggested that, at the time of trial, claiming that
the prosecution had the burden of disproving self-defense once the
defendant raised the claim would be anything but frivolous. More
importantly, nothing in the Supreme Court's prior statements on cause
suggested that it can only be established where counsel is correct in
assessing that such a claim would be frivolous.

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Engle, 456 U.S. at 110.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 130.
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 364.
Engle, 456 U.S. at 133-34.
Id. at 130.
See id.
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The majority's somewhat dismissive treatment of whether cause has
been met280 resulted in one of the most dramatic dissents in Justice
Brennan's career. He wrote: "The Court still refuses to say what 'cause'
is: And I predict that on the Court's present view it will prove easier for
a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a state prisoner to show
'cause."'

28

1

The Court's opinion in Engle regarding cause-and-prejudice is
troublesome in aspects central to the concerns of this Article. First, the
opinion ignores the importance and usefulness of habeas corpus as
postconviction relief for the poor, and particularly for the
over-represented African-American and Latino prison population. The
importance of having a right and an avenue to address unjust treatment
to largely disenfranchised criminal defendants of color has been a
fundamental part of articulated Due Process as early as Powell and
received recognition as a "special circumstance" of criminal justice in the
subsequent decision in Betts. 2 8 2 As the Court later expanded Powell's
application through incorporation of the Sixth Amendment, 283 it kept in
mind the dilemma facing poor and disenfranchised defendants by
guaranteeing counsel at every critical stage in the proceedings against
them.

284

280. There can be little doubt that prejudice is met regarding an issue of the
prosecution's burden of proof in this case as is evident from the Court's own reliance on In
re Winship, and the apparent significance to the jury of evidence of self-defense in
acquitting as to the greater charge and convicting on the lesser included offense, even in
the face of an improper jury instruction.
281. Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
282. Rather than applying Powell's Due Process-based right to counsel to a broad
spectrum of criminal defendants, the opinion limited the application of Powell to "special
circumstances." In particular, such circumstances existed where,
[Il]gnorant and friendless negro youths, strangers in the community, without
friends or means to obtain counsel, were hurried to trial for a capital offense
without effective appointment of counsel on whom the burden of preparation and
trial would rest, and without adequate opportunity to consult even the counsel
casually appointed to represent them.
Betts, 316 U.S. at 463 (emphasis added).
283. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43.
284. Drawing upon the famous line from Powell-" [the indigent defendant] requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him," 287 U.S. at 69-the
Court has protected the disproportionately non-white population's right to be heard
through counsel at such stages as: arraignments, Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 52; preliminary
hearings, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); post-formal charge corporeal
identification confrontations, Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); and at every stage of
the trial proceedings where important rights of the defendant may be won or lost. Mempa,
389 U.S. at 128. Cf. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
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The modicum of protection and ability to address injustice by Sixth
Amendment-appointed counsel abruptly ends after sentencing. Gagnon
v. Scarpelli285 made it clear that there is no Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel after the sentencing stage. 286 Convicted defendants
seeking to speak effectively regarding trial injustice through appointed
counsel may do so only through an appeal if granted by the state. 287 The
Court has made clear that appointed counsel in collateral review, such
as federal habeas corpus, is not a constitutional right. 288 Habeas corpus,
without the assistance of appointed counsel, thus becomes the only
avenue for access to the courts for thousands of convicted persons.
Curiously, having meaningful access to the courts had previously
received constitutional blessing from the Court. In Avery, the Court held
that "the basic purpose of the writ [of habeas corpus] is to enable those
unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom." 289 The Court indicated
that it had steadfastly insisted that there is no higher duty than to
maintain the right of access to the courts through habeas corpus. 290
Striking down a Tennessee provision forbidding the use of prisoner "writ
writers" by other inmates, the Court held that "Tennessee has adopted a
rule which, in the absence of any other source of assistance for such
prisoners, effectively . . . forbid[s] illiterate or poorly educated prisoners
[the ability] to file habeas corpus petitions." 291
In Bounds, the Court reinforced its earlier per curiam opinion in
Younger v. Gilmore,292 where the Court held that the fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts required that prison
authorities provide prisoners with adequate law libraries or assistance
from persons trained in the law. 29 3

285. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
286. Id. at 790-91.
287. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356-58.
288. In Finley, the Court held that, even where a state provides for appointed counsel
in state postconviction, federal courts will not recognize that the counsel performance
criteria from Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), mandated in federal
constitution-based right to appointed counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or Due
Process, will apply. Finley, 481 U.S. at 554-55. Noting that the Court has "never held that
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks [to] their
convictions . . . [the Court] declined to [do so in this case]." Id. at 555. The Court further
made clear its opposition to constitution-based appointed counsel in postconviction cases
like MacCollurn,426 U.S. 317 (28 U.S.C. § 2255). Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-57.
289. Avery, 393 U.S. at 485.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 487.
292. 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
293. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817.
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Perhaps more significant in trying to understand the Court's position
in Engle is the Court's position in Ex ParteHull,294 which the Court relied
on in Bounds.295 Hull, a prisoner in Michigan, prepared a petition to send
directly to the Supreme Court to invoke original habeas corpus
jurisdiction. Michigan prison officials intervened based on a state
regulation requiring all legal documents, including petitions for habeas
corpus, to first be presented to prison officials for review and approval. 296
The Court invalidated the state regulations as a means of denying
meaningful access to the court, declaring that state officials "may not
abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ
of habeas corpus." 297
That a state's procedural requirement may not prevent a potentially
unconstitutionally confined person's access to federal courts through
habeas corpus seems lost in Engle's willingness to let the non-legally
educated, unrepresented, and incarcerated be denied access because of
their attorneys' nonadherence to state procedural requirements. To the
extent that the cause-and-prejudice standard of Engle prevents access to
the courts, it works a particular hardship on the overrepresented black
and brown prison population.
This is nowhere more evident than when one considers the racial
demographic of persons who have managed to have their convictions
vacated through postconviction relief sought by the volunteer work of the
Innocence Project. The Innocence Project, which provides postconviction
assistance in only a fraction of the cases of persons convicted of serious
felonies, reported that since 1989, it has successfully obtained
postconviction exoneration in 351 cases. In 243 (69%) of those cases,
black or brown petitioners were exonerated using DNA alone. 298
The injustice of the Engle cause-and-prejudice approach is even
greater when one considers that the sin of noncompliance with state
procedure is committed by the attorney but visited upon the perhaps
wrongly-convicted defendant. The Court has hidden this sin of attorney
failure behind what has become a nearly insurmountable wall of seeking
redress for ineffective assistance of counsel. The implied alternative for
defendants wrongly convicted is to seek relief via Strickland v.

294. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
295. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-22.
296. Hull, 312 U.S. at 547-49.
297. Id. at 549.
298. DNA
Exonerations in
the
United
States,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
(last
visited
Nov. 12, 2017).
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Washington299 when the defendant was otherwise denied access to
federal habeas corpus relief because of state procedural default.
The challenge for any convicted individual forced to turn to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in order to successfully follow the twisted
path to federal habeas corpus relief is nothing short of Kafkaesque. Like
poor Surveyor K's need to seek entry into the castle in order to obtain a
pass to enter the castle,30 0 the uncounseled and often uneducated
would-be habeas petitioners will effectively need counsel in order to
articulate their claims to comply with Strickland. Justice Brennan
probably addressed this best in his Sykes dissent when he said "[A]NY
realistic system of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction must be premised
on the reality that the ordinary procedural default is born of the
inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial
counsel."301
Adding to the bewilderment is the majority's failure to recognize that
a petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief is hardly ever represented by
the same attorney in the collateral action as at trial. More often than not,
a habeas petitioner is left to seek such relief without counsel at all. 302 The
strong likelihood that trial counsel will not be around to benefit from
avoiding state court determination of constitutional issues casts
substantial doubt on the majority's fear of attorney "sandbagging." 303 For
299. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Interestingly, the worlds of race and ineffective assistance of
counsel have recently collided once again in Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017). The Court
found that defense counsel's performance during the penalty phase of a capital case fell
below the Strickland standard of competent counsel where the black defendant's own
lawyer presented expert testimony indicating that African-Americans
were
disproportionately predisposed to violent conduct. Id. at 775.
300. See FRANZ KAFKA, THE CASTLE (1926).
301. 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
302. See Murray, 492 U.S. at 10.
303. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89. In Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012), the Court
addressed whether the unanticipated abandonment of counsel prior to compliance with
state procedural rules was sufficient cause. Id. at 271. The petitioner, convicted of murder
in a capital case, failed to timely appeal from denial of state postconviction relief based on
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel after his pro bono attorneys, who had
prepared the state postconviction relief petition, abandoned the petitioner without warning
and without filing a notice of appeal to join another law firm. Id. at 270-71. The Court
found that adequate cause was shown and "a client cannot be charged with the acts or
omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him." Id. at 283. Implicit in that statement
and explicit in the opinion is the Court's remarkable reaffirmation of its position in Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), that a defendant otherwise victimized by the negligence
of a postconviction relief attorney cannot show cause in the absence of complete
abandonment because such an attorney is an agent under principles of agency law and the
principal must endure the consequences of the negligence of an agent. Id. at 753-54. The
application of this aspect of agency law to poor, disenfranchised, and disproportionately of
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the indigent African-American defendant, it is even more unlikely that
the defendant will have a public defender with the time or resources to
plot such circumnavigation.3 04
Cause-and-prejudice restrictions frustrate the Warren Court's core
value of habeas corpus as a venue for addressing issues of racial injustice
broadly impacting societal civil rights. Strict application of cause-andprejudice places the Court in the unconscionable position of allowing
procedural default to obstruct addressing outrages of broad impact. It is
this broad impact that also is of concern in perhaps the most significant
matter raised by the Engle majority opinion-the wholesale attack on the
availability of federal habeas corpus as a form of postconviction relief.
Rather than recognize the role of federal habeas corpus the Court
earlier emphasized as a point of access to courts30 5 -particularly for the
poor and the unrepresented-Justice O'Conner's opinion emphasized the
perceived burden on the federal system by the writ. 306 O'Conner asserts
that "[clollateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal of trial for both
society and the accused."s07 She further stated that "liberal" allowance of
the writ is detrimental to the trial process because the state expends
significant resources in bringing individuals to trial and the "availability
of habeas corpus may diminish [state trial] sanctity by suggesting to the
trial participants that there may be no need to adhere to [protections for
the accused] during the trial itself."308
color postconviction relief seekers is that such individuals lack virtually any bargaining
power or true free-market status in the selection of postconviction counsel and more often
than not, like the petitioner in Maples, are lucky to get pro bono or court-appointed help.
Poor and minority petitioners are in no position to "choose" counsel but apparently must
suffer the consequences of their poverty without relief or consideration of the substantive
justice of their case.
304. See Rebecca Marcus, Racism in Our Courts: The Underfundingof Public Defenders
and Its DisproportionateImpact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219
(1994).
305. In Avery, the Court stated: "This Court has constantly emphasized the fundamental
importance of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme, and the Congress has
demonstrated its solicitude for the vigor of the Great Writ. The Court has steadfastly
insisted that 'there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired."' 393 U.S. at 485
(quoting Bowen, 306 U.S. at 26). "Since the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those
unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners
to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or
obstructed." Id.
306. The majority pays passing homage to the writ by stating "habeas corpus
indisputably holds an honored position in our jurisprudence," Engle, 456 U.S. at 126, but
like all revered museum pieces, the honor is apparently in observing its existence but never
using it.
307. Id. at 126-27.
308. Id. at 127.
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Perhaps recognizing that it had backed itself into a corner by drifting
away from habeas' core values, the Court has given itself some room
regarding actual innocence claims. Turning a procedurally deaf ear,
under cause-and-prejudice, to the pleas of persons who may be factually
innocent runs contrary to the very foundation of habeas corpus.
In Schlup v. Delo,309 the Court considered applying cause-andprejudice to another procedural bar to federal habeas corpus the Court
has developed over the years-successive petitions.3 10 Citing the
expansion of habeas corpus beyond its original, jurisdiction-oriented
purpose, the Court noted that, consistent with prior congressional action
over concerns regarding the burden that successive petitions place on the
federal judicial system, 3 11 the cause-and-prejudice standard articulated
in Sykes and Engle is applied to "successive" or "abusive petitions." 312 In
Schlup, the Court considered whether, and under what circumstances,
the assertion of actual innocence satisfies this standard. 313
Lloyd Schlup, who is white, was sentenced to death following a
conviction for the murder of another Missouri prison inmate, who was
black.3 14 The murder was alleged to have been a race-motivated killing. 315
Schlup asserted an alibi defense and that both the institution's videotape
and alibi witnesses indicated that Schlup was the victim of a wrongful
identification. Despite his claims, Schlup was convicted and sentenced to
death. Following unsuccessful appeals, Schlup filed for federal habeas
corpus relief alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because of his attorney's failure to call an alleged
alibi witness. His petition was denied without an evidentiary hearing.
Schlup thereafter filed a second petition for federal habeas corpus relief

309. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
310. The issue of successive petitions originally arose because of a recognition that the
civil procedure doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable, regarding constitutional claims, to
a "hybrid" collateral attack, such as habeas corpus. See Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230
(1924). Although the nonapplication of res judicata to state postconviction has now been
largely rethought, a common law doctrine of successive petitions was developed "as a kind
of substitute." RONALD P. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS § 25.1, 187-90 (2d ed. 1969). In
Sanders, the Court recognized that the then-standard for federal postconviction relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 was equally applicabile to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 proceedings. 373 U.S. at 14.
Under this standard, a successive petition could only be dismissed on the same ground
asserted if the successive petition was previously determined on the merits adversely
against the applicant and the interest of justice would not be served by reaching the merits
in the subsequent petition. Id. at 16-17.
311. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 450-51 (1986).
312. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
313. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 301.
314. Id. at 301-02, 305.
315. Id. at 316.
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alleging three claims: first, he asserted that he was actually innocent of
the murder and that the execution of an actually-innocent person would
violate the Eighth316 and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution; second, he reasserted his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel and; third, he asserted that the State had failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence.3 17 Because Schlup failed to satisfy the cause-andprejudice standard, his second petition was dismissed. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri also based its dismissal
on Schlup's failure to satisfy the standard in Sawyer v. Whitley 318
regarding claims of actual innocence-that the Eighth Amendment is
only violated upon the defendant showing by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted.3 19
The Court, granting relief to Schlup and steering away from its
restrictive application of cause-and-prejudice, divided the claim of actual
innocence into two categories. 320 First, a petitioner alleging that
procedural trial error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent
person may, consistent with the earlier decision in Murray v. Carrier,321
establish cause by demonstrating that a constitutional violation probably
resulted in a conviction of someone who is actually innocent. The second
category, in contrast, involves cases where one asserts actual innocence
despite a trial with no procedural error. 322 In opening this closing door to
federal postconviction relief, the Court recognized that habeas corpus is
an equitable relief demanded by justice despite the "societal interest in
finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources." 323 This
more expansive view of habeas intent is consistent with the reformative
vision of federal habeas corpus espoused by the Warren Court three
decades earlier but hard to reconcile with the limitations of Sykes and
Engle.
The Court's attack on federal habeas corpus postconviction relief both
mirrored and fueled a national "law and order" focus that swept the
nation during the 1980s. Not long after Engle was decided, Congress took
the opportunity to consider legislation to severely restrict the
postconviction remedy. In 1982, The Criminal Code Revision Act (CCRA)

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 303-07.
505 U.S. 333 (1992).
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 313-14.
477 U.S. 478 (1986).
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-26.
Id. at 324.
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of 1981324 was introduced into the Ninety-Seventh Congress. This Bill
sought change across the federal criminal process reflecting the national
anti-crime emphasis. 325
Drawing particular attention were the Act's provisions regarding
federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. In an attempt to
embody the Sykes and Engle cause-and-prejudice standard, Subtitle II of
the CCRA required: (1) that a state prisoner show prejudice resulting
from the non-application of a federal right alleged to be violated; (2) that
the federal right alleged to be violated did not previously exist; (3) that
state action precluded assertion of the right; or (4) that the factual basis
of the claim could not have been previously discovered by reasonable
diligence. 326 The Bill also created a three-year statute of limitations for
state prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief and prohibited federal court
evidentiary hearings, with limited exceptions, when the state court
record showed that the factual issue had been litigated. 327
The Bill was referred to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice where it attracted attention from critics for this attempt
to substantially limit access to federal habeas corpus. Among other
critics, this Author appeared before the Subcommittee on May 12, 1982,
on behalf of the National Conference of Black Lawyers, in order to
address, inter alia, the potential impact of these proposed changes on
African-Americans if adopted. 328 The Author raised the following four
324. H.R. 5679, 97th Cong. (1981).
325. In Subtitle II, the Act sought broad revisions, including: repeal of the Bail Reform
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214-17 (1966) (largely credited as the model for
state bail reform throughout the country); repeal of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2017);
repeal of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421-24 (2017); and removal of selected affirmative
defenses to the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2017). Subtitle
also would have abolished
both parole and "Good Time" credit for federal prisoners in addition to its attempts at major
reform of federal habeas corpus. H.R. 5679.
326. H.R. 5679.
327. Id.
328. Hearingon H.R. 1647, H.R. 4492, H.R. 4711, H.R. 5679, and H.R. 5703: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.
1965-66 (1982) [hereinafter CriminalJustice Hearings] (testimony of LeRoy Pernell, Ohio
State University School of Law, on Behalf of the National Conference of Black Lawyers).
This Author stated:
Americans have a keener interest and greater stake in the availability of this
writ than perhaps other persons.
In that regard, let me state first that the writ of habeas corpus has traditionally
been a primary tool for those who wish to challenge the unconstitutionality of
their conviction. For black prisoners it has been used to challenge racial
discrimination in jury determinations, pretrial detention, and problems
involving the right to counsel.
This is because black Americans very often have been unable to afford the type
of representation that would present these issues in some other forum other than

m
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main points with the committee: (1) habeas corpus is a remedy of the poor
and non-white; (2) the restrictions on the availability of federal habeas
corpus contained in the CCRA are not justified by claims of excessive
drain on court resources; (3) that attempts to codify Sykes and Sumner v.
Mata329 via the CCRA unduly interfered with the role of the Court in
shaping judicial policy; and, (4) the Court's direction in limiting the
availability of federal habeas corpus was wrong and should not be
supported by legislative action. 330
Other commentators raised concerns regarding the CCRA. Professor
Stephen Gillers of New York University School of Law and Phylis Skoot
Bamberger of the Federal Defender Unit of the Legal Aid Society of New
York's Appeals Division addressed the often-repeated claim also relied
on by the Court in both Sykes and Engle that restricting habeas corpus
access to the federal court is justified by the resource strain occasioned
by such petitions.331 Both pointed out that it is filings and delays
associated with the civil docket that delay civil justice. 332
The CCRA subsequently died in subcommittee. However, the
restrictions sought that would have the effect of severely limiting federal
habeas corpus access, particularly to the poor and non-white state
habeas corpus. There is no question in my mind that if black Americans had the
resources of say, Claus von Bulow, we would not have to be concerned with
whether or not we had the ability to raise issues in a postconviction forum.
I have no doubt in my mind that where the defendant has sufficient resources,
those issues will be raised at trial and on appeal. That is not the case for the
poor and that is not the case for the minorities in the prison system.
329. 449 U.S. 539 (1981). In Sumner, the Court held that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2017), a factual issue determined by a prior state court of competent jurisdiction shall be
presumed correct and cannot be redetermined by a federal court in a habeas corpus
proceeding unless at least one of the seven enumerated exceptions contained in § 2254(d)
are found to be present. Sumner, 449 U.S. at 551-52.
330. See Criminal Justice Hearings, supra note 328, at 1972-77.
331. Id. at 1640-83 (testimony of Professor Stephen Gillers, New York University School
of Law); Id. at 1683-1765 (testimony of Phylis Skoot Bamberger, Attorney in charge,
appellate section of Federal Defender Office of New York Legal Aid Society, on behalf of the
National Legal Aid and Defenders Association).
332. Id. at 1653-54, 1683-84. Specifically, Bamberger stated:
The argument that habeas uses up too much time of the Federal courts simply
doesn't hold water. The real problem with a lot of these cases [is] that the
petitioner is pro se and because of his custody cannot collect the documents
necessary. The State attorneys general or district attorneys, whoever is
responsible for defending against the petitioner do not, despite the requirement
of the statute, do the job of putting together the papers which are necessary for
the district court judge or the magistrate to make a determination in the case. I
know from experience that in many instances judges and magistrates must issue
orders to the States to respond with the appropriate documents necessary to
resolve the matter.
Id. at 1683-84.
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prisoner, would see new life fourteen years later in the form of the
AEDPA. Following the failed effort to restrict habeas corpus through the
CCRA and before the later successful legislative effort of the AEDPA, the
Court continued its barrage of restrictions-some of which have had a
particularly onerous impact on the vindication of racial injustice. 333
In Rose v. Lundy,334 the Court considered whether the exhaustion of
available state remedies required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b) and (c) required
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition where some, but not all, issues
satisfied the exhaustion requirement. 335 The Sixth Circuit held that the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee acted
properly in granting the petition, finding that the petitioner-defendant
had been denied his right of confrontation because the trial court limited
defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim and that the petitioner
had been denied a fair trial because of a least ten instances of serious
prosecutorial misconduct. 336 Both issues were exhausted at the state
level by the defendant's unsuccessful petition for state postconviction
relief. The district court declined to rule on the petitioner's additional two
claims alleging improper prosecutorial comments to the jury and
improper instructions to the jury because those two issues had not been
337
exhausted at the state level.

Writing the plurality opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor reversed
the Sixth Circuit and the district court, finding that principles of "comity"
required that such mixed petitions be dismissed. 33 8 Justice O'Connor
further reasoned that a petitioner could always refile upon the
exhaustion of all of the petitioner's claims or, alternatively, could amend
the petition to eliminate the unexhausted claims. 339 The Court's rationale
was drawn largely from the significance it placed on the district court's
observation regarding exhausted and unexhausted claims in the case
before it; that "there is such mixture of violations that one cannot be

333. The Court's restriction of habeas corpus certainly did not begin with the failure of
the CCRA. The Court's efforts throughout the 1980s and 1990s, exemplified in Sykes, Engle,
and Sumner, reflected the independent consensus of the Court that habeas corpus relief,
readily available to the poor and unrepresented, was a source of unwanted delay and undue
consumption of federal court resources. See John H. Blume, AEDPA- The "Hype"and the
'Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REv. 259 (2006).
334. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
335. Id. at 510.
336. See id. at 511-13.
337. Id. at 510-11.
338. Id. at 522.
339. Id. The realistic ability to refile either the entire petition or dismissed claims is put
somewhat in doubt by the Court's stance on what it terms as "abusive" petitions. Id. at 53638.
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separated from and considered independently of the others." 340 Yet, the
rationale of the plurality does not limit itself to those exhausted and
unexhausted issues that are so comingled that they prevent independent
consideration. The Court seemed to hold out the possibility of going
forward regarding exhausted claims if such can be clearly distinguished
from the unexhausted claims, but noted that a petitioner does so at the
peril of a federal court dismissing the deleted, unexhausted claims if
subsequently pursued in habeas after exhaustion. 341 Stated differently,
if a petitioner moves forward with an amended petition that eliminates
unexhausted claims, such deleted claims may never be heard. 342
The Court subsequently sought to mollify the "damned if you do,
damned if you don't" concerns by holding, twenty-seven years later in
Rhines v. Weber, 343 that a district court has the discretion to stay a
"mixed" petition in order to allow a petitioner to exhaust the unexhausted
claims before returning to federal court. 344 However, in the context of
having a forum to address racial injustice, the restriction on mixed
petitions has relevance. The Court in Rose, perhaps mindful of the
criticism concerning yet another procedural roadblock to habeas relieffrom Justice Stevens, particularly-noted that the Court's holding sets a
trap for the unwary pro se petitioner. 345 The Court further stated that pro
se petitioners, a category in which many, if not most, non-white
petitioners find themselves, should be able to "manage" "this
straightforward exhaustion requirement." 346 More importantly and
perhaps more troubling for issues typical in racial justice claims is the
fate of the mixed petition in Lundy itself. Despite the Court's recognition
that comity's necessity requirement gives way "in rare cases where
exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown," 347 the
unexhausted issues of prosecutorial misconduct and improper
340. Id. at 512.
341. Id. at 518-20.
342. The Court stated:
By invoking this procedure, however, the prisoner would risk forfeiting
consideration of his unexhausted claims in federal court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Rule 9(b), a district court may dismiss subsequent petitions if it finds that "the
failure of the petitioner to assert those [new] grounds in a prior petition
constituted an abuse of the writ."
Id. at 520-21.
343. 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
344. Id. at 277.
345. 455 U.S. at 520.
346. Id. It is hard to see how this or any other interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and
(c) or its impact with then existing Habeas Rule 9(b)-both requiring Advisory Committee
notes-would be "manageable" by a pro se petitioner.
347. 455 U.S. at 515.
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comments-claims at the heart of many racial injustice claims-were
found to be so intertwined in the mixed petition as to require dismissal
as opposed to redaction.3 48
Other procedural roadblocks were pursued by the Court prior to the
advent of the AEDPA.349 However, no case decided during this period had
a more direct and profound impact than Teague v. Lane350 on limiting
federal habeas corpus as a postconviction tool for addressing racial
injustice.
The challenge of whether and how state prisoners could use Court
decisions decided after state conviction has long plagued the Court
hearing § 2254 petitions. 35 1 The doctrine of retroactivity as it impacted
postconviction relief had, at its center, posed the difficult question of
whether new Court pronouncements merely proclaimed law as it should
have originally been determined or whether the new principle broke
unanticipated new ground that should inure prospectively.3 52 The issue
has been complicated by concerns that retroactive application regarding
convictions long thought as "final" would result in an uncontrollable
"floodgate of litigation" that would both overload judicial resources and
undermine confidence in the criminal justice system. 53
As far back as Linkletter v. Walker,354 the Court struggled with the
purpose of the Court's pronouncement and its effects on the state as
critical to retroactivity analysis. 355 Considering the focus of this Article
and the earlier discussion of the civil rights importance of Mapp, the

348. Id. at 519.
349. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court found that death-sentenced
inmates must show substantial denial of a federal right in order to pursue an expedited
appeal from a denial of federal habeas corpus relief. Id. at 892-93. Successive petitions,
often used by indigent and unrepresented petitioners, were severely limited in McCleskey
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 502 (1991). Additionally, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992),
limited the availability of evidentiary hearings. Id. at 11-12. The concept of the "the poor
man's pleading," often associated with pro se habeas corpus petitions and relaxed pleading
expectations, was challenged to a large extent by the tightening and more strict
requirements of Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995), prompting Justice Stevens to say in
dissent that the Court's opinion "creates an exacting pleading requirement that serves no
legitimate purpose in our habeas corpus jurisprudence." Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), made federal habeas corpus review of a state
conviction more difficult by imposing a more stringent constitutional harmless error test
for postconviction relief. Id. at 637.
350. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
351. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
355. Id. at 619-20.
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Court in Linkletter questioned whether Mapp would have applied to a
conviction that became final by way of affirmation of conviction by the
Louisiana Supreme Court one year prior to the decision in Mapp.356 The
Court nonetheless determined, in light of the existing precedent of Wolf,
that rejecting application of the federal exclusionary rule to the statesa decision on which the states heavily relied-Mapp would not be applied
retroactively. 357 In addition to the significant level of state reliance on the
decision in Wolf, the Court in Linkletter found that the purposes
articulated in Mapp would not be served by retroactive application,
particularly in light of the conclusion that "[r]ejection of the [illegally
seized] evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing official, while it
may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant [and] does
nothing to protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but
fruitless searches."3 58
Two years later, the Court further clarified its application of
retroactivity to § 2254 proceedings. In declining to retroactively apply the
36 0
holdings of United States v. Wade 359 and Gilbert v. California,
regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, to pretrial
identification procedures, the Court in Stovall v. Denno 36 1 stated that the
criteria for determining retroactivity were three-fold: "(a) the purpose to
be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards." 362 The Court in Stovall emphasized, yet again, the singular
importance of purpose. Pronouncements of the Court impacting the
reliability of the fact-finding process, namely its ability to determine
actual guilt, are preferred for retroactive application. Yet, the Court was
reluctant to declare automatic retroactivity based on the violation of
those Constitutional protections most identified with fair trial, such as
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and instead adopted an approach
of considering the "degree" of impact on the determination of truth. 363

356. Id.
357. Id. at 633-34, 639-40.
358. Id. at 632.
359. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
360. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
361. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
362. Id. at 297-98.
363. Id. at 298. The Court went on to state:
Although the Wade and Gilbert rules also are aimed at avoiding unfairness at
the trial by enhancing the reliability of the fact-finding process in the area of
identification evidence, "the question whether a constitutional rule of criminal
procedure does or does not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process at
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It is ironic that the Warren Court, long the champion of combatting
racism in criminal justice, chose this case to invoke a "nuanced" approach
regarding the impact of a Sixth Amendment violation. Stovall was a
black man who was displayed to a white crime victim in a one-on-one
display, a highly suggestive procedure conducive to wrongful
identification. 364 Despite the significant role that counsel can play in both
identifying and challenging the wrongful identification of persons of
color, the Court opted not to apply this protection under the Sixth
Amendment to all who may have been falsely imprisoned prior to 1967
as a result of counsel not being present at the post-formal-charge pretrial
identification. 365 Instead, the Court created a Due Process test placing
the burden on the defendant to show the pretrial identification procedure
to irreparable
and conducive
suggestive
was unnecessarily
misidentification. 366
Teague presented the question of whether those who were tried by
juries where persons of color had been wrongfully excluded could use the
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky 367 retroactively. 368 This keystone
issue of racial justice-the right to a jury of "peers" not limited by raceis as old as the presence of blacks in America. This issue is at the very
fountainhead of the application of constitutional oversight and civil
rights reform in the criminal justice system as discussed earlier
regarding the challenge facing the Scottsboro defendants, where this
most prominent form of racism was first tackled.3 69
When a black or brown defendant faces a jury on which jurors are not
allowed to sit because of race, as in Patterson, any finding of guilt has
questionable reliability. Is the finding based on facts presented or
predetermined by race? Is the defendant's own testimony immediately
accorded less credibility because of race-particularly where it is
contrary to the testimony of white witnesses? 370 The Court thought this
trial is necessarily a matter of degree." The extent to which a condemned practice
infects the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial is a "question of
probabilities." Such probabilities must in turn be weighed against the prior
justified reliance upon the old standard and the impact of retroactivity upon the
administration of justice.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966)).
364. Id. at 295.
365. Id. at 298-99.
366. See id. at 301-02.
367. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
368. Teague, 489 U.S. at 292.
369. See Patterson, 294 U.S. at 600; Norris, 294 U.S. at 587; Powell, 287 U.S. at 45.
370. In Maryland, pre-civil war law provided that "negroes and mulattoes, free or slave,
[were] not competent witnesses, in any case [in which] a Christian white person [was]
concerned." United States v. Dow, 25 F. Cas. 901, 902 (Cir. Ct. Md. 1840).
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issue was serious enough that in Batson it stated: "Selection procedures
that purposely exclude black persons from juries undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." 371 Nonetheless, the
Court in Teague, per Justice O'Connor, chose not to extend Batson to
those who sought postconviction relief in instances where their
convictions had become "finalized" prior to the Batson decision. 372
The petitioner in Teague, a black man, was convicted by an all-white
jury of attempted murder. During jury selection, the prosecution used all
of its ten peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from the
petit jury. The prosecutor, in response to a defense challenge, claimed
that he excluded African-American jurors in an attempt to obtain a
balance of men and women. After failing to obtain relief on direct appeal,
Teague sought relief under § 2254 on three grounds. 373 First, he claimed
that he had been denied equal protection in light of the Court's decision
in Batson.374 In Batson, the Court held that the defendant's burden of
proof regarding the State's purposeful and deliberate denial of jury
service because of race, outlawed by Swain v. Alabama,375 is met upon a
showing of a prima facie case of discrimination, as demonstrated by
evidence that the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group and
that the prosecution has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from
the venire members of the defendant's race.3 76
Second, Teague claimed that, regardless of whether the 1986 Batson
decision applied retroactively to his conviction, which became finalized
in 1983, he was denied equal protection pursuant to the decision in Swain
371. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. Additionally, the Court stated that "[tihe petit jury has
occupied a central position in our [legal] system of justice by safeguarding a person accused
of crime against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge." Id. at 86. Though
ostensibly relying on equal protection, the strong undertone and linkage to due process via
fundamental fairness, as suggested in the above quoted language, is extended to both
gender discrimination and the trial and conviction of defendants who are not members of
the "protected" class. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975). In Taylor, the Court stated:
We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the requirement
has solid foundation. . . . Restricting jury service to only special groups or
excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be
squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial. "Trial by jury presupposes
a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community as well as
impartial in a specific case."
Id. at 530.
372. Teague, 489 U.S. at 296.
373. Id. at 292-94.
374. Id. at 294.
375. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
376. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
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because the prosecutor's explanation for his exercise of peremptory
challenges to exclude African-American jurors satisfied the Swain
requirement of proof that the peremptory challenge system had been
perverted because of racial animus.377
Third, the petitioner claimed a violation of the Sixth Amendment faircross-section requirement of Taylor, which held that a venire-the pool
from which petit jurors are selected-must, consistent with the jury trial
provision of the Sixth Amendment, represent a fair cross-section of the
community. 378 However, the Court's opinion in Taylor specifically
withheld determining whether it applied to the petit jury itself.379
In a plurality opinion that in many ways re-conceptualizes
retroactivity in postconviction cases, the Court declined to apply Batson
or Taylor to cases that had become finalized prior to the date of the
Batson decision.38 0 To do this, the O'Connor opinion adopted and modified
Justice Harlan's previous view on retroactivity in § 2254 proceedings. 38
Justice Harlan had previously asserted that criminal procedure rulings
should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless
the case met one of the following two exceptions: (1) if the new ruling
places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe"; or (2) if the
"those procedures that ... are 'implicit
new ruling requires observance of 382
in the concept of ordered liberty."'
Recognizing that part one of the Harlan test was not in play, the Court
focused on the "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" exception
announced by Harlan.3 83 The consideration of what is included and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" has a history that is tied to the
Court's view of its doctrine on selective incorporation. As far back as at
least 1937, the Court wrestled with the concept of "ordered liberty"
mandating procedural safeguards at the state level consistent with
federal practice. 384 In that context and at that time, a scheme of ordered
liberty was thought to include those procedural concepts that were
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice."38 5 Before the 1960s, the
Court applied what it considered to be a practical test for selective

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Teague, 489 U.S. at 297.
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
Id. at 538.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 295-96.
Id. at 292.
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
See Palko, 302 U.S. at 328.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).

2018]

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

509

incorporation: a protection was fundamental to justice and an ordered
scheme of liberty when a civilized system of justice could not be imagined
without that protection.3 86
The criminal procedure revolution conducted by the Warren Court
took a more reality-based view of state criminal procedure that
recognized the unwanted roles that race played and that ordered scheme
of liberty should be measured by whether the procedural safeguard had
a historic and cultural value presence in our Anglo-American concept of
justice. Consequently, the Warren Court found that the protections of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments were largely applicable to the
states as a matter of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
For the purposes of better understanding Justice Harlan's approach to
retroactivity in § 2254 cases, it should be noted that he disagreed with
the Court majority's approach regarding fundamental fairness as it
pertained to incorporation and as the same concept applied to
retroactivity.3 87 Justice Harlan was concerned that incorporation meant
destruction of the state systems' ability to construct a unique procedure
tailored to its own needs and history and that necessity meant a
"jot-for-jot" and "case-for-case" uniformity dictated by adherence to
federal precedent. 388
Justice Harlan's view on retroactivity in postconviction cases, which
formed the basis for Justice O'Connor's reformulation, mirrors his
thinking regarding incorporation.38 9 Systemic change in state criminal
procedure, brought about through federal court determination arising
from cases that in all other ways have reached finality, should only occur
when the change involves rights that are part of an ordered scheme of
liberty or otherwise dictated by fundamental fairness. Contrary to
Justice O'Connor's interpretation, Justice Harlan emphasized that
fundamental fairness issues, sufficient for retroactivity in habeas,
concern themselves more with the proper pronouncements regarding the
essential principles of our Anglo-American system of justice than simply
whether the accuracy of the fact-finding process is enhanced.3 90 In
386. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 328.
387. See generallyDuncan, 391 U.S. at 171-93 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 14-33 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
388. See generally Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
389. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist v. United States, 394

U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
390. Justice Harlan stated:
Typically, it should be the case that any conviction free from federal
constitutional error at the time it became final, will be found, upon reflection, to
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denying relief to Teague, Justice O'Connor interpreted Justice Harlan's
of procedural
retroactive application
position of permitting
determinations that establish rules that are implicit in an ordered
scheme of liberty to mean holdings that address instances where the
accuracy of the fact-finding process is undermined. 391 This position was
both specifically rejected by Harlan and fell short of understanding the
significance of eliminating racism in jury selection.
What Justice O'Connor failed to realize in her opinion, and what the
Warren Court did recognize, was that the influence of racism, like
poverty, 392 in the process of guilt determination, is anathema to the
"bedrock" Anglo-American legal tradition and, in fact, undermines the
truth determination process. Juries that have been racially "scrubbed"
are devoid of the cross-cultural and racial perspective for determining
truth and credibility-particularly where multiple racial witnesses are
among the presenters of evidence. The Court emphasized, in Rose v.
Mitchell,393 the former point regarding the bedrock nature of combatting
racism particularly in the context of federal habeas corpus relief.
The limitation of habeas corpus through a suppressive retroactivity
policy did much to hide the sins of past racism, as it may have impacted
many black and brown prisoners serving the long sentences now
associated with mass incarceration. The efforts to restrict habeas further
were not over. Congress succumbed to the strident cries and fears
have been fundamentally fair and conducted under those procedures essential
to the substance of a full hearing. However, in some situations it might be that
time and growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can
rightly demand of the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate
the fairness of a particular conviction.

Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693.
391. Teague, 489 U.S. at 314-15.
392. Justice Harlan went to particular lengths to reaffirm his support for the retroactive
application of Gideon, which is fully entwined with addressing both poverty and the
principles of Powell. Justice Harlan stated in Mackey,
For example, such, in my view, is the case with the right to counsel at trial now
held a necessary condition precedent to any conviction for a, serious crime. See
my separate opinion in [Gideon], where I concurred in conferring this right on a
state prisoner, seeking state habeas corpus, on the grounds that this "new" rule
was mandated by Palko. Hence, I would continue to apply Gideon itself on
habeas, even to convictions made final before that decision was rendered.
401 U.S. at 694.
393. 443 U.S. 545 (1979). In Rose, African-American defendants challenged their
conviction via a § 2254 petition based on claims of racial discrimination in the selection of
the grand jury foreman. Id. at 547. The Court concluded that racial discrimination in the
selection of a grand jury foreman is cognizable in federal habeas corpus even though there
was no allegation of impropriety in the selection of the petit jury and the defendants had
been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 564-65.
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prevalent particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. Under the guise of the
"war on terrorism," the AEDPA was born.
IV. THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
AND RACIAL JUSTICE
In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center and the 1995 Oklahoma
City bombings, the AEDPA was introduced in 1995 and passed in 1996
with broad bipartisan support. On April 24, 1996, the AEDPA was signed
into law. Although purporting to be an act aimed at terrorism, 394 death
penalty reform, 395 and victim rights, 396 the heart of the law was its
attempt to severely restrict access to federal habeas corpus for
postconviction relief purposes. The AEDPA provided for severe
restrictions on successive petitions, 397 a statute of limitations for habeas
corpus cases, 398 and circumstances under which a federal district court
may be permitted to hold an evidentiary hearing. 399 The most significant
restriction on habeas corpus access contained within the AEDPA is the
so-called "deference provision" contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).400 Under
this provision, federal habeas corpus postconviction relief for a state
defendant can only be provided if there is a determination made that the
state court decision is "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application" of
Supreme Court precedent. 40 1
Before looking more closely at these provisions, it is significant to note
that the cumulative impact on African-American prisoners and their
ability to raise issues of racial justice did not go unnoticed in the debate
of the AEDPA. Congresswoman Nydia Margarita Veldzquez, then
Representative of the Twelfth District of New York, testified in the House
floor debate on the AEDPA:
My colleagues, the Constitution says we are all entitled to equal
protection under the law, but in today's society some of us are more
equal than others. The reality is, if you have the money to hire a good
lawyer, you can make it through our legal system. But, if you are a
poor minority, lacking those resources, you will lose and not have the
opportunity to prove you are innocent. By severely limiting this
ultimate right to appeal more innocent Americans will unfairly die.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

AEDPA tits. III, VII, VIII.
28 U.S.C. § 2266 (2017).
AEDPA tit. II.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2017).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2017).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2017).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2017).
See Blume, AEDPA, supra note 333, at 260.
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Their blood will be on your hands. I encourage a "no" vote on this
402
conference report.
Representative Howard Lawrence Berman of California's TwentyEighth Congressional District stated during those same debates:
Indeed, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was the first civil rights law
enacted after the Civil War, intended to flesh out the habeas clause of
the Constitution and thereby protect the rights of the newly freed
slaves by giving Federal judges the power to hear "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
Constitution." . . . But I cannot in good conscience vote for a bill which
guts the historic means by which Americans enforce the Bill of Rights.
403
That is why I will vote against the conference report.

402. 142 CONG. REC. H3583, H3612 (1996).

403. Id. at H3610. The fears of Rep. Berman and Rep. Velizquez were both emphasized
and renewed when, nine years after the passage of the AEDPA, Congress again sought to
restrict federal habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy by way of The Streamlined
Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005). In testifying against that proposal
Theodore M. Shaw, the Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund stated:
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) has been involved
in the litigation of both capital and non-capital cases in both state and federal
courts since our formation more than half a century ago. Our involvement began
with pleas for help from family members of African-American men charged with
or convicted of capital offenses, mostly in the Old South. Those cases often
revealed shameful truths about the way the state criminal justice systems
functioned-the insidious role that race played, the inability of poor people to
find competent lawyers to mount a defense for them, the ease with which
prosecutors could present false testimony against defendants, and the blatant
disregard for the most basic constitutional guarantees of fairness and objectivity
in prosecutions.
As the Committee well knows, federal habeas corpus is the mechanism by which
the federal courts are able to insure that a conviction and sentence were not
obtained in violation of the United States constitution. Nine years ago, after long
study and debate. Congress undertook an extensive revision of federal habeas
corpus, resulting in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA). Among other things, AEDPA shortened the amount of time within
which a prisoner could file for habeas corpus review, limited the ability of a
federal court to disregard a state court's finding that there was no reversible
federal constitutional error in the case, eliminated the prisoner's ability to file
multiple habeas corpus challenges to his conviction or sentence, and made
appeals in the federal system more difficult to obtain. What S. 1088 seeks to do
is to close the small window that AEDPA left open for prisoners to redress
fundamental wrongs, even in death penalty cases.
Habeas Corpus Proceedingsand Issues ofActual Innocence: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 299-300 (2005) (written testimony of Theodore M. Shaw,
Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
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Despite opposition, the AEDPA was passed and enacted. Its most
pertinent parts, for purpose of this discussion, provided the following four
principles.
Limitations on Successive Petitions:In order for a would-be petitioner
to seek a successive petition, a showing must be made to the court of
appeals demonstrating a prima facie case that either the successive
petition relies on a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactively
applied, or that the factual basis for the new application could not,
through due diligence, have been previously discovered. 404
Statute of Limitations: In one of its most controversial provisions, the
AEDPA405 requires that a state petitioner apply for federal habeas corpus
relief for direct review within one year from the date of the state court's
final judgment. 406
Deference Provisions: No provision has caused greater concernparticularly in light of the traditional role of the courts in overseeing
racial justice at the state level, as espoused by the Warren court-than
the language of § 2254(d), which prohibits the granting of habeas corpus
relief regarding any claim adjudicated at the state level, unless that
determination
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 407
Such a concept had no judicial history and received little attention
during floor debate. Yet this provision effectively allows the state to
determine federal law, including United States Constitutional law,
without any ability of federal courts, through habeas corpus, to monitor

404. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2017).
405. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Tolling of the statute of limitations may occur following
the latest of:
(1) the date upon which the State removes an unconstitutional or federally
illegal impediment to filing and application; (2) the date on which the Supreme
Court recognizes a new constitutional right asserted by the petitioner; or (3) the
date on which the factual predicate of the claim could have been exercised
through the exercise of due diligence.
Andrea A. Kochan, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Habeas
Corpus Reform?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 399, 410 (1997).

406. The definition of direct review is unclear. It has been suggested that the Court's
definition should include certiorari proceedings. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).
407. Blume, AEDPA, supra note 333, at 272.
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unjust imprisonments absent a finding that the state determination was
unreasonable.
State Opt-in Provisions in Capital Cases: Initially, concern existed
regarding the AEDPA's provisions allowing states funding and
facilitating appointment of competent counsel for state postconviction
review in capital cases, to "opt-in" to an expedited time-line for federal
habeas corpus review, the treatment of "untimely filed" petitions as
successive petitions, and the prevention of habeas review for petitions
found by the state court to be procedurally defaulted. This concern has
become largely muted by the fact that, since enactment, only Arizona has
qualified for application of this provision. 408
In Felker v. Turpin,409 the constitutionality of the AEDPA was
challenged the year after its enactment. At issue were the provisions
limiting successive petitions.410 The petitioner, sentenced to death, had
exhausted both direct appeal and state postconviction relief. Following
the denial of state postconviction relief, the petitioner first unsuccessfully
sought federal habeas corpus relief and appealed that denial to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Following denial
of relief by the court of appeals, the petitioner both sought a stay of
execution and filed a second application for habeas corpus relief. Again,
the court of appeals denied relief. 411
The AEDPA was signed into law prior to Felker's second § 2254
petition for habeas corpus relief. 4 12 Under the then new language of 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1),413 dismissal of a successive petition is compelled as
to any claims not presented in the first petition. 414 Such dismissal can
only be avoided by the granting of a motion for leave to be filed in the
court of appeals.4 15 The motion may only be granted if a three-judge panel
determines that there is a prima facie showing that the conditions

408. Because of a failure to follow its own procedures, Arizona did not qualify to "Opt-In"
until 2005. See Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2002).

409. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
410. Id. at 658.
411. Id. at 655-58.
412. Id. at 656-57.
413. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
414. Felker, 518 U.S. at 656. Felker attempted to raise two claims in his second petition
for federal habeas corpus. First, he claimed a violation of Due Process because the state
trial court equates "beyond a reasonable doubt" with "moral certainty" in its voir dire and
jury instructions. Second, he claimed irregularities in the forensic evidence due to
qualifications of the state's experts and the conflict with the position of his own experts
established alibi and thus he had a claim of actual innocence. Id. at 657-58.
415. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2017).
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outlined in that subsection had been met. 4 16 Section 2244(b)(3)(E)417 also

provides that the decision of the three-judge panel is neither appealable
nor the proper subject for a writ of certiorari to the Court. 418 Following
denial of his motion for leave by the court of appeals, the petitioner
sought relief in the Court by a combined petition to invoke the original
habeas jurisdiction of the Court or, in the alternative, for certiorari
review of the denial by the court of appeals of his motion for leave to file
a second petition. 419
The Court, in this first test of the AEDPA, found that the new Act did
not alter the Court's original habeas corpus jurisdiction but that the act
provides "guidance" regarding its consideration of original actions. 420 In
this regard, the opinion is somewhat vague. While alluding to "[s]everal
sections of the Act impos[ing] new requirements for granting relief [as
informing the Court's] authority to grant such relief as well," 421 the Court

did not state what information it gets from this section. Instead, the
Court concluded that its own rule for disposition 422 is the basis for
416. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) provides:
(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under
section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under
section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence
as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that,
but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
417. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (2017).
418. Id.
419. Felker, 518 U.S. at 658.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 662.
422. United Supreme Court Rule 20.4(a) states:
A petition seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus shall comply with the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2242, and in particular with the provision
in the last paragraph of § 2242 requiring a statement of the "reasons for not
making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is
held." If the relief sought is from the judgment of a state court, the petition shall
set forth specifically how and wherein the petitioner has exhausted available
remedies in the state courts or otherwise comes within the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b). To justify the granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner
must show exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of the Court's
discretionary powers and must show that adequate relief cannot be obtained in
any other form or from any other court. These writs are rarely granted.
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concluding that the petitioner's request for original habeas corpus
consideration should not be granted because the claims did not
"materially differ from numerous claims made by successive habeas
petitioners which we have had occasion to review on stay applications to
this Court." 423

The Court went on to uphold the constitutionality of the AEDPA by
declaring that it does not violate the Constitution's Suspension Clause 424
by suspending the writ of habeas corpus. 425 The Court found that the
restrictions of the AEDPA regarding successive petitions were a
modification of res judicata and "well within the compass of the
evolutionary process" of restrictions designed to curb abuse of the writ. 426

Although the Court has not considered the constitutionality of the
AEDPA since Felker, the Act's most controversial provision has been
addressed by the Court on several occasions. The new language of
§ 2254(d)(1) requires federal courts considering applications for habeas
corpus relief to determine first if a claim has previously been adjudicated
at the state level and whether such adjudication was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of established federal law. 427 In Williams v.
Taylor,428 the Court considered what and how much constraint this
provision places on the ability to consider claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel.4 29 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims depend largely on
federal habeas corpus and state postconviction relief for vindication,
largely because the need to develop facts outside the transcript makes
the claim unavailable for direct appellate review. It is also a claim that
is often pursued by non-white defendants concerned that race may have
impacted the quality of representation that they received.
In Williams, the Court considered the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the federal district court's grant of
habeas corpus post-implementation of the AEDPA.430 The petitioner,
Williams, sought relief regarding his conviction for capital murder and
imposition of the death penalty. Williams asserted that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase because
of his attorneys' failure to investigate and present substantial mitigating

423. Felker, 518 U.S. at 665.
424. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ('The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended.").
425. Felker, 518 U.S. at 663.
426. Id. at 664.
427. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2017).
428. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
429. Id. at 367.
430. Id. at 374.
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evidence. Although the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed both the
conviction and sentence, the state trial judge, upon considering a
subsequent state postconviction petition, found after holding an
evidentiary hearing that Williams' counsel failed to discover and present
significant mitigation material and thus violated the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard set forth in Strickland.431 Based on its
interpretation of Lockhart v. Fretwell,432 the Virginia Supreme Court
disagreed, holding Williams had not suffered sufficient prejudice to
warrant relief.433 The United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia disagreed with the Virginia Supreme Court and found
that its interpretation of Strickland and Fretwell was "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of Federal law" per § 2254(d)(1).434
The Court, responding to the Fourth Circuit's overturning of the
district court decision, considered to what extent § 2254(d)(1) restrained
federal courts in general, and the Court in particular, from granting
relief.435 The

congressional

imposition of a

"contrary to" or

"an

unreasonable application" threshold before which federal courts must
cross in order to review a state's interpretation of United States
constitutional law was without precedent. 436 The Court seemed
perplexed by such an intrusion into traditional federal court doctrine and
decision making. In Williams, Justice O'Connor, who wrote Part II of the
opinion, stated regarding the legislative intent:
The message that Congress intended to convey by using the phrases,
"contrary to" and "unreasonable application of" is not entirely clear.
The prevailing view in the Circuits is that the former phrase requires
de novo review of "pure" questions of law and the latter requires some
sort of "reasonability" review of so-called mixed questions of law and
fact. We are not persuaded that the phrases define two mutually
437
exclusive categories of questions.
Additionally, Justice O'Connor said,
When federal judges exercise their federal question jurisdiction under
the "judicial Power" of Article III of the Constitution, it is
"emphatically the province and duty" of those judges to "say what the
law is." At the core of this power is the federal courts' independent

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. at 370-71.
506 U.S. 364 (1993).
Williams, 529 U.S. at 371.
Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 379.
See id. at 367.

437. Id. at 384 (citations omitted).
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responsibility-independent from its coequal branches in the Federal
Government, and independent from the separate authority of the
several States-to interpret federal law. A construction of AEDPA that
would require the federal courts to cede this authority to the courts of
the States would be inconsistent with the practice that federal judges
have traditionally followed in discharging their duties under Article
III of the Constitution. If Congress had intended to require such an
important change in the exercise of our jurisdiction, we believe it
would have spoken with much greater clarity than is found in the text

of AEDPA.4 3 8
The Court determined that the Virginia Supreme Court decision was
contrary to the established law of Strickland and a misinterpretation of
Fretwell.439 The Court spoke primarily of the Virginia Supreme Court's
error without saying that its finding was unreasonable. 440 The Court
treated the language of § 2254(d)(1) as disjunctive in that federal courts
sitting in habeas may reconsider a state court's interpretation of federal
law if it is either contrary to established Court decisions or
unreasonable. 4 4 1 If the Court's reaction to review restrictions of the
amended § 2254(d)(1) suggests concern over the writ becoming too
inaccessible, that concern became more manifest as the Court considered
the plight of those who are imprisoned but maintain actual innocence.
V. ACTUAL INNOCENCE-AN ISSUE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO RACIAL JUSTICE
IN THE ERA OF THE AEDPA
The fear of criminal conviction of the innocent is an image that has
haunted African-Americans since the days of slavery. The images of Ed
Brown, Arthur Ellington, and Henry Shield, beaten and tortured so badly
that the rope marks of hanging were still on the neck during trial, 442 Still
burn brightly, as do those of the Scottsboro defendants. Actual innocence
is as much an issue of racial justice today as it was in the 1930s. It is

438. Id. at 378-79 (citations omitted).
439. Id. at 391.
440. See generally id. at 391-98.
441. Id. at 385-86. Justice O'Connor returned to the issue of the ability of federal courts,
consistent with § 2254(d)(1), to reconsider a state court's determination regarding claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). With facts very
similar to Williams, but where the Maryland Court of Appeals made a determination before
Williams was decided, the Court in Wiggins held that, while the state court had correctly
identified the established federal law, its application was objectively unreasonable. 539
U.S. at 527. Additionally, the Court considered the amended § 2254(d)(1) in Renico v. Lett,
559 U.S. 766 (2010), Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011), Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170
(2011), and, most recently, in Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015).
442. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281.
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conservatively estimated that as many as 10,000 persons may be
wrongfully convicted of serious crimes each year. 443 A 2007 study

indicated that 3-5% of the persons convicted of capital crimes in the
1980s were probably innocent. 444 Exonerations after the advent of DNA
testing in 1989 show that, of the limited number of cases that have had
the opportunity for DNA review, 69% of those exonerated were
non-white. 445 The National Registry of Exonerations reports that over
58% of exonerations for all crime are non-white. 446
The reasons for wrongful convictions, and the roles that race play,
vary. The "most common cause . . . is eyewitness misidentification." 4 47
Forty percent or more of wrongful eyewitness identifications involve
attempts at cross-racial identification. 4 4 8 False and coerced confessions
also play a significant role.44 9 The Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment issues associated with wrongful identification and false
confessions, along with the other significant causes of wrongful
convictions, often cannot find judicial relief in appellate review. The
Court, faced with the closing-door of its own policy on habeas corpus and
the enactment of the AEDPA, has carved out an approach regarding
exceptions to procedural defaults based on claims of actual innocence.
The Court has never clearly declared actual innocence to be an issue
cognizable under § 2254 except as it pertains to the imposition of a death
penalty. 450 Instead, the Court has considered whether an assertion of
actual innocence should allow the consideration of other claims of
constitutional or federal law violation despite the presumed bar of
procedural default fashioned from both the Court's doctrine on restriction
of habeas access and the AEDPA.451
443. See C. RONALD HUFF, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1996).

444. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 775-77, 780 (2007).
445. See DNA Exoneration, supra note 298.
446. Exonerations by Race and Crime, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/speciallexoneration/Pages/ExonerationsRaceByCrime.aspx
(last visited Sept. 27, 2017); see also Emily Homrok, SpeakOut: How Often Do Wrongful
Convictions Involve Black Defendants?, TRUTH OUT (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.truthout.org/speakout/item/25848-how-often-do-wrongful-convictions-involve-Black-defendants.
447. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005).
448. Innocence Project, Leading Causes of Wrongful Convictions, NAACP,
http://www.naacp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IP%2OWrongful%20Convictions%20Fac
ts%20and%20Causes.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
449. Gross et al., supranote 447, at 544.
450. See generally Murray, 477 U.S. at 478.
451. See generally Schlup, 513 U.S. at 298.
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The issue of actual innocence, as a gateway to consideration of
otherwise procedurally defaulted claims, as set forth in Schlup, was
revisited in House v. Bell 4 52 after enactment of the AEDPA. In House, the
petitioner's claim for federal habeas corpus relief was denied at the
district court level because of procedural default regarding his assertion
of ineffective assistance

of counsel and prosecutorial

misconduct.

Summary judgment against House was granted despite the fact that the
petitioner presented significant new evidence, not presented at trial, of
forensic evidence showing unreliability of the state's blood analysis and
scientific evidence showing that House was not the source of the DNA
samples used in trial against him. 453

The Court re-affirmed the Schlup exception to procedural bar, which
indicated that when a petitioner establishes that it is more likely than
not, in light of new evidence, "that no reasonable juror would have found
the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," 454 then he is entitled to

pass through procedural default "gateway" and to have his otherwise
uncognizable habeas corpus claims heard on the merits. 45 5 The Court
concluded that the AEDPA is not a bar to the consideration of a protection
against a miscarriage of justice.4 56 The Act's provisions, which allow
consideration of what would, under the Act, be considered successive,
abusive, or defaulted sentence-related claims, only if such claims met the
stricter standard and only if the petitioner "shows by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable
juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under
the applicable state law,"45 7 were inapplicable to the consideration of

defaulted claims in a first petition. 458
In McQuiggin v. Perkins,459 the Court had the occasion to broaden the
concept of actual innocence as a basis for a petitioner to present claims
for determination on the merits, despite the restricting language of the
AEDPA.460 McQuiggin addressed the question of whether the 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D)461 one-year statute of limitations will prevent a petitioner
from seeking habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel

452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

547 U.S. 518 (2006).
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 536-37.
Id.
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id.
133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013).
Id. at 1928.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2017).
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where the petitioner also asserts actual innocence. 462 Perkins filed for
federal habeas corpus relief more than eleven years after his conviction
became final. 4 6 3 Although it is unclear if the petitioner offered any
rationale for failing to file within one year of his conviction becoming final
as required by § 2244(d)(1)(D), it may well be supposed that he, like many
imprisoned, poor, and disproportionately minority defendants, did not
have access beyond his "appeal as of right" to the advice of appointed
counsel-particularly counsel willing to examine the handling of his case
not reflected in the trial record. Such issues and circumstances are the
backbone of postconviction relief and are particularly suitable for
determination in settings that allow an evidentiary hearing. Inmates,
without the resources and education to understand the finer points and
requirements of the AEDPA, must often rely on the assistance and
"jailhouse lawyer" advice of other inmates. 4 64
Perkins presented three affidavits with his petition for habeas corpus
relief, the most recent of which was obtained in 2002 and the earliest of
which was from 1997, but after the date of his trial, all tended to show
that the State's chief witness, Jones, was the actual killer. Presumably,
the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of his
trial counsel failing to fully investigate or present this evidence of actual
innocence at trial.46 5 This case presented an issue of the impact of actual
innocence evidence on procedural default that went beyond the Court's
previous consideration in Holland v. Florida,466 of the AEDPA statute of
limitations. 467 In Holland, the Court determined that the doctrine of
"equitable tolling" allows a petitioner to avoid the restriction of the oneyear statute of limitation if the petitioner could show that the petitioner
had diligently pursued his or her rights and that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in the way of timely filing. 468 Perkins met neither of
the two prongs of Holland'sequitable-tolling test.4 6 9 Instead, the Court,

relying on the principle of avoiding a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice," recognized not a "tolling," but an "equitable exception" that
allows, in the presence of evidence of actual innocence, for timeliness in
filing to be treated not as an absolute barrier, but as a factor to be

462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.

McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.
Id. at 1929.
See generally Johnson, 393 U.S. at 483.
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1929.
560 U.S. 631 (2010).
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.
Holland, 560 U.S. at 649.
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1936.
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considered in determining whether actual innocence has reliably been
shown sufficient to meet the high burden and standard of Schlup.470
Despite the modifications of House, Holland, and McQuiggin, the
statute of limitations provision of the AEDPA still represents a major
injustice for the wrongly convicted. 471 The sad irony for the
disproportionately black and brown wrongly convicted is that the
imposition of any statute of limitations on the right of any innocent
person to seek redress in federal habeas corpus for their wrongful
confinement flies in the face of the very origin of modern habeas corpus
authority-created and enacted in response to racial injustice. 472
The shortcomings of the Court's approach include barriers that are
"too restrictive and fail to alleviate the injustice done to time-barred
prisoners with valid claims of innocence." 473 Requiring that an innocent
person's claim be "extraordinary" eliminates many prisoners' claims that,
while not appearing extraordinary on paper, would be particularly
compelling if the innocent, mostly pro se litigant could just have his or
her day in court to present in-person evidence of their innocence. This is
the truest meaning of the concept and purpose of "produce the body"the literal translation of habeas corpus.
In order to take advantage of either the tolling or exemption doctrines,
pro se petitioners must turn to "new reliable evidence" not presented at
trial. 474 It is a particularly unrealistic expectation that many
incarcerated, and mainly-pro se, wrongly convicted persons can

470. Id. at 1933-34. Without deciding that such a standard was met, a sharply divided
Court (5-4) vacated the Sixth Circuit's denial of relief and remanded the case for further
consideration. Id. at 1928.
471. See Brandon Segal, Habeas Corpus, Equitable Tolling, and AEDPA's Statute of
Limitations: Why the Schlup v. Delo Gateway Standardfor Claims ofActual Innocence Fails
to Alleviate the Plight of Wrongfully Convicted Americans, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 225 (2008).
472. As Segal points out,
After the Civil War, Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, "which
gave state prisoners the right to file habeas petitions in federal court." No
statutes of limitations were imposed during this development of habeas corpus
jurisprudence. A prisoner who was "restrained of his or her liberty in violation
of the constitution" could seek redress in federal court, buttressed by the
protection that except in very limited and unusual circumstances, the "Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended."
Id. at 229-30 (footnotes omitted).
473. Id. at 246.
474. Segal points out that as regards to Schlup, the lower courts were split as to whether
this requirement meant "newly discovered" or merely "newly presented" evidence. See
Wright v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 581, 590-91 (5th Cir. 2006); Segal, supra note 471, at 24849. The subsequent decisions through McQuiggin do not answer the question.
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"satisfactorily perform investigations, secure post-conviction DNA
[results], or analyze physical evidence." 475
Considering, as evidenced by the cases before the Court discussed
above, that a significant portion, if not the majority, of constitutional
complaints seeking to go through the "gateway" involve claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, it is even more unlikely that an actually
innocent person could effectively analyze the decision-making,
preparation efforts, and other performances of the attorney in order to
know or understand what evidence was not presented or discovered.
Professor Todd E. Pettys's conceptualization of the problem associated
with the use of the "miscarriage of justice" requirement points out the
disconnect between what the Court perceives as a miscarriage and the
discomfort that a large part of society would feel if it realized that the
innocent are without realistic access to habeas corpus. 476
The net effect of the Court's approach to actual innocence is to leave
the vast majority of actually innocent, disproportionately-minority
prisoners without the opportunity to have their claims heard in federal
habeas corpus because of the inability to pass through a procedural
gateway; a gateway not created by the United States Constitution, but
477
by legislative and judge-created fiat.

475. Segal, supra note 471, at 248.
476. Professor Pettys writes:
Suppose that the best a death row prisoner can show with new evidence is that
there is a fifty-fifty chance that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.
A federal court applying the Schlup standard would refuse to forgive any
procedural defects that had saddled the prisoner's efforts to secure habeas relief,
and would refuse to adjudicate the merits of the prisoner's constitutional claims.
Yet a large segment of the public undoubtedly would feel profoundly disquieted
if they believed there was a fifty-fifty chance that a person whose constitutional
rights may have been violated, and who was about to be executed, was actually
innocent of any crime. Indeed, the constitutional requirement that a person's
guilt be proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt is based, in part, on the need
to assure the public that those who have been convicted are deserving of
punishment ....

Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2313, 2350 (2007).
477. The Amicus Brief of Former Prosecutors and Professors of Criminal Justice, filed
in House, noted that a study of Schlup decisions between 1995 and 2005 shows that only
9.2% of the petitions successfully met the actual innocence standard. The Risinger study
indicated that, in 2008, approximately 46,000 actually innocent persons were incarcerated.
See supra note 444. This would suggest over 41,000 of the 46,000 actually innocent
defendants, assuming procedural default, would be shut out of habeas corpus review under
the AEDPA.
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VI. CONCLUSION: RACIAL JUSTICE AND FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS POSTCONVICTION RELIEF: NOW AND THE FUTURE

Nancy J. King and Joseph L. Hoffman have set forth a detailed review
of the past, present, and what they argue to be the future of federal
habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy for those convicted pursuant
to state law. 478 King and Hoffman's central premise is that habeas corpus
for the twenty-first century has radically changed from the days of the
Warren Court. 479 The civil rights crisis, as reflected in criminal
procedure, at the heart of the Warren Court's concern is one that King
and Hoffman posit has "long since passed." 480 The authors contend that
the Warren Court battle was largely fought over defining the source of

rights protection and the concomitant role of the federal courts in setting
the parameters of those rights.48 1 They also contend that, despite some
"disagreements" over scope, the debate is largely over. 482 The end has
come about, so it is claimed, by virtue of states having adopted "modern
appellate and post convictions remedies" that allow adequate access to
state court review of claims of federal constitutional error.48 3 By contrast,
the low rate of success of post-AEDPA petitions is used to suggest that it
is a less-effective remedy. 484

478. See generally NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTYFiRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011).

479. Id. at 55. King and Hoffman write:
The Warren Court's transformation of habeas corpus was deeply interwoven
with the Court's extension to state criminal defendants of most of the
constitutional protections already enjoyed by federal defendants under the Bill
of Rights. From the late 1930s through the 1950s, the Court gradually became
convinced that criminal "justice" was woefully lacking in many communities.
Treatment of poor and minority defendants that would be considered appalling
and illegal under federal standards was standard practice in many state courts.

Id.
480. Id. at 64-66.
481. Id. at 65. The authors assert that the Warren Court actually waged a second battle
of federalism; citing to the late nineteenth century, and in particular to the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867, as the "first war," in which habeas is "an individual remedy for any prisoner
whose federal rights were trampled was never truly realized." Id. at 50, 65.
482. Id. at 65-66.
483. Id. at 88.
484. Id. at 75. This is a curious argument considering the authors point out that the rate
of success is severely impacted by the tremendous procedural obstacles discussed above and
which follow the limiting intent of the AEDPA. As the authors state,
For all but a very small proportion of the millions of those convicted of crime
every year in the United States, the Great Writ is a pipe dream. It is available
only to those prisoners whose prison sentences are so long that they are still in
custody even after the state courts have finished reviewing, and rejecting, their
constitutional claims.
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King and Hoffman speculate that "[t]he microscopically low rate of
habeas relief might also mean that there are hardly any meritorious
claims left to grant after the prisoner has had his chance at state judicial
review." 485 That interpretation presupposes that the states are actually

adjudicating the claims and does not account for claims not raised by
procedural default that are more the fault of trial counsel, stem from
ignorance, or discovered only after the case is no longer pending on
appeal of those forced to pursue claims pro se. It is also unclear whether
there is data to support this conclusion.
King and Hoffman paint a very dim, even if realistic, future for habeas
corpus as a postconviction remedy. They suggest that the remedy, in light
of restrictions discussed earlier, should largely be available only in
capital cases and cases for claims of actual innocence. 486 That view
coincides with the approach that the Court has taken post-AEDPA, but
does not answer whether the "Great Writ" should be so limited. In their
work, King and Hoffman recognize the historic importance of remedying
manifest injustice as a foundational goal of habeas corpus. 487 In that
regard, there is hardly any conviction that can be more of a "miscarriage
of justice" than one that is obtained from, and is tainted with, racial
injustice.
The court recognized this in Rose. In Rose, the defendants were
convicted in Tennessee of murder based on an indictment handed down
by a grand jury where the defendants alleged an African-American was
precluded from serving as the foreperson. 488 Although it is unclear
Id.
485. Id. at 83.
486. See id. at 91-107.
487. Id. at 62-63. Regarding the limitations of Sykes, King and Hoffman note that the
petitioners unable to meet the cause-and-prejudice standard might still overcome a
procedural default if "the petitioner [can] demonstrate a 'fundamental miscarriage of
justice' by proving that it was more likely than not that he was innocent of the crime and
that he was convicted as a result of the alleged constitutional violation[s]." Id. at 63
(footnote omitted). Although the authors recognize the historical importance of a
miscarriage of justice claim, the burden on the defendant is now much higher than "more
likely than not." Id.
488. 443 U.S. at 547. Tennessee used the much discredited "key man" system for
selection of the grand jury members. Under this system, grand jurors are selected by three
jury commissioners. The judge then appointed the foreman. The importance of the foreman
is demonstrated by the following:
Included among the duties of the foreman are assisting and advising the district
attorney in investigating crime, supplying the names of witnesses, issuing
subpoenas, administering oaths to witnesses, and indorsing and signing
indictments. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-1510, 40-1706 (1975). The foreman serves
as the thirteenth member of the grand jury "having equal power and authority
in all matters coming before the grand jury with the other members thereof."
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whether the system for selection of all grand jurors was challenged, the
defendants unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the indictments, as
regards to the selection of the foreman, based on the Equal Protection
Clause. Subsequently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals denied relief and
the Tennessee Supreme Court denied certiorari.4 89
The Court took up the matter of the defendants' pro se federal habeas
corpus petition. 490 The Court examined the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the
district court's dismissal of the petition. 491 The Court considered two
issues critical to the role of habeas corpus in addressing issues of racial
justice. 492 First, the Court considered whether a trial and conviction
without alleged procedural error rendered a claim of racial
discrimination in the grand jury indictment process moot or harmless. 493
Second, the Court analyzed whether the issue of racial discrimination in
the selection of the grand jury foreman was cognizable in federal habeas
corpus where there had arguably been a full and fair litigation of the
issue in the state court. 494
As to the issue of harmless error, the Court had to consider the

application of its longstanding principle that a conviction obtained by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt cures any error that may have
resulted from the determination of probable cause by the grand jury,
so long as the indictment was valid on its face and the product of a
legally constituted grand jury. 495 The Court's response was that the
elimination of racial discrimination in our criminal justice system is a
value that transcends issues of the procedural fairness of the trial
itself or possible prejudice regarding the jury's determination. 496 The
Court, in very strong terms, stated "Discrimination on the basis of
race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the
administration of justice. Selection of members of a grand jury because

Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 5, Rose, 443 U.S. 545 (No. 771701).
489. Rose, 443 U.S. at 549.
490. Id. at 550.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 550-51.
494. Id. at 551.
495. Id. at 552. Although the Court in Rose could have couched its discussion more
sharply along the lines that racial discrimination in the selection of the foreman meant that
the grand jury was not legally constituted, the Court instead went directly at the
commitment to eliminating racism in the criminal justice system. See id. at 551. Contra
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956).
496. Rose, 443 U.S. at 551.

2018]

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

527

they are of one race and not another destroys the appearance of justice
and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process."4 97
Particularly significant for purposes of this Article is the importance
that the Court placed on the availability of § 2254 actions for addressing
racial discrimination. 498 Even though there are systemic costs to making
habeas corpus available to combat racism, the Court, just two years after
Sykes, decided that those costs do not outweigh the "strong policy the
Court consistently has recognized of combatting racial discrimination in
the administration of justice."49 9
As to the second issue, the Court declined to extend Stone to
allegations of racial discrimination despite the fact that there were factfinding hearings at the state level.500 As noted in Rose, the Court in Stone
held that Fourth Amendment claims, raised by way of application of the
exclusionary rule, were not justiciable in habeas corpus if such claims
had already been fully and fairly litigated at the state level.501 Claims of
racial discrimination directed against the court system itself differ from
application of an exclusionary rule which seeks to deter the out-of-court
actions of police officers. 502 The Court cast doubt on the ability of state
courts to fully and fairly litigate complaints as to its own behavior. 503
Using language reminiscent of the Warren Court's civil rights agenda for
the criminal justice system, the Court in Rose declared, "There is strong

.

497. Id. at 555-56. The Court stated,
As this Court repeatedly has emphasized, such discrimination "not only violates
our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government." . .
[D]iscrimination on the basis of race in the selection of members of a grand jury
thus strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial system and our society as
a whole ....

Id.
498. The Court further stated,
We think the better view is to leave open the route that over time has been the
main one by which Fourteenth Amendment rights in the context of grand jury
discrimination have been vindicated. For we also cannot deny that, 114 years
after the close of the War Between the States and nearly 100 years after
Strauder, racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of life, in
the administration of justice as in our society as a whole. Perhaps today that
discrimination takes a form more subtle than before. But it is not less real or
pernicious. We therefore decline "to reverse a course of decisions of long standing
directed against racial discrimination in the administration of justice . . ..
Id. at 558-59 (emphasis omitted).
499. Id. at 558.
500. Id. at 564.
501. Id. at 560.
502. Id. at 561.
503. Id.
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reason to believe that federal review would indeed reveal flaws not
appreciated by state judges perhaps too close to the day-to-day operation
of their system to be able properly to evaluate claims that the system is
defective."50 4
Although the petitioners in Rose were unable to convince the Court
that discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreman actually
existed, the approach of the Court in recognizing the preeminent role that
federal habeas corpus, as a postconviction relief, should play regarding
claims of racism set perhaps a model for the future of habeas corpus in
the post-AEDPA world. In recent years, both the Court and the AEDPA
recognize that procedural barriers should not stand in the way of
addressing manifest injustice. Rose is still good law and recognizes that
racial injustice is manifest injustice.
The future of federal habeas corpus should recognize the issues of
racial discrimination in the adjudicative process as issues going to the
fundamental principles of our legal system, and should constitute a
waiver of any procedural defaults that might prevent federal court
examination in habeas corpus. This is, in essence, what the Court did in
Rose when it did not let claims of harmless error or full and fair litigation
deter it from meritorious determination of the fundamental issue.
Most recently, the future suggested above has become a present
reality, if we can take guidance from the per curiam pronouncement of
the Court, issued at the beginning of 2918, in Tharpe v. Sellers.505 Racial
justice is at the heart of the Court's decision to not let procedural default
under the "cause and prejudice" standard to blind the Court to the odious
imposition of a death penalty where a clear expression of racism was at
the core of that decision.50 6
In Tharpe, the petitioner, who is black, was convicted by a Georgia jury
and sentenced to death for the 1990 murder of his sister-in-law.5 0 7 More
than seven years following his conviction, lawyers for the Petitioner
obtained an affidavit from a white trial juror named Gattie who swore
the following regarding Tharpe:
"[T]here are two types of black people: 1. Black folks and 2. Niggers";
that Tharpe, "who wasn't in the 'good' black folks category in my book,
504. Id. at 563.
505. 583 S. Ct. 545 (2018) (per curium).
506. While remaining unconvinced that the procedural default barriers in this case have
been overcome, Justice Thomas, in dissent, nonetheless recognizes the significance that the
majority places on racial justice: "In bending the rules here to show its concern for a black
capital inmate, the Court must think it is showing its concern for racial justice." Id. at 547
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
507. Id.

2018]

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

529

should get the electric chair for what he did"; that "[slome of the jurors
voted for death because they felt Tharpe should be an example to other
blacks who kill blacks, but that wasn't my reason"; and that, "[a]fter
studying the Bible, I have wondered if black people even have souls."
App. B to Pet. for Cert. 15-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).508
Gattie later claimed to have been drunk when he gave the statement,
and in a state post-conviction hearing ten other jurors proclaimed that
their decision was not influenced by race.509 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court found error in the Eleventh Circuit denial of a Certificate of
Appealability based on the conclusion that jurists of reason could not
dispute that the District Court's procedural ruling was correct.510
The Court reasoned that the prior court determinations were
essentially based on the existence or non-existence of prejudice.5 11 The
Court noted, however, that prejudice is not the only issue in determining
whether a certificate of appealability from the District Court's ruling was
proper. 512 The Court, clearly shocked by the racist vitriol of Gattie's
statement, found that such presented "extraordinary circumstances" 513
entitling Tharpe to at least having an opportunity to show that jurist of
reason could disagree whether the District Court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to re-open the habeas corpus proceedings. 514
The recognition of the need for a racial justice component to justiciable
issues and procedural default exceptions stands as a direct counterpoint
to the future of habeas corpus analysis of King and Hoffman. King and
Hoffman see the future need of federal habeas corpus review of state
convictions as limited largely because, in their view, the state judicial
system provides an adequate forum for the protection of procedural
rights. A case can be made, however, that there is less reason to believe
508. Id. at 546 (majority opinion).
509. Id. at 548 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
510. Id. at 546 (majority opinion).
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. See id. (quoting Gonzales v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536 (2005)). The petitioner also
asserts the presence of racism as an extraordinary circumstance by relying on the Court's
earlier decision in Buck, which allowed consideration in habeas corpus of the petitioner's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel following his attorney's assertion that AfricanAmericans were more likely to commit crime. 137 S. Ct. at 759; Tharpe, 138 S. Ct. at 549
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
514. Tharpe, 138 S. Ct. at 546 (majority opinion). The Court's majority admittedly states
that Tharpe will have a high burden to meet in order to be successful regarding his motion
to overturn the district court's determination. Id. Justice Thomas, in dissent (joined by Alito
and Gorsuch), concludes that it is a waste of time given the testimony of ten jurors that
race played no role in their decision and Gattie's later denial of his affidavit based on
intoxication. See id. at 552-53 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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that states have or will be adequate for the procuring of racial justice
with the presence of federal habeas corpus postconviction relief.
The King and Hoffman position that the role of federal habeas corpus
as postconviction review, which has largely seen its day, depends on
acceptance of the conclusion that state appellate and postconviction
review procedures are serving as adequate protection for constitutionally
protected rights. There may be room for serious doubt as to whether such
state avenues serve as a bulwark against racial injustice.
We are now fifty years plus since the landmark habeas corpus decision
in Gideon. Yet, the states' inability to provide meaningful counsel to poor
and minority defendants may be making a mockery of that decision. In

Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida v. Florida,515 the
Miami-Dade County public defender sought authority to be relieved of its
statutory obligation to provide appointed counsel, in a wide range of
non-capital cases, because inadequate public defender funding created
case overloads and resulted in attorneys being inadequately prepared for
trial. A Florida statute prohibited appointed counsel withdrawing on the
ground of excessive caseload.5 16 In a decision that is somewhat confusing,
the Florida Supreme Court granted the motions to withdraw, but at the
same time, denied the constitutionality challenge to the statute
prohibiting withdrawal.5 17 While this decision may let the public
defender "off the hook," it does little to ensure that the defendant actually
receives competent counsel.
The crisis of ineffective assistance of counsel, at the heart of virtually
every case discussed above, is greater today than ever before.518 The
evidence would appear to be significant that the states are not adequately
protecting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. When the racial
imbalance in our criminal justice system is factored in, the failure of the
state to provide the resources for effective assistance of counsel becomes
an issue of racial justice.51 9
Wrongful identification is both an issue of actual innocence and racial
justice. Earlier it was noted that the most common cause of wrongful
conviction is eyewitness misidentification. 520 Numerous studies have
indicated that when it comes to matters of race, cross-racial identification
515. 115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013).
516. Id. at 264-65.
517. Id. at 265.
518. See David Rudovsky, Gideon And The Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric
and The Reality, 32 L. & INEQ.: J. THEORY & PRAC. 371 (2014); see, e.g., National Right to
Counsel Committee, The Constitution Project, JusticeDenied:America's ContinuingNeglect
of our ConstitutionalRight to Counsel, CONSTITUTION PROJECT (2009).
519. See Marcus, supra note 304.
520. See Exonerations by Race, supra note 446.
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is often unreliable and wrong. 52 1 It has principally been the federal
habeas corpus decisions in cases such as Manson v. Brathwaite522 and
Neil v. Biggers 523 that have sought to provide some level of due process in
challenging unreliable eyewitness identification but, as noted in the
Connelly article,
Not all state supreme courts have agreed that it is their role to reform
eyewitness identifications. For example, the Washington Supreme
Court held in State v. Allen 524 that a defendant's due process rights

are not violated if the trial court refuses to instruct jurors on
cross-racial eyewitness identifications....
As of 2008, the only states that require or authorize a jury instruction
on cross-racial identifications are California, Utah, Massachusetts,
and New Jersey. 525
This Article began by noting the concern of President Obama over
racially-disproportionate mass incarceration. The most immediate road
sign pointing to this imbalance concerns incarceration sentences. In
relatively recent times, federal doctrine and delineation regarding
constitutional responsibility in sentencing has led to a massive revision
of constitutional considerations regarding the right to jury trial and proof
of all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court in Apprendi v. New
Jersey526 recognized a constitutional framework for sentencing
considerations that had previously been left to the unfettered discretion
of the trial judge. Considering that in the seventeen years since Apprendi
racial disparity in state sentences has not appreciably improved, a
continued strong presence of federal review through habeas corpus would
appear to be warranted in the interest of racial justice.
The above suggests that the issue of racial injustice is still of such
importance in our criminal justice system that we should be required to
recognize that the work of the Warren Court in this area of the civil rights
struggle is not finished. The future of postconviction relief through
federal habeas corpus is still so important that continuing to provide
access and the removal of barriers still needs to be a priority if we are to

521. See John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial
Identifications,28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2001); Laura Connelly, Cross-RacialIdentifications:
Solutions to the "They All Look Alike" Effect, 211MICH. J. RACE & L. 125 (2015).
522. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
523. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
524. 294 P.3d 679 (2013).
525. Connelly, supra note 521, at 135-36 (footnotes omitted).
526. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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effectively do anything about what President Obama called a "long
history of inequity in the criminal justice system of America." 527

527. Remarks by the President,supra note 1.

